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ABSTRACT
Alignment in Pakistan's Foreign Policy: 1954-19 77.
A study in International Relations. Arif Hassan Syed.
Thesis submitted for the Degree of Ph.D., University of 
Surrey.
The main aim of this study is to examine and analyse 
the element of alignment in Pakistan's foreign policy.
The study demonstrates that the various bilateral and 
multilateral defensive arrangements with which Pakistan be­
came involved proved to be counter-productive, and detrimental 
to the territorial integrity and political independence of 
Pakistan.
The study further analyses the divergent interests of 
the signatories, and the differences implied therein. Paki­
stan basically joined these arrangements to safeguard its 
territorial integrity and political independence, especially 
against India.
The study further reveals that these military pacts 
proved to be useless and Pakistan's allies refused to help 
Pakistan in its hour of need in 1965 and 19 71, and Pakistan 
was allowed to be dismembered in 1971. Pakistan, as a result 
reappraised its international commitments, and as a matter
of principle opted out of these military pacts which had
( \\ /
lost their significance. Fundamentaljmisconceptions of the 
purpose of alliances were the cause of failure; for the
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United States the pacts were part of the policy of containing 
the Communist powers,while for Pakistan they implied a 
guarantee of territorial integrity.
Pakistan decided to follow a more realistic foreign 
policy,and as a result, started to draw closer to the non- 
aligned movement,and eventually joined the movement as a 
full member.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The term international relations, in its broadest 
traditional sense, denotes relations among the autonomous 
politico-territorial organisations or states, or among in­
dividual members of such units. On the collective level, 
such relations may be political, economic, cultural or mili­
tary; they can comprise many kinds of individual relations 
involving members of different nations. Thus international 
relations, within this context, denote political relation­
ships and embrace, all collective and individual relations 
which impinge upon the political position of a state vis-a- 
vis other states. The term in this sense is synonomous with 
foreign policy, "Most studies in 'world politics' or inter­
national politics have, in fact, been studies of foreign pol­
icy, where policy is defined as the decision that defines 
goals, set procedures, or lay down course of action, and the 
actions taken to implement those decisions ... As distinct from 
international politics and foreign policy, the term inter­
national relations may refer to all forms of interaction be­
tween the members of separate societies, whether government- 
sponsored or not. International relations would include the 
analysis of foreign policies or political processes between 
nations, but with its interests in all facets of relations 
between distinct societies .... "^
1. Holsti,K.J. International Politics: A Framework For 
Analysis, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1972, p.21
- 6 -
b u r  M  2
52
CDH*
O'o£
m
- 7 -
Pakistan 
and 
its
The concept of international relations is as old as 
political history itself, and has shown throughout the ages 
constant patterns of relationships and policies, whether 
devised and practised by monarchies, aristocracies, or dem­
ocracies, cities or nation states, continental empires or 
tiny principalities. The consistency of patterns beneath the 
variety of historic manifestations makes both historic under­
standing and theoretical analysis of international relations 
possible. As a result one is in a position to understand and 
appreciate the development of the Greek city-states, the 
Indian political philosophy or the Islamic ideology. By 
detecting in the international relations of different cultures 
and historic periods identical responses to identical challenges, 
one is able to develop certain theoretical assumptions about 
international relations regardless of time and place.
The dynamic force that moulds international relations 
is to be found in the aspirations for power of independent 
political entities. These aspirations crystallize into three 
basic patterns, (i) to keep power, (ii) to increase power, 
and (iii) to demonstrate power. In the context of this classi­
fication three distinct policy patterns emerge: the policy of
status quo, the policy of imperialism and the policy of 
2prestige. The clash of these policy patterns leads to an 
unending struggle for power which characterizes all inter­
national relations. As such the concept of power and the 
struggle for power unquestionably leads to the balance of
2. See Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, A.Knopf, N.Y. 
1973, pp.41-100
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power through which nations endeavour to maintain the status 
quo individually or collectively. Independent political 
entities strive to pursue their respective goals in conjunction 
with other nations, and as a result embark upon a policy of 
alignment (the participation of Pakistan in the bilateral 
and multilateral defensive arrangements is a classical case 
in point) . If and when states have taken a decision in princ­
iple, to use force or the threat of force to pursue their ends 
then there ensues a race which often can lead to an open and 
violent conflict. Moreover, nations endeavour to justify 
and rationalise their policies, position and actions, in 
struggle for power by reference to universal values typically 
of a moral nature, and nations as such develop political 
ideologies.
Pakistan emerged, in 1947, as an independent state at 
the time when British and European Imperialism was crumbling, 
and the United States had emerged as one of the two most 
powerful states in the world claiming its respective sphere 
of influence. The era of Cold War had started and the world 
was basically divided into two power-blocks, and as such 
Bipolarism had been established. This Bipolar system dominated 
from 1944 to 195 8, and encouraged the Domino Theory.
According to Karl Deutsch governments that must contin­
ually prove their will and capacity to fight probably do not 
have enough prestige for the policies they are engaged in.
An insufficiency of prestige, like a lack of credit in the
- 9 _
3bank, is no trifling matter.
The sum of government's commitments is often much larger 
than the sum of its resources, and if government promises 
more than it can deliver, the result is something like a run 
on a bank, which is a ready recipe for unrest or revolution. 
Something similar can happen in foreign policy,too. Even an 
awsomely mighty and wealthy nation's government may enter into 
so many commitments to defend, develop, or control so many 
different colonies, satellites or weak allies, that it may 
simply not have the wherewithal to do so if its power in more 
than a few of them should be challenged by local uprisings, 
outside attacks, infiltrations, or combinations of all these.
Here again nations or governments may find themselves over­
committed, vulnerable to any real serious crisis in their 
prestige that might precipitate a run by their client countries 
on all their committments and promises.
To some of the rulers of that great power, their allies
and clients may then come to take on the aspect of a row of
dominoes, which may fall concurrently or consecutively; and 
if any one of these smaller states or regimes should fall 
because it lacks trust in its great protector, they fear, all 
the others will fall with it. In this way, the "row of
dominoes" image often has its roots in a preceding over­
extension and overcommitment of resources and prestige on the 
part of some metropolitan power. It is axiomatic to state
3. Deutsch,K.W. The Analysis of International Relations, Prentice 
Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968, pp.43-44
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that the beginning of an empire is the very beginning of its 
end.
There is no denying the fact that the former Colonial 
Empires did keep contact with their former colonies or terri­
tories (the Commonwealth of Nations is a case in point) but 
it would also be correct to suggest that their influence has 
been diminishing and their hold waning with the passage of 
time. Some of the former Colonial Empires met humiliating 
defeat e.g., France at Dien Bien Phu; and their successors 
who went into Vietnam in the name of democracy and freedon 
had to sign a peace treaty with North Vietnam whose forces 
then swept southwards and conquered South Vietnam and created 
a united Vietnam. The massive military machine of the Viet­
namese was later used against Kampuchea (Cambodia) and to 
hold sway over Laos. Could Thailand be the next domino?
The emergence of General Charles de Gaulle in France in 
19 58, and the assertion by the newly emergent states of their 
existence set in motion the concept of Multipolarity. The 
emergence of the People's Republic of China, as a potential 
super-power, has given credence to the new concept,* the con­
cept has been further strengthened by the ever increasing 
influence of the non-aligned states.
Political subdivisions may itself contain, therefore, 
impediments to self-fulfilment and may interact unfavourably 
with other components of the variable character of places and 
areas, and thus augment the adverse or beneficial effects 
that these other components may have upon human material 
welfare.
- 12 -
A man's lot depends to a certain extent upon the en­
vironments in which he lives, the environmental effect being 
the total impact upon him at any time and through time of 
the variable character of places near or far.
One cannot over-emphasise the importance of distance as 
an important element in the field of international relations 
or geopolitics. It is important to note that distance has 
shrunk in this day and age; in this sense technology has made 
distance meaningless. But at the same time one cannot ignore 
the fact that the Americans were at a disadvantage in Viet­
nam, and on the other hand both Chinese and Russians enjoyed 
the benefits of proximity to the actual theatre of war.
In the Cuban cirisis distance must have played an important 
role when the decision making process was taking place in 
the Kremlin. Again proximity or otherwise played a vital 
role in the context of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan 
in December, 19 79. It may not be out of place to suggest 
here that in the light of discussion in the preceding pages, 
Pakistan might well be the next domino; one must not rule 
out Iran from the "row of dominoes".
Geopolitics is the science of the relation of politics 
to geography. Richard Hartshorne has defined it "as the study 
of areal differences and similarities in political character 
as an interrelated part of the total complex of areal differ­
ences and similarities. The interpretation of area differences
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in political features involves the study of this inter-
4
relation with all other relevant areal variations...."
The subject matter of geopolitics is derived from pol­
itical geography, history and military strategy. In the op­
inion of geopoliticians the strength or weakness of a state 
depends to a large extent on geographical factors e.g., location, 
size, shape, topography, natural resources, manpower, industrial 
potential and political organization. Geopoliticians, I be­
lieve, can very effectively speculate and chalk out the course 
of events in the life history of a given politico-territorial 
organization; and some of these conclusions have been auth­
enticated in the annals of history. The threat and use of 
naked power have enjoyed a significant position in international 
politics, and it would not be inappropriate to suggest here 
that power rests securely upon geographical foundations.
The position and power of a given state very much depends 
upon (a) what that state is in relation to people and national 
consciousness, (b) what does it possess in the shape of terri­
tory and natural resources, and (c) its position vis-a-vis 
other nation-states and their wealth.
In estimating the power potential of a given state or of 
a region one must examine its location, size, shape and bound­
aries, and learn as to how its natural resources rank in re­
lation to those of other political areas of the world.
4. Hartshorne, Richard, Politics and Geographic Relationships, 
W.A.D. ffackson, London, 1964, p.60
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Human resources include not only manpower but also 
those characteristics required to make manpower effective 
e.g., technical know-how, national cohesion, sources of energy 
resourcefulness, national traits and characteristics and the 
effectiveness of the government. The power and position of 
a state is measured by the degree to which it is able to 
achieve that which it desires. The sum total of these desires 
and objectives may be termed as its national interests. The 
means that a territorial society pursues to secure these ob­
jectives is known as national policy? domestic policy so far 
as it relates to internal affairs, and foreign policy as it 
relates to external relationships. The soundness, or lack 
of it, of a national policy may be effectively measured by 
the success with which it uses the national resources and 
energies to provide prosperity, amicability in foreign re­
lations, and the means to safeguard its territorial integrity 
and political independence.
Almost all. geopolitical concepts, however repugnant or 
untenable one may judge them to be, can contribute a measure 
of understanding of past and present trends in the behaviour 
and relations of states. The underlying premise of these 
postulates is that configuration of land and seas provides 
and sets limits within which the political relations of 
nations have evolved and will continue to evolve.
To appreciate, properly, the emergence of Pakistan as an 
independent state in 19 47, it should be noted here that "A 
state is an area organized politically in an effective manner 
by an indigenous, or resident, people with a government in
£ 15 -
effective control of the area. It is modern history's re-
5
pository of legitimate authority." The term state implies 
the mechanism of government through which the will of the 
state is formulated, expressed and exercised. In most modern 
states the people themselves have some bonds of union e.g., 
common objectives, common language, common heritage, common 
culture and common religion. These are some of the unifying 
elements within the state structure, and separate those people 
who possess different bonds of unity.
If and when the disparate elements within the state fail 
to achieve a semblance of national unity and cohesion then 
the very structure of the state-idea may be demolished, and 
the superstructure is bound to disappear and the state dis­
integrates. If the unifying bonds are allowed to flourish 
then national cohesion and unity would be achieved. Otherwise 
the polarisation of forces is likely to damage the fabric of 
the society, and as such the state itself is likely to be 
dismembered.
The basic centripetal force must be some concept or idea 
which seeks justification for the existence of a given state 
must have a raison d'etre. The forces of inertia, vested 
interests, and fear of the consequences of change may keep it 
going more or less effectively for some time, but if a state- 
structure has lost its original reason for existence then the 
state is likely to collapse. Those states are strongest in 
which the basic state-idea encompasses the entire body-politic.
5. Buehring,E.H. "Role of New States in International Politics" 
The Review, vol.8. pp.27-37, Indiana University, 1965
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Pakistan emerged as an independent political entity on 
the basis that the Muslims of India were a separate nation 
and as such entitled to a separate homeland. Jinnah expressed 
his views on the subject in the following manner: "It has 
always been taken for granted mistakenly that the Musalams are 
a minority. The Musalams are a nation by any definition,.... 
The problem in India is not of inter-communal character but 
manifestly of international one, and it must be treated as 5 
such....The Hindus and Muslims belong... to two different 
civilisations which are based on conflicting ideas and con­
ceptions .. .. " ^
The partition of the Sub-continent and the political
boundaries of Pakistan were established on the basis of the
Radcliffe Awards. Each of the two Commissions was "instructed
to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab/
Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority
areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will also
7
take into account other factors." This was inconformity 
with the Lahore Resolution which is popularly known as the 
Pakistan Resolution, passed on 2 3rd March, 1940, and asserted 
that "no constitutional plan would be workable in this country 
or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed on the follow­
ing basic principle, namely that geographically contiguous 
units...,be so constituted...,that the areas in which the 
Muslims are numerically in a majority as in north-western
6. M.A.Jinnah, Address to the All India Muslim League Session, 
Lahore, 1940
7. The Report of the Punjab Partition Committee, p.11,1947
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and north-eastern zones of India should be... autonomous and 
8sovereign." In this manner religion formed the raison d'etre 
of Pakistan's territoriality as an independent state.
However, the present territorial limits of Pakistan are
very much in conformity with the ideas of the poet-philosopher
Muhammad Iqbal when he wrote in 19 30, " I would like to see
the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan
amalgamated into a single state,. Self-government within the
British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West
Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the
9Muslims, at least of North-West India."
Religion was the main unifying force of the state-idea 
as it emerged in 1947, and appeared to hold very tenuous bonds 
between the distant, dislocated and distinct parts of Paki­
stan. In addition to religion as the reason for existence 
one may as well include the desire of the Muslims, in the 
North-east and North-west of British India, to achieve eco­
nomic independence, and the right to order their life free 
from economic suppression and exploitation, internally or 
externally. The objective, therefore, vras to establish a 
state in which the Muslims could forge their socio-economic 
and political development without the prospects of Hindu 
domination, and as such the newly emergent state had to be 
organised and administered with a view " ...to establish
8. Iqbal, Muhammad, Presidential Address to the All India 
Muslim League Session, Allahabad, 19 30
9. The Lahore Resolution which was passed on 2 3.3.1940 
(The All India Muslim League)
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complete and exclusive control over internal political re­
lations .... the creation and maintenance of law and order.
Local political institutions must conform with the concepts 
and institutions of the central, overall, political organiz­
ation....a state may tolerate considerable variation in its 
different regions... .there is a tendency...»to exert unifying 
control even over the institutions.... every state must strive 
to secure the supreme loyalty of the people in all its regions,
in competition with any local or provincial loyalties and in
10definite opposition to any outside state-unit."
If a state fails to achieve these ends and allows fissi- 
parous tendencies to flourish or does not effectively nip the 
evil of parochialism and sub-nationalism in the bud, then 
internal and external vested interests are bound to exploit 
these weaknesses within the state structure, and the secondary 
political groups i.e. political parties (such as the Awami 
League in the former East Pakistan, and now the defunct Nat­
ional Awami Party in West Pakistan) are likely to be used as 
vehicles of disruption and influence by the internal and ex­
ternal political groups. Most of the secondary groups operate 
largely in the advancement of interests of various non-political 
groups e.g. linguistic, religious, industrial, commercial and 
agricultural.
A state should formulate a policy of direction, and a 
framework of operation which is consonant with the state-idea,
10. Hartshorne, R. op cit. W.A.D. Jackson edition, p.86
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and must lead towards cohesion and away from disharmony and
disunity. The overriding priority of the state should be
that "all the regions of a state are clearly included under
the state-idea, and have complete loyalty to the overall
concepts of the national unit, regional differences inevitably
cause some differences in interpretation and implementation
of these concepts....If the differences are great, the attempt
to impose such a uniform system may provoke opposition en-
11dangering the national unity."
The Concept of State-Government in Islam
It is imperative to discuss in detail the concept of 
State-Government in Islam since religion formed the very 
raison d'etre of Pakistan as an independent state. It may 
be argued at the very outset that no form of state-government 
is prescribed in the Holy Quran. For obvious reasons Allah 
(God), having declared Himself to be the absolute Ruler and 
Sovereign of the entire universe, could not have appointed 
man as a ruler on the planet earth. Man could only be desig­
nated as His deputy.
In the universe God's government which is based on Adi 
justice is carried out by His angels but on the planet earth, 
this task has been entrusted to man, and for his guidance 
His Apostle has laid down the pattern. God sent Adam on this 
earth as His Khalifa or vicegerent (Al-Quran 11:30), and
11. ibid. p. 95
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directed him to follow His guidance (llif38). Allah promised 
to confer Khilafat (vicegerency) on the successors of Adam 
if they became believer's, and followed the righteous path,
"God has promised to those among you who believe and do 
righteous deeds that He will of a surety grant them in the Law, 
inheritance (of power) as He granted to those before them."
(XXXIV:55)
As such there can be no doubt that the Holy Prophet, be­
sides proclaiming His message had, in fact, established a 
government for administering the affairs of the state. Acc­
ording to the Holy Quran, legislative, executive and judicial 
powers were all vested in him; and as such he became the 
Khalifa-tullah (God's deputy) to proclaim and enforce the 
Laws of Allah on earth. Thus he was the first Head of the 
Islamic state; and he established the Kingdom of God (Hakumat- 
i-Illahia) on earth and acted merely as a Khalifa (deputy) of God, 
as the Holy Quran says, "It is He who hath made you His Khalifa, 
inheritor of the earth." (VI:165). Allah had commanded him, 
however, to work for a common consensus, while dealing with 
the affairs of the state. The Holy Quran says, "and consult 
them in the affairs of the moment. Then when thou hast taken
•k k
a decision put thy trust in God". (111:159).
The argument above has been the cardinal feature of the 
various constitutions of Pakistan since 1947, and the pre­
amble of each of those constitutions emphasised, "Whereas
** There are 30 Paras (parts), 114 Surahs and 62 36 Verses 
(Ayats) in the Koran (Quran).
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sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty
Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people
of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred
trust....Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their
lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance
with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in
12the Holy Quran and Sunnah. . . . "
The Prophet of Islam did consult men of knowledge and 
learning, but did not establish a regular Majlis-i-Shura 
(the consultative and advisory body) for this purpose. The 
state had a unitary form of government, and the emphasis 
was on centralism. The Prophet of Islam, however, never 
considered himself to be the ruler of the state; and he 
could not have done so, because the sovereignty of the heavens 
and earth belongs to Allah. The virtual ruler of the Islamic 
state was only a servant of God and had no superior rights 
than any other citizen of the state. The rule and exploit­
ation of man by man is repugnant to the very spirit of Islam.
A man is considered superior not because of his wealth, high
kkk
status or ancestry, but on the basis of "Taqwa" alone, 
"Verily, the most honoured of you in the sight of God is 
(he who is) the most righteous of you" (XLIX:13)
The Khalifa, therefore, is the central figure in the 
Islamic scheme of government. Just as Allah is the centre
12. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 19 73, 
East West Publishing Co. Lahore, 1974, p.l 
*** Taqwa-Abstinence-piety-fear of God.
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of the universe. Tauheed (unity) is the pivotal point of 
Islam, and the Khalifa is the shaft around which the edifice 
of the Islamic state revolves and is built. This is the 
pattern of government laid down by the Prophet of Islam, and 
this pattern of government was strictly adhered to by Khulafa- 
i-Rashdeen (the first four Caliphs) after the death of the 
Prophet.
There is a school of thought in Islam which argues that 
only the Prophets were the Khalifas of Allah and that the 
Khilafat (Caliphate) came to an end with the last of the Pro­
phets. They also argue that there was one Amir-ul-Momineen 
(leader of the believers)and the remaining successors were 
only administrative heads; and that these successors to the 
Prophet of Islam were merely Khalifa-tur-Rasul (deputies to 
the Prophet) or as "Ulul-Amre-Minkurn" (those who simply carried 
out the orders as laid out by the Prophet in "Sunnah" (practices) 
and the "Hadith" (sayings) of the Prophet in strict obedience 
of the Quranic injunctions). It is further argued that a head 
of the state should simply be called Amir-i-Mumlakat, and 
head of all the Amirs should be called as Amir-ul-Umara (Head 
of all the heads of states) or Khalifa. Since there are more 
than 45 states where Muslims reside in a considerable number, 
therefore, it is neither prudent nor possible to have such a 
person; especially after the indignities suffered by the 
Khalifa and the Sultan in the aftermath of the First World War.
The Holy Quran also confirms such a system and suggests 
that these Amirs will be the III u 1 - Amre - Mi nk urn, for whom
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obedience is prescribed, along with God and the Apostles, "Ye 
who believe, obey God and obey the Apostle,.and those charged 
with authority among you" (IV:59). The Holy Quran has clearly 
stated that if at any time, the elected Khalifa were to trans­
gress the limits of the Quran and Sunnah, the believers were 
empowered to remove and replace him.
It may be argued that the Islamic form of government is 
indeed unique and cannot be identified with any other form 
of government. It is neither monarchy nor dictatorship. It 
is also not theocracy. One cannot really call it democracy 
either parliamentary or presidential, but it would not be 
wrong to suggest that it is a mixture.
It is the government of Allah through the Divine Law, 
based upon "Adi" for the welfare of humanity, run by those 
Muslims who are worthy of being entrusted with administration, 
and who delegate their power to the Khalifa or the Amir who, 
in turn acts as the vicegerent of Allah and His trustee.
Only those persons are acceptable as Khalifas or Amirs who 
are well versed in the Quranic injunctions, Sunnah and the 
Hadith, and who are prepared to establish an Islamic form of 
government for the purpose of enforcing Nizam-i-Islam (Is­
lamic System), on the pattern set up by the Holy Prophet.
It was imperative to discuss the Islamic system and to 
emphasise its importance to a Muslim society, especially 
with reference to Pakistan since Islam was the very raison 
d'etre of Pakistan's territoriality. Pakistan was created
- 24 -
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on the basis of contiguous/majority areas in 1947, and pre­
cisely for this reason the two wings of Pakistan emerged as 
one single state in 1947? and religion, no matter how ten­
uous, was the most important link between the Former East 
Pakistan and West Pakistan.
Invariably all the constitutions of Pakistan emphasised 
the point that Pakistan would be an Islamic state; and that 
the people of Pakistan would be encouraged to lead their 
lives in accordance with the Quranic injunctions, Sunnah and the 
Hadith. Although only lip-service was paid to that effect by 
the various governments; and it was never given real import­
ance regarding the enactment of various laws.
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Chapter 2
East-West Pakistan: A Georolitical Distihctiveness
The external relations of Pakistan need to be studied 
in their proper context, and as such an analysis of its 
geo-political problems is highly desirable. Such a critical 
analysis would help a great deal in explaining the desire, 
on the part of Pakistan, to align itself with the West. 
Pakistan did not enter into the East/West '/ideological con­
flict until 1954, and on the whole adopted and pursued an 
independent foreign policy, especially with regard to the 
cold war. Pakistan's economic and geopolitical problems, 
however, forced it to seek friendship with the United States 
and its allies. Pakistan was deeply disturbed by the nega­
tive attitude that India seemed to have adopted towards 
Pakistan since the very inception of this nascent state.
Pakistan's geographic position was its worst enemy.
The two wings of Pakistan were totally dislocated, and were 
advocating different socio-economic and political policies; 
and the parts were too distant to achieve a meaningful and 
harmonious relationship. These geopolitical drawbacks, dis­
advantages and weaknesses were very effectively exploited 
by the internal and external vested interests, and eventually 
proved disastrous for the territorial integrity and political 
independence of Pakistan as it emerged in 1947.
A critical analysis of the geopolitical distinctiveness 
of the two wings of Pakistan would clearly demonstrate the 
inherent weaknesses of Pakistan, and establish the fact that 
the links between the two parts were very tenuous, and this
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link was unable to withstand the pressures from within. The 
fissiparous tendencies and the dissidents, with help from 
without, were successful in dismembering Pakistan in Decem­
ber, 1971.
Pakistan emerged a unique state in the terms of modern 
history because of her geographic discontiguity. The pop­
ulation of Pakistan in 1970-71 was approximately 130.28 
million (the present population of Pakistan is in the region 
of 74 million). Pakistan occupied an area of 364,737 square 
miles. The two wings of Pakistan were approximately 1230 
miles apart (Islamabad-Dacca). It is imperative, therefore, 
to treat these two wings separately so as to have a better 
understanding of their geopolitical location and socio­
economic problems.
West Pakistan (present Pakistan) is situated between 
the longitudes 61°E and 75°E and the latitudes 2 4°N and 
37°N. This wing touches the Himalayas' foothills and the 
Hindu Kush mountains in the north and is separated from the 
Soviet Union by a narrow stretch of mountain ranges, and 
extends from the Pamirs down to the Arabian Sea. Afghanistan 
and Iran are in the north-west, while in the east and the 
south-east it is bounded by India. West Pakistan comprises 
the former areas of the North Western Frontier Province, 
the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the former States of 
Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Kalat, Mekran, Lasbela (these are now 
practically part of Baluchistan, whereas Khairpur is within 
the sway of Sind and Bahawalpur was incorporated in the 
Punjab), Dir, Swat, Buner, Chitral, Hunza and Nagar (these
- 28 -
have been brought within the administrative control of 
the NWFP.
West Pakistan experiences an arid climate. The rain­
fall is very scant, with most of the rain falling in the 
hilly north and the fertile plains of the Punjab, especially 
during the monsoons. The scarcity of rainfall is amply 
remedied by the waters of the Indus, Jhelum and the Chenab. 
These rivers flow into Pakistan from! the disputed State 
of Jammu and Kashmir (the Indus originates in<the Chinese 
region of Tibet ). The three eastern rivers such as the 
Sutlej, have also made: a substantial contribution towards 
the agricultural and economic development of this wing.
These eastern rivers the Sutlej, the Ravi and the Beas, 
flow from India into Pakistan, and are now fully used by 
India in accordance with the terms and conditions as stip­
ulated in The Indus Water Treaty which was fully implemented 
in 1970. The treaty gave Pakistan the right to utilise the 
three western rivers excepting a limited use of water by 
India in the disputed Kashmir, eastern Punjab and Himachal 
Pradesh. The Aid Pakistan Consortium along with India helped 
Pakistan financially and in the technical fields in the re­
placement programme under the Indus Water Treaty.
Some political geographers accepted the socio-economic 
and political viability and validity of the western wing 
(Pakistan) and have strongly argued in support of its eco­
nomic prosperity, "West Pakistan is fundamentally better-found 
than East, and it has the makings of a decent if not spec­
tacular agrarian prosperity, if only the Kashmir crisis can
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be settled by genuine agreement and relations of real co­
operation between the two Republics established."^
The former East Pakistan (Bangladesh) lies between the 
longitudes 88°E and 92.30°E and the latitudes 21°N and 2 7°N.
It borders the Union of Burma in the south-east, India in 
the east, north and west, and the Bay of Bengal in the south.
The total area is 5 4,501 square miles, supporting a popu­
lation of approximately 81 million. The region has a sub­
tropical climate, and the area has heavy rainfall,* and is 
ribboned with thousands of streams providing Very rich silt 
and alluvium for growing jute and rice. This region was 
visualised "as a very vast piece of flooded land - a gigantic 
delta stretching from the sea upwards, and we will find that 
in this gigantic delta the rivers have also been shifting
from West to East thereby creating numerous lakes all along 
2
the delta." There are no wide contrasts of scenery. Heavy 
rainfall and intensive developed river system had made the 
former East Pakistan a green land, rich in sub-tropical prod­
ucts.
While no one would contend that shape alone would pro­
duce a federal structure in a given state, it is correct to 
assume that the shape characteristics of some states have 
contributed largely to that choice of politico- territorial 
organisation. It is argued that Pakistan would not have 
become a federal state were it not fragmented into two major 
units: other states (Islamic) are highly centralised and- 
unitary in character. The erstwhile sceptics now expressed 
their hope and confidence that Pakistan had come to stay and.
1. East,W.G. Spate, O.H.K. and Fisher, C.A. "The Changing Map 
of Asia: A Political Geography, Methuen, London, 1971,p.180
2. Ahmad, Kazi S. "Introducing Pakistan" A N.I.P.A. Publication, 
Lahore, 196 7, p.24.
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could not be dismembered short of war and aggression,
"That Pakistan will survive appears certain: it could not
now be destroyed short of war, and although in that event
the dice would be very heavily loaded against Pakistan
(owing to the negligible war potential vis-a-vis India, and
almost impossible strategic lay out) .... But it would not
be very surprising if East Pakistan, by way of ad hoc regional
agreements to meet local interests...were gradually to slip
into a special position such that there would eventually be
an abrupt confrontation....At that point the evolution could
hardly be consummated without a major crisis in the sub- 
3
continent."
In the case of Pakistan, cultural and economic centri­
fugal forces consolidated the divisive nature of the state's 
fragmentation, "The bisection of Pakistan raised serious 
administrative problems. East Pakistan is notoriously un­
military; except for the short frontier with Burma it is 
entirely surrounded by India, and a veritable hostage to 
fortune. West Pakistan consists effectively of an attenuated 
oecumene of good (where irrigated) land, 750 miles from 
Karachi to Rawalpindi but only 80 miles wide in the constricted
'wastesouth of Multan. The inheritance of the North West
4Frontier is not an unmixed gain. "
West Pakistan (Pakistan) is almost six times as large 
as the former East Pakistan (Bangladesh), but its population 
was only two thirds of the eastern wing (19 70-19 71, figures). 
While the population gravity point thus appeared to lie in 
the former East Pakistan, the effective administrative capital
3. East,W.G. & Spate, O.H.K., The Changing Map of Asia, Methuen, 
London, p.170.
4. East, Spate & Fisher, "The Changing Map of Asia", Methuen,
1971, London, pp.174-175
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remained in the western wing (Dacca was the seat of the 
Federal Legislature).
Political decision making remained in the western wing 
and often, according to the East Pakistanis, did not suff­
iciently take into account the legitimate interests of the 
eastern wing. There were two national languages i.e. Bengali 
and Urdu while English enjoyed the status as the official 
language for a limited period. West Pakistan truly remained 
a Muslim country, with over 95% of the population adherent 
to the Muslim faith, but in the former East Pakistan only 
two thirds of the people were Muslims. Here the Hindu min­
ority found itself in the similar situation as the Muslim 
minority in India.
The most serious disparities, however, between the two 
wings were economic. Living standards were lower in the 
eastern wing, where the land was overcrowded, and subsistence 
modes of li.‘/e prevailed. There were serious charges levelled 
against the Federal Government that its economic policies 
invariably favoured the western wing and ignored the socio­
economic needs of the eastern wing. They further accused 
the central government that it was treating the eastern half 
as a colony and not as an equal partner in the federation.
There is no denying the fact that some of these charges and 
accusations were well founded but others were wholly fallacious. 
The relations between the two parts were strained not only 
by the government's pricing and export policies towards the 
two competitive cash crops of the country i.e. jute and cotton 
but also by a resentment in the eastern-half against a
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government that was proceeding too slowly in agrarian reforms, 
because more than half of the population in the east, under 
the British, had fallen into the hands of the landlords 7 
whereas the western-half enjoyed, on the average, larger 
land-hol dings.
There can be no question that geographic discontiguity 
of the state had been a major factor in every issue of dis­
agreement facing the two wings. It is also not hard to imag­
ine why the East Pakistanis were not so enthusiastic towards 
the Kashmir question, while in West Pakistan there has been a 
virtual unanimity of views on this thorny issue. There is 
no denying the fact that a greater proximity of East and West 
Pakistan would have created a more harmonious relationship, 
and certainly improved communications and the absence of the 
real psychological barrier of the Indian landmass would have 
engendered and invigorated the state idea in this divided 
and fragmented country, and enhanced the chances of Pakistan 
surviving as a unified ; entity.
The idea of Pakistan was opposed by many, and at the time 
of its independence serious doubts were cast on the socio­
economic it-and political viability of Pakistan as an independ­
ent sovereign state: "The greater the weight we attach to the 
geographical factors, however, the more difficult does it
become to accept the racial and ideological aspects of the
5
Two Nations Theory." Carlson remarked, "Perhaps not wisely 
constituted as a sovereign state, Pakistan is beset with the 
economic difficulties that its restricted and divided domain 
imposes upon it." Weigert similarly expressed a belief
5. Spate,O.H.K. "Geographical Aspects of the Pakistan Scheme" 
Geographical Journal, 1943, p.129
6. Carlson, Lucile, "Geography and World Politics" N.J. 1958, 
p.487
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that "the soundness of the Pakistan solution has still to
7
stand the test of history." Brown aired his thoughts:
"Pakistan would come into existence in chaos without a well- 
ordered governmental organisation and would have severe 
handicaps threatening its very existence... disadvantages 
were so certain, so clearly pointed, so much calculated to 
affect Muslims as well as Hindus, that they forbid the creation 
of Pakistan."^
These comments, express, rather typically, the common 
belief that the discontiguous political pattern of the nascent 
state was both illogical and impractical, and pointed towards 
the very tenuous nature of its continued existence. This 
was a feeling which differed radically from that of the Paki­
stanis, who viewed the obstacles to nationhood as a test of 
Muslim nationalism and resurgence in which they were bound to 
succeed. "All observers are impressed with the depth of 
national feeling which is displayed by the Pakistanis. It
was the intensity of this feeling which was responsible in
9
the initial days for the survival of Pakistan." Spate had 
since stated, "The setting up of a state in the appaling con­
fusion of Partition was a tremendous achievement in itself, 
but the gains of Jinnah and Liaquat Khan seemed in danger of 
dissipation during ten years of factionalism; a new stability
seems to have been attained but there remain critical difficulties,
10internal and external."
These remarks clearly demonstrate the level and direction
of discussion with regard to the political validity of this
7. Weigert, Hans w. et al. "Principles of Political Geography,
N.Y. 1957, p.58
8. Brown,W.The United States & India & Pakistan, Harvard, U.P. 
1963, p.148
9. Qureshi,I.H. "The Development of Pakistan in the New Asia"
(ed. by Metraux and Francois Crouzet), N.Y. 1965, p.233
10. Spate,O.H.K. Learmonth, A.Y.A. "India and Pakistan" General 
and Regional Geography, London, 1967, p.171
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fragmented and culturally divided Pakistan. Once the de­
cision to partition the sub-continent had been made, however, 
there was no argument as to which part of the newly emergent 
state constituted its heart - its raison d'etre. The Punjab 
was the vital core of Pakistan. This part of Pakistan had 
established strong Islamic traditions, and contemporary 
economic conditions were highly favourable as compared with 
those in the rest of the country - "From the point of view 
of political geography, the Punjab must be considered the 
raison d'etre of Pakistan, although the province contained
only 18,814,000 persons in 1951, less than 25% of the total 
11population."
The dominant cultural position of the Punjab was based 
on its close affinity with Islamic South-west Asia; for the 
north-west is largely a product of the Islamic way of life 
found in the lands to the west. A series of invaders tra­
versed the Khyber and Bolan Passes, bringing with them a 
conservative, agricultural economy imbued with Islamic values 
and concepts that had their base and origin in Arabia. This 
drive continued eastward until its fervour and energy were 
sapped in the Ganges valley, where Hindu culture and values 
were strong, and had survived in good shape after having 
assimilated the invading alien ideologies and philosophies. 
The Islamic faith, however, had gained a strong foothold 
several hundred miles down the Ganges, at its very mouth,and 
in this area the Islamic values and concepts remained intact 
and entrenched. But it was in the Punjab that Islamic ideas
11. Ginsburg, Norton edit: "The Pattern of Asia", N.J. 195 8, 
p.634.
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took form in comparative isolation from contemporary influences 
in British India.
Lahore is the most important centre of Muslim culture 
in Pakistan. A key city in the Punjab, it has played the 
role of strategic control point between the Khyber Pass and 
Delhi. The Muslim conquerors from Central Asia or the Hindu 
Kush used Lahore as their regional capital, the British as 
their provincial capital, and from 1947 to 1955 it served 
as the provincial capital of Pakistani Punjab. In 1955 the 
One Unit was created incorporating the four provinces of the 
western wing along with Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Kalat, Mekran 
and Lasbela; and Lahore was again made the capital city of the 
new province. Since the partition left Lahore well exposed 
geopoliticslly and militarily, the new state selected Karachi 
as its capital. In 1959, however, most of the functions of 
the capital were being conducted from Rawalpindi as a prelude 
to the eventual shift to Islamabad, the new capital, which is 
only fifteen miles away from Rawalpindi, "The two cities...
12form a nucleus exercising both civil and military authority", 
and it would not be out of place to state here that the 
Rawalpindi-Lahore-Lyallpur axis constitutes the core area.
A cultural, economic, social and historical analysis of
the former East Pakistan would immediately reveal that it is
13too distant from the focal point of Islamic culture, and that
12.Tayyeb,A. "PakistanrA Political GeographyV,London,1966,p.176
13.Mo one, however, denies the fact that the Muslims of Burma, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines constitute 
a very important part of the Islamic world, but the contention 
remains that the Muslims of this region have been under the 
effective influence of the regional culture e.g.,dance and 
music are part of the cultural rituals of the region but ana­
thema to the basic concepts of an islamic society. This does 
not mean, however, that the rich Muslims of Egypt, Syria, Jordan 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan or for that matter Paki­
stan have jealously guarded the basic principles of Islam.
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its people belong to a different ethnic unit. It would not 
be wrong to argue that the East and West Pakistan were more 
distant from each other than Poland and Spain, and in many 
instances their life styles depict greater dissimilarities 
than those of the two European states.
The cultural development and diffusion in West Pakistan 
produced a people that can be characterised as tall, bigboned 
and often fair skinned (mostly wheatish in complexion), where­
as the people of the former East Pakistan (Bangladesh) are 
generally small, slender and have darker complexion. These 
physical contrasts only represent a small proportion of the
inherent ethnic differences between the two peoples,* food
14and manner of living are also different. The people of 
the former East Pakistan are much more artistic than their 
erstwhile compatriots in the western wing.
The people who considered the Punjab to be the raison 
d'etre of Pakistan were not only convinced about the cult­
ural dominance of the region but of its economic contrib­
ution to the state, "The Punjab alone was really sound fisc­
ally...it seems that this one province, with less than a
quarter of the population of Pakistan must be the stay and
15foundation of the East."
The Punjab, as a result, assumed economic leadership 
and the former East Pakistan was pushed back and considered 
a poor relation, a land with negligible resources, having 
an agrarian society and the added burden of over-population.
14. East Pakistanis (Bangladeshis) generally prefer Dhoti, Lungi 
and Saree. People in West Pakistan prefer Shalwar, trouser 
suits and turbans. The staple diet of the Bangladeshis
is rice and fish whereas in Pakistan people generally 
prefer wheat-flour and Chappati.
15. Spate,O.H.K. "The Partition of India and the Prospects 
of Pakistan", Geographical Review, Vol.38, 1948, p. 25
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There was a great optimism in the Punjab which was over­
spilling in the rest of West Pakistan, and this optimism 
was largely based on the possibilities of extending large- 
scale and systematic irrigation and for a tremendous expansion 
of hydro-electric power for the manufacturing potential of 
the region and its agricultural surplus.
The concentration of political power and the predominance 
in the cultural and economic fields of the raison d'etre is 
not sui generis in geopolitics. There are very few states 
which are homogeneous and free from regional disparities or 
differences. One has to study some basic statistical data 
regarding the United Kingdom to ascertain as to which part 
or region of the country is predominant. But regional differ­
ences and frictions can be easily exaggerated, exploited, 
intensified and consolidated in a politico-territorial organ­
isation which is physically divided, especially when the 
raison d'etre region appears to hold such a commanding pos­
ition in spite of the fact that it enjoys a minority population 
status: the Punjab in particular and West Pakistan in general 
may be cited as cases in point!.
During the initial stages of nation building some of 
these fundamentals were ignored and the major attention was 
concentrated in West Pakistan, which in turn created further 
frictions and suspicions between the two pabts of Pakistan. 
Richard Hartshorne has very succinctly put the picture in its 
true perspective underlying dangers which are inherent and 
affect the situation as such, "In much older states, we may 
expect to find that an indigenous raison d'etre has evolved
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that may have little or no relation to the original genesis.... 
In the well developed modern state, politically minded people 
in all regions of the state area are conscious of their 
loyalty to the state, and have some common understanding 
even though not clearly phrased, of what that state means 
to them. In such a case we may recognise, I think, the ex­
istence of a nation as something distinct from the state itself 
....Whatever is found to be the raison d'etre, the underlying 
idea of the state, it is with this concept, I submit, that 
the geographer should start in his analysis of the state area 
....On this basis, we may approach the most elementary prob­
lem. ..that of the distinguishing within the legal confines of 
its territory, those regions that form integral parts of the 
state-area in terms of its basic idea, and those parts that 
must be recognised as held under control, in the face of 
either indifference or of opposition on the part of the 
regional population."^  To demonstrate his point of view 
that a certain area in a given political entity may be treated 
as a subject area: "Thus during the centuries in which all 
of Ireland was recognised in International law as part of 
the United Kingdom, its greater part was certainly operated 
in fact, as a subject area, distinct from the controlling 
state. Much the same may be true today of certain portions 
of the Soviet Union, notably the so called republics of 
Central Asia....On the other hand, we have in the United States
clear cut though tiny relics of internal colonialism in the
17Indian reservations."
16. Hairtshorne, R, "The Functional Approach in Political Geo­
graphy" in the edition, Politics and Geographic Relation­
ships, Jackson, W.A.D. London, 196 4, pp.93-94
17. ibid. p.94
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West Pakistan is near to the heartland Islamic environ­
ment whereas in former East Pakistan (Bangladesh) a form of 
Southeast Asian culture predominates. This contrast as well 
as the obvious factor of spatial separation affected the 
integration of East and West Pakistan into a whole and well- 
knit political entity: "And there is always the fundamental 
difficulty arising from the unique divisioniof East and West, 
entities so different that to build omstate of them is like
18trying to harness a camel and a water-buffalo to one plough."
If Pakistan continued to make visible progress in re­
dressing genuine grievances of the majority, and in evolving 
a national culture flexible enough to allow a maximum amount 
of variations between the two regions, then its geographical 
dislocation, although unique as a political phenomenon, 
should not have unduly affected the solution of the problems 
that were strongly polarising the socio-economic and polit­
ical differences; a veritable host to separatism and secession. 
The government of Pakistan could not effectively plug the 
widening gulf between the two halves of the country, and as 
a result, the original territoriality of the state-idea could 
not be held together.
The gradual but definite alienation of the public in 
former East Pakistan which eventually ended the legal bonds 
between the two wings of Pakistan, a Muslim homeland, as it 
emerged in 1947, could be explained by the interplay of 
centrifugal forces, which effectively outmatched the centri­
petal forces, and as such the balance of power was seriously 
jeopardised, and both the internal and external vested interests
18. East,W.G., Spate,O.H.K. and Fisher,C.A. The Changing Map of 
Asia: A Political Geography, Methuen, London, 1971, p.180.
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were effectively allowed to exploit these inherent weaknesses 
to the disadvantage of a United Pakistan. The Central Gov­
ernment, as a result, was unable to hold the country as it 
had emerged in 1947, and the territoriality of the raison 
d'etre was severed.
The effective operation of the centrifugal forces in 
Pakistan could be ascribed to k) the economic disparities, 
b) the linguistic and cultural distinctiveness, c) the ad­
ministrative and bureaucratic elitism, d) the pre-eminence 
of the military machine and e) the gradual spread of paro­
chialism, regionalism, provincialism and sub-nationalism.
Until 1970, when the first general elections were held 
on the basis of universal adult franchise, and the people of 
Pakistan were denied their inherent political rights under 
the guise of "Basic Democracies, indirect democracy" and a
19system of government which suited the "genius of the people'.'
Most of the time the national political scene was dominated 
by a Punjabi or Nathan, and the Bengalis were relegated to 
a secondary position, especially in the area of decision-making 
in spite of the fact that they were in majority. This grad­
ually led to the alienation of Bengali political opinion, 
urban educated class,' and the farming community (who resented 
the attitudes and the remote decision-making operation of the 
military and civil bureaucracy). The quasi-unitary political 
system worked against the very interests of a united Pakistan 
and the state-idea was irreparably damaged.
The criticism and resentment was particularly directed 
towards the army for failing in their supreme duty, and there-
19. Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, O.U.P. London-Lahore, 196 7,
p .211
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fore, the Bengalis particularly emphasised the futility of 
allocating the lion's share of the Central Budget (50-65 per 
cent) for the maintainance of a large army which had apparent­
ly left them defenceless (there were approximately 8,000 men 
and officers in East Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan War 
of 1965). The criticism was directly or indirectly meant . 
either to highlight or undermine the "Punjabi hegemony", 
especially since the army was overwhelmingly Punjabi in origin, 
"The Pakistan army has been almost entirely recruited from 
four districts of northern Punjab (Rawalpindi, Campbellpur, 
Jhelum and Gujrat) and two districts of the Frontier Province
(Peshawar and Kohat). Sixty per cent of the army is Punjabi
20and thirty five per cent is Pathan."
The development of political institutions was painstakingly 
supervised by the elitist group comprising the Civil and 
Military Services who tended to act as masters and not as 
public servants. This was particularly true of the Civil 
Service of Pakistan (now reorganised and merged with other 
services within the Administrative Services but without los­
ing their real hold and prestige in spite of the fact that such 
appletions as C.S.P. and P.S.P. have been dropped) who were 
posted in the Eastern Wing,* and their dealings with the Ben­
galis were very officious and they tended to stay aloof. A 
small minority only ventured- to learn the Bengali language 
which further alienated the indigenous people. Both the Civil 
Service and the military establishment used the democratic
20. Sayad/K'..b . ; "The Role of the Military in Pakistan" in Jaques 
Van Doorn ed; Armed Forces and Society, the Hague, 1968, 
p.276
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institutions for their self-aggtrandisement instead of act­
ing as the instruments of democracy in the service of the 
interests of the people at large. The devastation of the 
19 70 cyclone in East Pakistan generated further hatred for 
the Central Government, and the masses in East Pakistan voci­
ferously criticised the apathy and the failure of the Federal 
Government in their care of the millions who were devastated 
by the ravages of the huge tidal waves. The remoteness of 
the Federal Government and the Capital in addition to the 
decision-making machinery, were identified as the real vill­
ains of the tragedy. The cyclone might be construed as the 
real catalyst. The Awami League led by Sheikh Mujib-Ur-Rahman 
exploited, in full, this human tragedy and pin-pointed various 
other drawbacks of the relationship that existed, at that point, 
in time, and as such pursued, with added vigour, the implement­
ation of the Six Points, which in effect, meant the establish­
ment of a confederal structure.
It needs to be stated here that the more the Central 
Government endeavoured,to impose a unitary cultural-religious 
concept, the more difficult it became for the state-idea to 
hold sway over the territoriality of a United Pakistan.
The more the politico-military leaders struggled to strengthen 
the unity of the state, the more certain its eventual sever- 
ence became.
The tenuous nature of the Islamic link between the two 
wings of Pakistan was not capable of withstanding the pressures 
from within, especially the parochial approach of the dissi­
dents who encouraged fissiparous and secessionist elements
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on the grounds that Hindu economic domination must not be 
allowed to emerge in the shape of Punjabi or West Pakistani 
socio-economic and politico-military pre-eminence. Especially 
in view of the fact that Islam had constituted the most imp­
ortant link between East and West Pakistan, and that the 
Muslims of East Pakistan were only too happy to align them­
selves with the Muslims of West Pakistan because they were 
keen to get rid of the Hindu economic domination (especially 
the Marwari economic predominance). This fact was very 
effectivley exploited by the internal and external vested 
interests especially the Indians who proved to be the decisive 
factor in 1971.
This was a good example of the failure and incompetence 
of the framers of Pakistan's foreign policy, and those who 
failed to correctly calculate or evaluate the significance 
of the internal forces and as to how and to what extent these 
internal forces were able to merge their interests with the 
external vested interests with a view to achieve their collec­
tive objectives.
Pakistan's allies did not come to the aid of Pakistan 
when Pakistan needed them in 19 71. Pakistan's forces in its 
Eastern wing were seen as the "forces of occupation" or "foreign 
army of occupation" and its allies within SEATO were content 
to see the Eastern wing amputated from the main body, and 
with the help of a foreign power. The events were allowed to 
take their natural course and Pakistan was made to.realise the 
realities of the situation. , l :
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Chapter 3
Economic Factors
TU--""Political potentials and foreign policy options of 
a given state are clearly related to its economic system. 
Natural resources, military power, industrial base, lines 
of communication and transportation, effective administrat­
ive structure and sound financial institutions are important 
instruments of statecraft. A state's ability to back up 
its demands on other political entities, to attract and 
support its friends and allies, to bring pressure to bear 
upon adversaries, requires the ability and power to manip­
ulate various goods and services, qualities and quantities.
The intangible called national prestige may to a greater 
or lesser extent very much depend upon the economic struc­
ture of that state.
Strategy and national policy are often subject to the 
economic power potential and strength of that political entity. 
Ideas and concepts which are advanced by various national 
leaders are directly or indirectly associated with the eco­
nomic potentials of their state.
The magnitude and comparison of a state's economic out­
put depend upon a complex of variables: natural and mineral 
resources, manpower2 and the socio-economic system, and 
the pattern of its institutions; and it has a direct bear­
ing on the external relations of that particular state.
This may impose limitations on its foreign policy options
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or on the other hand remove such inhibiting constraints 
from the area of its international activities and relations.
The Disruption of the Existing Pattern .
1 '• ' r
<•'
For a geopolitical analysis of Pakistan it is important 
to analyse the circumstances under which it achieved its 
independence, and therefore, an examination of its economic 
background and potential is necessary for a better understand­
ing of Pakistan's geopolitical problems.
The partition of the sub-continent in 1947, created a 
number of very intricate socio-economic,political and terri­
torial problems which practically eliminated any chances of 
good neighbourliness between the two nations. The Chairman 
of the Award Commissions, Sir (later Lord) Cyril Radcliffe 
envisaged that after the chaos of the partition had died 
down, th& two states would develop very friendly and harmon­
ious relations, and that there would be a political reconcil­
iation and any outstanding boundary problems would be settled 
in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and co-operation,
"I have done what I can in drawing the line to eliminate 
any avoidable cutting of railway communications and of river 
systems, which are important to the life of the Province; 
but it is quite impossible to draw a boundary under our terms 
of reference without causing some interruption of this sort, 
and I can only express the hope that arrangements can be made
and maintained between the two states that will minimize the
1
consequence of the interruption as far as possible." This
1. The Radcliffe Awards, 12 August,.1947
was a very simplistic opinion and a forlorne hope in view 
of the hostility between the two states.
The partition disrupted the water system, and the irri­
gation complex in the Pakistani Punjab became dependent upon 
India as a result of the Radcliffe Award, especially in view 
of his thoughts that this kind of situation was precisely 
what he had in mind when he expressed his opinion. Some of 
the most important headworks and embankments were awairded 
to India though they controlled the water to Pakistan, "of 
the 48 million acres of cultivable land in the Indus Basin 
(32 million in Pakistan and 16 million in India), only 26 
million acres (21 million in Pakistan and 5 million in India) 
receive irrigation..."^
The partition also severed some of the most important 
links (rail and road), and some of the river channels in 
the former East Pakistan were also badly affected? the polit­
ical division also disrupted the social and cultural bonds, 
and as such seriously uprooted the existing economic system.
A number of important market towns gained their socio­
economic and cultural importance because these were sites 
of some of the most revered religious shrines (mazaars), 
temples and religious centres, one must not, however, mini­
mize the importance of some of these cities which are also 
the centres of economic and commercial activities, and which 
have played a significant part in the industrial and economic 
development of their respective regions e.g., Lyallpur is 
famous for its textile industry and is called the "Manchester 
of Pakistan", Multan is a very important financial, economic
2. Khosla,A.N. "Development of the Indus River System", India 
Quarterly XIV, No.3 (July-September 1958) pp.233-253
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and commercial city. Again Guj rat (Pakistani Punjab) is 
known for its pottery, in addition to the Shah Dowllah 
Shrine. Ajmer (India) is highly respected by the Muslims, 
Hindus and Sikhs. A number of Pakistanis still travel to 
Ajmer, annually. Thousands of Sikhs have been allowed to
visit Nankana Sahib and Panja Sahib in Pakistan. The Ahmadis 
(Mirzais) had their religious centre in Batala (India) , and 
large parties have been permitted to visit their holy places. 
Lahore is a very important socio-economic, political and 
cultural centre, and its added attraction to the Muslims 
is the shrine of Datta Ganj Baksh. Thousands of people 
visit the shrine every day to pay their respect and homage 
to this Muslim saint and teacher.
In addition, a number of urban centres had achieved 
their significance because of the fact that annual horse 
and cattle shows were held there e.g., Lyallpur, Pakistan.
This city was and still is very famous livestock market
for the whole of the Punjab. But as a result of the par­
tition its links with the Indian Punjab and Haryana have 
been severed in this respect.
The above examples clearly demonstrate the fact that 
the partition of the South Asian sub-continent resulted in
the emergence of a new geopolitical structure, and this
effectively disrupted the existing economic system. As a 
result the political division of the sub-continent, East 
Bengal (the former East Pakistan) received three quarters 
of the jute growing area but only negligible manufacturing 
capacity. India on the other hand received one quarter 
of the jute growing land but all of the manufacturing facil­
ities .
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India duplicated the jute production of Pakistan, which
in turn was obliged to look for distant markets which were
more expensive in economic terms. In addition, Pakistan
launched a comprehensive programme to achieve self-sufficiency
in the manufacture of jute. There was a tremendous growth
of interprovincial trade between the two wings of Pakistan
3(approximately 800 million Rupees per annum) ; this was ob­
viously expanded at the expense of trading and commercial 
links between India and the former East Pakistan. Moreover, 
the Indians were forced to reroute the transportation of 
their tea from Assam which proved to be quite an expensive 
venture since the traditional channels of transportation 
through the former East Pakistan were denied to India.
Again, for political reasons, Pakistan preferred to import 
coal from the People's Republic of China, at comparatively 
very heavy costs than the natural source of supply i.e. India.
The Agrarian Base
Pakistan is predominantly an agrarian country, and more;, 
than seventy per cent of the civilian labour is engaged in 
agricultural pursuits. This figure amounted to 85.25 per 
cent in the former East Pakistan. In Pakistan the man/land 
ratio was 0.66 cultivated acres per person, with a distinct 
disparity between the two wings (0.53 in the former East
4
Pakistan, and 0.8 acres in West Pakistan). In spite of this 
ratio the dependence on land is considerable and the existing
3. Pakistan Times, 4.4.1975
4. Stamp,L.D. Applied Geography, 1963, p.24
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situation is not likely to change in the near future,"...
Pakistan will remain predominantly an agrarian...for many
5
years or decades," Since the very inception of Pakistan 
the various agrarian reforms i'n Pakistan have endeavoured 
to eradicate sub-division and fragmentation, achieve a 
reasonable standard of land holdings and to better the lot 
of the peasavts and haris or cultivators.
It is not easy to give a correct assessment or an acc­
urate critical analysis of the various land reforms which 
have been announced from time to time simply because of 
the fact that it is difficult to ascertain how far these re­
forms were actually implemented to the very letter and spiirit 
of these reforms. There have been persistent reports that 
the limits imposed by The Ayub Reforms in 1959, 500 acres 
of irrigated and 1000 acres of unirrigated acres were not 
implemented in good faith and the big landlords or land­
owners were in a position to twist the actual requirements, 
and the consolidation of land holdings was not fully carried 
out.
The Bhutto Reforms of 1972, further reduced the land 
holdings and fixed at 150 irrigated or 300 unirrigated acres 
or the equivalent to 15,000 produce index units* It is be­
lieved that these reforms were not fully implemented and 
the influential landlords or big Zamindars (landowners) were 
allowed to flout the letter and the spiirit of these reforms. 
It is,therefore,too premature to make any judgement as to 
whether the land reforms were effective and whether these
5. Spate,O.H.K. and Learmonth, India and Pakistan, Methuen, 
London, 1967, p.225.
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were instrumental in improving the lot of the ordianry 
peasant or Zamindar. It is generally believed that the 
absentee landlordism still thrived in spite of these re­
forms, but one has to accept that there may be few except-
6ions.
The partition in 1947 resulted in the disappearance 
of non-Muslim moneylenders. Some Pathans who practised 
usury in towns were limited in their resources and were 
unable to advance any considerable loans to the village 
cultivators. The situation in the former East Pakistan was 
particularly serious because the Baniya (the Hindu money­
lender) migrated to West Bengal and Assam. The Village 
Agricultural and Industrial Development programme, the Basic 
Democracies and the Agricultural Development Cooperation 
were responsible for procuring and distributing fertilisers, 
implements, improved seeds, pesticides and agricultural 
extension activities.
Pakistan has had a serious foodgrain problem, especially 
in the former East Pakistan until 1971. The problem had 
been particularly serious because of the recurrent floods, 
water-logging and salinity. Water-logging and salinity were 
wide spread in the western wing whereas floods were more 
severe in the eastern wing. These seriously affected agric­
ultural production, reducing yield per acre. While the pop­
ulation was growing at the rate of three per cent per annum, 
the growth of food production was two per cent per annum.
This necessitated the import of foodgrains in large quantities.
6. Syed,A.H. World Survey "Pakistan", , The Atlantic Education 
Trust, No. 76, April, 19 75, London, p.6.
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During the 1950's Pakistan imported around 500,000 tons
of foodgrain annually which had grown to 1,000,000 tons
during the 1960's. The gap between the domestic supply
and demand was widening, and the import requirements in
7
19 71 had reached approximately 2.5 million tons . This 
placed Pakistan in a very difficult situation since the 
import of foodgrains Very heavily burdened the foreign 
exchange earnings andfseriously affected its development 
planning.
The main source of supply was the United States, and 
the Americans were very willing to meet Pakistan's food 
requirements, especially since 1954, the year Pakistan signed 
the ManilasTreaty and joined SEATO. The foodgrain require­
ments of Pakistan were met under the Public Law 480. The 
whole programme was carried out as follows:
1. The aid was provided on local currency items i.e. the 
sale of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities against pay­
ment of Pakistani Rupees in cash which was deposited in U.S. 
Account of the State Bank of Pakistan. The bulk of this 
amount was given back to Pakistan in the shape of loans and- 
grants. 2. The Americans provided the assistance on con­
vertible local currency terms. The surplus,U.S. agricult­
ural commodities were supplied and Pakistan was required to 
pay back in U.S. dollars within a period of 40 years.
3. The U.S. Government made a gift and donations of U.S. 
surplus agricultural commodities to meet relief requirements, 
and to combat hunger and malnutrition.
7. Pakistan Year Book, Karachi, 19 72
Pakistan,Basic Facts, Karachi, 19 72.
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There were, however, far reaching conditions which 
very clearly affected, and in fact, limited Pakistan's re­
lations with other states especially those which were con­
sidered unfriendly states by the Americans, e.g.,. Cuba, North 
Korea, North Vietnam and for a considerable time China.
There was a definite clause of the agreements that if and
-k
when Pakistan accepted aid and assistance under P.L.480** 
then it must not have trade relations with Cuba, North Korea 
and North Vietnam.
In addition to these limitations on Pakistan's foreign 
policy options, the Americans obliged Pakistan to purchase 
a certain amount of its agricultural requirements from American 
markets with cash payments. This stipulation was within the 
scope of P.L.480, and was known as Usual Marketing Require­
ments (UMR), and as a result Pakistan had to import 100,000 
to 160,000 tons annually at comparatively higher costs.
Moreover, the recipient was required to pay the freight 
charges for all the aid and assistance so received. Pakistan 
was not allowed to export the same or the like commodity 
either domestic or of foreign origin without first having 
received U.S. clearance.
The total aid received under P.L.480 was U.S.$ 1,196m 
up to 1965, and in 1974 the total had reached U.S.$ 1.303m.^
The fact that the total aid received by Pakistan under P.L.480, 
from 1965 to 1974 amounted to U.S.$ 107m.illion, demonstrates 
the kind of relationship Pakistan enjoyed with the United 
States, and which definitely affected Pakistan's imports from 
the United States for the period in question.
8. All these figures have been taken from the Pakistan Times, 
Lahore, 4.4.1975.
** P.L. stands for Public Laws**
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This point is further substantiated by the trade fig­
ures of Pakistan, especially 1971-1972 with regard to its 
imports from the United States. The reason being that the 
United States was the chief donor within the Aid Pakistan 
Consortium and that practically influenced the decisions of 
the Aid Consortium to Pakistan during the East Pakistan 
crisis ih 1971,and the fact that the aid was not fully re­
habilitated till Pakistan recognised Bangladesh in February, 
1974. This is proof enough of the political limitations 
and constraints which Pakistan has been obliged to recognise, 
at times, because of its economic requirements.
The Industrial Base
In 1974 the total U.S. deposits in Pakistan stood at 
9Rs. 6,620,000,000, as a result of its aid and assistance 
programme under P.L.480. Tliie Americans have used this massive 
fund for the maintainence of its Embassy personnel, propo- 
ganda publications, the award of scholarships and the var­
ious exchange programmes. This huge fund has been a source 
of considerable embarrassment to Pakistan.
Pakistan's economy at the time of its independence was 
predominantly agricultural and it had no major industrial 
centres, and was without capacity for processing indigenous 
raw material. At the time of independence, there were only 
34 factories in Pakistan with a total daily employment of 
26,400 persons. Although Pakistan inherited twenty per cent 
of the sub-continent's population, its industry was less than 
7 per cent and even this consisted of small scale and minor
9. ibid.
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industrial units. Thus for instance, Pakistan was the home 
of jute but without a jute factory of its own.^
Jute:
As stated previously the growth of the domestic man­
ufacturing industry in Pakistan, especially jute, stemmed 
from the partition of the subcontinent which split the 
world's main jute growing area in Bengal between the former 
East Pakistan and Indian West Bengal. In 1947, Calcutta 
was the jute capital since it had the largest terminal mar­
ket for jute from East Bengal (East Pakistan - Bangladesh).
But this facility was disrupted in 1949 as a result of the 
dispute concerning the exchange rate between Pakistan and 
India. The government of Pakistan was obliged to take measures 
aimed at reducing the impending hardships of the jute grow­
ing farmers and issued the Jute Ordinance 1949 (which was re­
placed by the act in 1956) to establish the minimum support 
prices, to administer the purchase/sale and storing facilities 
on behalf of the government. Since the entire output of raw 
jute was exported and domestic requirements were met by imports, 
Pakistan found it imperative to set up its own jute industry 
so as to eliminate dependence on foreign manufactured jute 
i.e. Indian. The jute manufacturing capacity increased from 
a negligible level in 1947 to 8070 looms in 1961, and to
10. Pakistan Year Book, Karachi, 1975, p. 125
(Pakistan Basic Facts, 196 7-68, an official publication 
indicated that at the time of the partition there were 
14,569 industrial establishments in the undivided India 
and only 1406 units were located in the area that formed 
Pakistan. Pakistan had 10 per cent of the industrial 
units but these mainly were flour mills, rice mills and 
cotton ginning factories.)
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19428 in 1969.^ The Third Five Year Plan of Pakistan 
estimated a total installed capacity of 24,619 looms by 
19 70. The development of jute manufacturing industry in 
Pakistan and the diversification of its raw jute exports 
was a good example of the characteristics of Pakistan's 
geopolitical problems, and a reflection on its.foreign poli­
cy options with particular reference to Pakistanis unhappy 
relations with India.
A study of jute production and manufacture in Pakistan 
indicates that until 1952 Pakistan imported jute manufact­
ured goods to the tune of 22.9 million rupees and its ex­
ports of jute manufacture amounted to only 0.2 million rupees.
In 1967-68 the exports in raw jute amounted to 758.9 million 
rupees, and the jute manufactured goods exported from Pakistan 
earned619.6 million rupees. This picture of the jute product­
ion and manufacture in Pakistan materialised as a result of
12the realigned geopolitical priorities of Pakistan.
Raw jute and jute manufactures constituted the largest 
single eource pf foreign exchange earnings for Pakistan. In 
196 7-68 the exports earned a total of 1379 million rupees.
After the Partition in 1947, the jute exports trade passed 
through some major vicissitudes. India was at the outset by 
far the most important consumer, taking 5.3 million bales as 
against 0.8 million by the rest of the world in 1947-48. In 
1948-49 Indian purchases were at the^more normal level of
11.’ The total looms installed were located as follows: 18,928.
in the former East Pakistan, and 500 in West Pakistan at Jaran- 
wala in the Punjab. There were 40 jute mills in Pakistan in 
1968 and the jute consumption of raw jute amounted to 2.88 
million bales and the production of jute goods was 490,535 
tons. In March, 1970 according to the Financial Times, London 
(17.8.1970), there were 21,700 looms in Pakistan.
12. Pakistan,Basic Facts, Karachi, 1969.
3.9 million bales, exports of other countries increasing 
to 1.8 million bales. By 1950-51 two-thirds of Pakistan's 
exports of jute were absorbed by countries other than India* 
chiefly the United States, the United Kingdom, France, West 
Germany and Belgium, "...as Indian domestic production of raw 
jute rose from 1.7 million bales in 1947-48 to about 6.3 mill­
ion bales in 1961-62, and Indian imports of raw jute from 
Pakistan were under 0.4 million bales in the latter year.
India has thus achieved its goal of virtual self-sufficiency
in raw jute...loss to Pakistan's exports is being absorbed
13by increasing manufacturing capacity (at home)...." The 
changed pattern of Pakistan's jute industry since 1947 was 
indicative of the eventualities of the division of the sub­
continent and its inherent geopolitical problems. The old 
and established channels of inter-Dominion trade we~re-gradually 
being eroded and new but expensive trade connections were 
established. Pakistan was exporting its raw jute and man­
ufactured jute goods to distant markets. This involved extra 
and unnecessary freight and insurance charges which were en­
dangering the competitiveness of the Pakistani jute and jute
14manufactured goods in the world market., India was the 
closest and the most natural customer in the field but the 
political considerations of the parties concerned outweighed 
the economic benefits, and which should be construed as a 
serious error of judgement. By 1960-61 Pakistan was exporting
13. Andrus,J.R. and Mohammed,A.F. Trade and Development in 
Pakistan, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 
1966, pp.27-30
14. These were expensive in the sense that had there been a 
continuous exchange of goods between India and Pakistan.
The two countries would have been spared of the unnecessary 
and extra costs.
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only 5 per cent of its commodities to India and was import­
ing only 5 per cent from India. Since the Indo-Pakistan 
war of 1965/ and until recently the trading relations be­
tween the two countries w<2f£ at a standstill.
Cotton:
■kick
Cotton is both the chief cash crop and the main Kharif 
crop in Pakistan (formerly West Pakistan), and is grown mainly
k k
on the doabs (canal irrigated areas) of the Indus Valley.
Since 1914 good quality seeds have been imported from 
the United States to improve the production and quality of 
cotton known as the Punjab-American; it has taken well to the 
indigenous soil and climate and now. 87 per cent of the area 
in Pakistan is under these improved varieties producing 90 
per cent of Pakistan's cotton production. These varieties 
of cotton are grown in well-defined zones north to south along 
the Indus Basin of Pakistan. Approximately three million 
acres were under cotton cultivation in 1947/ but the acreage 
has been increasing gradually over the years and in 196 7-68 
there were 4.3 million acres under cotton cultivation in Paki­
stan (West Pakistan). In the former East Pakistan cotton 
was mainly grown on the slopes in Chittagong Hill Tracts 
(approximately 35,000 acres) and is generally known as 
"Comilla Cotton". This area produced between 10 to 55,000 
bales of harsh short-staple cotton, "The cotton is mainly 
used for mixing with wool and its acreage fluctuates widely
because it depends on shifting cultivation (jhuming) by
15primitive tribes, predominantly Buddhist."
15. Ahmad,K.S. op.cit. p.96
*** Kharif crop-Autumn Crop ** Doab-Land between two
Rabih crop-Spring Crop waters - rivers
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As a result of improved qualities of cotton and in­
creased consumption at home and abroad, the production of 
cotton has increased considerably in the last few years.
The average production of cotton from 1955-56 to 1959-60 
was 1.68 million bales (392 lbs. each bale) which increased 
to 2.92 million bales (450,000 tons) in 1966-67 and 2.92 
million bales (511,000 tons) in 1967-68).^
In 1952-53 the crop reached a peak of 1.8 million 
bales. The food shortages that emerged in 195 3-5 4 led to 
an official discouragement of cotton growing in favour of 
summer grains. Because of the increase of cotton consumption 
at home, which resulted from industrial expansion in this 
sector, a campaign was launched to grow more cotton in 1955- 
56 but it did not prove very effective. Yields remained 
stationary at 189 lbs. per acre from 1955 to 1960 and thte 
failure of measures to increase the yield was ascribed to 
several factors, '."Recurring weather difficulties, insect 
damage and water shortages in the canals were held respons­
ible in earlier years. Later, there was increasing recog­
nition that the causes of stagnation lay deeper. Low app­
lications of irrigation waters, the accumulation of salts 
in soil, unreliable seeds, inadequate plant production and 
uneven cover of plants have combined to keep the yields low. 
Market incentives have also worked against cotton. Sugar­
cane proved profitable, encouraging the diversion from
cotton not of land as such, but of precious irrigation
17supplies and peasant energy." To improve the cultivation,
16. Pakistan Basic Facts, 1969
17. Andrus, Mohammed, op.cit. p.29
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marketing and manufacture of cotton centres of research and 
technology had been established especially at Karachi and 
Lyallpur.
At the time of the Partition in 1947 the bulk of the
cotton crop was exported and the industry was underdeveloped.
This state of affairs was maintained during the first five
years of independence. The need for development, however,
was realised and this sector of the industry was gradually
being given importance. The figures of 1947 (29.7 million
lbs. and 881 million yards of cloth) and those of 1967-6 8
(569.7 million lbs. and 782.5 million yards of cloth) high-
18light rapid development of the industry since 1947.
The Federal Government, with a view to safeguarding the 
interests of the cotton growers, decided on 19th April, 1979 
to continue providing necessary facilities i.e. improved 
seed, fertiliser, irrigation,water, credit and plant protect­
ion. A production target of 3.65 million bales of cptton 
was fixed for 19 79-80 crop? the government further decided 
to continue with its scheme of support prices, and the pur­
chase of the crop was done directly from the growers and strict 
quality control was maintained. But there was an element of 
bad economics since the government decided to continue with 
the concept of support prices in spite of the fact that the 
cotton prices in the world market were declining because of 
the decreasing demand for the commodity.,
In 1972 there was the record production of four million 
bales which declined to 2.446 million bales in 1976-77, and 
increased to 3.233 million bales in 1977-78. The production
18. ibid.
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declined in 1978-79 to 2.662 million bales due to heavy
19rains in Sind and severe pest attack in the Punjab.
With various incentives the government succeeded in 
encouraging the growers to increase the area under the 
cotton crop from 1.843 million hectares in 1977-78 to 
2.038 million hectares? the yield per hectare rose by 33.9 
per cent to 312 kgs in 1978 as compared to 19 76-77, but 
declined by 25.6 per cent to 2 32 kgs in 1978-79 mainly be­
cause of adverse weather conditions and inadequate pest con-
4 - 1  2 0trol measures.
The prices of cotton in the international market in­
creased significantly and commensurate with its demand. The
prices ranged between 74 cents and 80 cents per pound. The 
government, therefore, decided to withdraw the subsidy of 
Rs.45 per 37.324 kgs. The international prices, however, 
started to decline in January, 1979 because the buyers had
more than covered their short-term demands and the crop was 
21good.
The domestic consumption of cotton is estimated to have 
been 2.4 million bales. Till March 31, 1979 the Cotton Ex­
port Corporation had exported 0.31 million bales valued at
2261.7 million dollars, with 0.111 million bales in the stock.
It must be stated, at this point in time, that cotton 
enjoyed the position of cash crop in West Pakistan whereas 
jute enjoyed the position of cash crop in East Pakistan.
19. Pakistan Year Book, Karachi, 19 79
20. ibid.
21. ibid. Also see the Lloyds Economic Report "Pakistan"
22. These figures have been taken from Pakistan Year Book, 
Karachi, 1979, pp.273-274
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Cotton was earning a good percentage of the foreign ex­
change which was badly needed by Pakistan to meet its bal­
ance of payments requirements. But it must also be stated 
in categoric terms that cotton did not earn as much as did 
the predominant cash crop of East Pakistan i.e. jute, which 
remained the chief foreign exchange earner for the united 
Pakistan until December, 19 71.
It should also be noted here that the remittances by 
Pakistanis overseas have enjoyed the leading position for 
some years now. Jute and cotton as such played an import­
ant role in Pakistan's foreign policy since the two cash 
crops provided it with very substantial incomes from their 
export. Most of the income, however, was allocated to the 
military sector and a substantial amount was spent on devel­
opment projects in West Pakistan. Thus the Eastern wing 
was largely ignored in spite of the fact that jute was.-East 
Pakistan's main foreign exchange earner.
Both India and Pakistan chose to ignore the socio­
economic and geographical imperatives in view of their en­
trenched political priorities; since Pakistan's jute and 
cotton were sent to distant markets whereas these commodit­
ies could very well have been exported across the border 
to India. Its foreign trade policy, especially concerning 
its exports, was economically not only irrational but 
counter-productive since Pakistan's economic interests were 
intertwined with its political objectives within the frame- 
work of Pakistan's foreign policy. This irrationality created 
more difficulties for Pakistan and undermined the conduct
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of its foreign policy.
Pakistan was obliged to accept the restrictions and 
limitations as prescribed by the Public Law 480. It had 
also to accept very stringent rules and conditions of the 
donor countries as prescribed either by the Aid Pakistan 
Consortium collectively or the member states individually.
This limited, undermined and circumscribed Pakistan's 
conduct of its foreign policy since the stringent conditions 
proscribed Pakistan's trading links with certain states e.g. 
Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam. The increasing pressure 
on Pakistan's nuclear energy development programme and the 
conditional flow of economic and military assistance is yet 
another example of the manner in which Pakistan's conduct 
of its foreign policy has been limited and undermined.
Realignment in Pakistan's International Trade
International economic and political relations are 
very closely interrelated. The volume of aid and trade 
closely approximates to the degree of political cordiality 
that exists between states. Both aid and trade have, at times, 
been used as the instruments of political pressure, for 
example, the ban on Pakistan's military aid during the Indo- 
Pakistan war of 1965; the ban on American military supplies 
to both India and Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war of, 1971. 
iy'-'TFhe suspension of economic aid to Pakistan by the Aid Paki­
stan Consortium during the East Pakistan crisis; and during 
and after the Indo-Pakistan war of 19 71, which was not lifted
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until 1974. ii) The suspension of military aid and the 
economic assistance to Pakistan over the nuclear reprocessing 
plant which Pakistan had negotiated to purchase from France.
The enormous pressure by the Ford Administration and the 
Carter Administration, on the French, not to sell the re­
processing plant to Pakistan. The eventual refusal by the
French to honour the original agreement, which had, incident-
£•
ally been confirmed by the International Atomic Agency after
k
having accepted Pakistan's assurances that the plant was to 
be used for peaceful purposes. iii) The offer of military 
and economic aid to Pakistan, by the Americans, after the 
Russian invasion of Afghanistan in December, 19 79.
Since Pakistan is predominantly an agricultural country 
its main exports consisted of primary products, though in­
dustrialisation provided considerable opportunities for the 
export of manufactured goods, especially textiles. The main 
imports of Pakistan consisted of industrial raw materials, 
food and live animals, machinery and transport equipment, 
animal and vegetable oils etc. Pakistan generally has. had 
an unfavourable balance of trade since 1947.
Jute and cotton formed the basis of Pakistan's exports 
(approximately 75 per cent), though a relative decline in 
the importance of export of raw jute and cotton was registered. 
During the period of 1964-65 raw jute and cotton constituted 
46 per cent of total exports, in 1967-68 these shared 39 per 
cent of total exports. Jute still occupied the traditional 
role in exports, but cotton exports dwindled for a period, 
because of increased domestic consumption, and wide fluctuations
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in prices coupled with tough competition in the world mar­
ket. Jute and cotton manufactured goods were promising 
exports; and textile manufactures increased from 25 per cent 
in 1964-65 to 29 per cent in 1967-68. In spite of the in­
crease in the export of manufactured goods, Pakistan still 
depended upon a limited number of agricultural products, 
which are affected by weather conditions and their fluctuat­
ing prices in the world market. In addition, Pakistan earned 
valuable foreign exchange by exporting, on a small scale, 
sports goods, carpets, rugs, oil cakes and tea. The real 
foreign exchange earner in addition to cotton, for some years, 
has been rice. The Pakistani working overseas have been re­
mitting home substantial amounts of foreign exchange, and in 
fact, constitute the single most important source of foreign 
exchange earnings.
The structural modifications in the economy of Pakistan 
necessitated substantial changes in the composition of its 
trade. The expansion of industry relegated the importance 
of consumer goods, and the import of machinery, raw materials, 
fuels and spare parts took precedence. Moreover, the fast 
growth of population and relativley slow rise in agricultural 
production compelled Pakistan to import food grains to meet 
its increasing requirements. In 1947-48 the total imports 
amounted to Rs.359.2 million, and since then there has been 
a steady trend towards rising imports which stood at Rs.5,374.2 
million in 1966-6 7. During the fiscal year 1965-66 Pakistan's 
imports fell considerably because of the undeclared India- 
Pakistan war of 1965, tighter import restrictions and the
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temporary stop in the flow of the American economic assist­
ance. Imports, however, in the financial year 1966-67 
recorded an increase of 2 3 per cent which was basically 
necessitated by the increased import of food stuffs, coupled 
with the relaxations in the import policy. Imports fell 
by 10 per cent in 196 7-6 8 as compared with the previous 
financial year owing to the decreased import of food stuffs 
and the delay in the import of iron, steel and non-ferrous
metals, caused by the pending negotiations of loans and 
23credits.
Pakistan's trade relations with other countries have 
been largely determined by the following considerations: 
a) The inherited pre-partition trade relations, b) The 
source of foreign aid and the conditions thereof, c) The 
structural changes in the economy of Pakistan, elnd the develop­
ment of markets for the newly manufactured products, 
d) Commonwealth Preferences and e) The development of bar­
ter trade.
At the time of the Partition in 1947, the U.K. was the
24mam source of imports and destination for Pakistani ex­
ports (U.K. imported 17 per cent of Pakistan's total exports 
in 1948, and 25 per cent of Pakistan's total imports for the 
same period originated in U.K.). The U.K. maintained its 
top position as the chief importer of Pakistani exports, 
which amounted to Rs.396 million in 196 7-68, and the United 
States maintained its position as the chief exporter to 
Pakistan, and in 196 7-6 8 it exported goods worth Rs.1436
23. All these figures have been taken from i) Pakistan Basic 
Facts, ii) Statistical Fact Book, A U.S. A.I.D. Publication, 
Lahore, 1966-67, iii) Central Statistical Office (Pakistan) 
Bulletins, and iv) Economic Report "Pakistan" Lloyds Bank 
Ltd. London, 1969, 1979.
24. Oxford Economic Atlas of the World, Third Edition, O.U.P. 
1965,p.234
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Pakistan has been diversifying its trade ever since 
it became aware of the United Kingdom's interest in join­
ing the European Economic Community. The United Kingdom is 
still a very important customer of Pakistani goods although 
the relative importance of the British Markets has diminished. 
Pakistan's exports to U.K. constituted about 14 per cent of 
the total in 1963-64, but only 12 per cent in 1967-68.
Pakistan has mounted export drives in the African, Asian, 
Communist Block countries, and especially the Arab countries 
with whom Pakistan enjoys common affinities in a number of 
fields.
The increasing trade with the communist countries, whose 
trade is state controlled, prompted Pakistan in 196 7 to set 
up the Trade Corporation of Pakistan. The commodities that 
the Trading Corporation of Pakistan imported included pig iron, 
rubber, sugar, betel, nuts, aluminium ingots, copper tods and 
copper ingots. The Government of Pakistan intended to auth­
orise the T.C.P. to import bulk commodities as the sole import­
er. Pakistan's trade with the U.S.S.R. and the People's 
Republic of China provided a good example of the changing 
pattern and the realignment in Pakistan's international trade.
In 1960-61 Pakistan imported from the Soviet Union, goods - 
worth Rs.25,025,000, and its exports to the Soviet Union for 
the same period amounted to Rs.14,201,000. In 1966-6 7 the 
imports from Russia totalled Rs.179 million, and the exports
for the same period to the Soviet Union amounted to Rs.137
...,.26million.
25. Pakistan Basic Facts Statistical Fact Book, Central Statist­
ical Office Bulletins and the Economic Reports, Lloyds
Bank Ltd., 1969,19 79
26. PakistartjBook, Karachi , 1979
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These figures clearly demonstrate that the trading 
relations with the Soviet Union were in favour of the Russ­
ians, and Pakistan, on the whole, had an unfavourable bal­
ance of trade with regard to the Soviet Union.
Since Pakistan's economic sources are limited Pakistan, 
as a result, has been obliged to rely heavily on foreign 
economic assistance in the shape of grants and aid in 1950, 
and by December, 1978, it had received assistance worth 14.68 
billion dollars of which 3.95 billion dollars were in the ' 
shape of grants, including The Indus Basin Replacement Prog­
ramme and the Tarbela Project, and grant-like assistance 
(repayable in non-convertible rupees), and the balance of 
10.73 billion dollars in the shape of repayable loans and 
credits. This amounted to 9.2 billion dollars, of which 1.8
billion dollars has been repaid leaving the outstanding debt
27at 7.4 billion dollars on December 31, 1978.
There was an interesting change, during the sixties, in
the shape and form of foreign assistance? the grants and
grant-assistance were transformed to loans and credits to be
repaid in foreign currency, "During 1950-55, grant and grant-
like-assistance was to the tune of 70 per cent...in 1955-60
this percentage rose to 79. However, it declined to 4 3 per
cent in 1960-65 and 26 per cent during 1965-70... during 1970-
75 it constituted only 9 per cent of the total aid received,
whereas in the following years it has ranged between 11 to
2 819 per cent." This demonstrates quite a remarkable trans­
formation in the foreign economic assistance which was extended
2 7. Pakistan Year Book, Karachi, 1979
28. Pakistan Year Book, Karachi, 1979, p.361
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to Pakistan, and there is an obvious conclusion, that is 
to state that Pakistan did not receive many gifts, grants 
or grant-assisted foreign economic assistance but credits 
and loans, and at very high rate of interests at that, to 
say the least, "Pakistan received credits totalling dollar 
122.2 million for five development projects from...Inter­
national Development Association (IDA), during 1978...70 
million for salinity control and reclamation project In the 
Punjab? dollar 35 million for Tarbela? dollar 12.5 million 
for the Punjab extension and agricultural development project,
dollar 3 million credit for hill farming.. ..1.7 million for
29the Hazara forestry technical assistance project.
*With the inflow of aid 
in 1950, the trend of development moved fast towards creating 
an infra-structure e.g., irrigation, power and transport, 
fertilisers, cement, steel and capital goods manufacturing 
units. The public sector development expenditure of Rs. 
2,636.42 million in 1971-72, rose to Rs.19,000 million in 
1978-79. Reliance on foreign economic assistance, as a result, 
was increased, especially from the Islamic countries. This 
put added burden on Pakistan's economic difficulties and 
further complicated the balance of payment situation. The 
balance of payments deficit on current account rose to 992 
million dollars in 1978-79 as against 489 million dollars in 
1977-78. In spite of the fact that the dollar volume of 
external assistance has increased during the last few years, 
its value in real terms has declined as a result of persistent
29. ibid.
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inflation both at home and abroad. According to the World 
Bank, Pakistan will require three dollars by 1980 to match 
what one dollar could buy in 1965; and more than two dollars 
to equal one dollar in 1970.
The aid pledge by the Consortium for 19 78-79 was 845 
million dollars in 1977-78. In addition another amount of 
104 million dollars was provided by the Consortium but out­
side the Consortium arrangements in 1978-79, as against 79 
million dollars in 1977-78.
Aid pledge from all sources:
Sources 1976-77 77-78 78-79
Consortium 728 755 845
Outside Consortium Arrangements 127 79 104
Non-Consortium 39 25 14 7
OPEC/Islamic Development Bank 240 226 56
IMF Trust Fund - 48 71
Total 1,134 1,133 1,223
The Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, which concluded its 
two-day session on June 6, 1979, decided to give aid of 
700 million dollars for 1979-80 fiscal year, which was 100 
million dollars less than Pakistan had asked for. In add­
ition, the Carter Administration decided to take economic 
measures against Pakistan because of its belief that Pakistan 
was in the process of making a nuclear weapon, in spite of 
repeated denials by Pakistan. As stated earlier the Americans, 
however, offered Pakistan military and economic assistance
30. ibid. p.364
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worth 400 million dollars, over a period of two years, as 
a sequel to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan,but Pakistan 
declined to accept the offer and described it as J'peanuts".
As a result of Pakistan's economic difficulties, 
especially with regard to debt servicing and the recurring 
charges, Pakistan has, at times, requested debt relief 
arrangements. According to Pakistan Year Book 1979 the Mem­
orandum of Understanding of June 2 8, 19 74, the Consortium 
members agreed to provide debt relief of 650 million dollars 
spread oi^ er a period of four years from 1974-75 to 1977-78 
in annual instalments of 175 million dollars for the first 
three years, and 125 for the fourth year; and the relief 
amount carried interest rate of 2.5 per cent and repaid over 
a period of thirty years including the grace period of ten 
years. Agreements were signed with France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, U.K. and U.S.A.
Pakistan also signed similar agreements with Czeckoslovakia,
31Denmark, Poland, Switzerland, Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
According to the Pakistan Year Book, 1979, The British 
Government has written off Pakistan's debt liability amounting 
to 76.421 million pound sterlings (162.3 million dollars), 
on account of principal and interest payable during the period 
up to the end of this century. In an agreement (June 26,
1979) the British Government agreed to the retrospective 
terms of adjustment of past British loans with effect from 
July 31, 1978, and the cancellation of debt liability.
According to an agreement signed in Islamabad on 22.3.19 79,
31. ibid. 365.
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Japan will also provide debt relief to the tune of 3.653 
million dollars. The grant and its accrued interest will 
be used by Pakistan purchasing synthetic rubber, chemicals, 
newsprint, steel and steel materials, machinery', scientific 
instruments and services from the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development.
Pakistan has developed special relations with the 
Islamic countries which have since been greatly expanded, 
especially since the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 and the oil 
embargo after the Arab-Israeli war of October, 1973. Pakistan 
has received valuable assistance from these countries, 
especially to meet its balance of payments requirements 
as well as loans for the implementation of the country's 
priority development projects. Pakistan was able to get 
total committments of 982.5 million dollars from Iran, Libya, 
Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and OPEC during the period 
1973-74 to 1978-79. The rupees generated by this assistance 
were utilised to finance development projects and other 
programmes.
With the collaboration of Abu Dhabi, Iran, Kuwait,
Libya and Saudi Arabia joint ventures in the field of fer­
tilizers, cement, textile industries and education have 
been set up.
These developments clearly demonstrate the direction 
and the realignment in Pakistan's international trade in 
conformity with the geopolitical structure in the region.
It is quite clear that Pakistan managed to cope with 
the new geopolitical structure in spite of the immense and
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overwhelming difficulties, especially since the state was 
dismembered in December, 19 71. The direction of its socio­
economic and political development is a response to the 
prophets of doom who were predicting an early demise of 
Pakistan after the Eastern half had been amputated, and to 
those who had condemned Pakistan for exploiting the riches 
of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and asserted that Pakistan 
was economically not a viable entity; and because of its 
enormous problems could not survive as an independent state.
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Chapter 4
The Pakhtunistan Issue
In 1947, Pakistan assumed the international rights and 
obligations of the Crown in India, and it naturally accepted 
the legality and established validity of the Durand Line.
But Afghanistan questioned the established frontiers because 
it was its view that Pakistan as a newly emergent state did 
not automatically succeed to the rights of the Crown in 
India since these, the Afghans believed, had lapsed with the 
transfer of powers on 15th August, 194 7. In the wake of its 
claims Afghanistan voted against the admission of Pakistan 
to the United Nations, thus casting the only negative vote; 
a Muslim negative vote.
At the same time the Afghan government demanded the 
creation of Pakhtunistan (Land of Pakhtuns-Pushtoons-Pathans). 
Pakistan rejected the demand and pledged to defend its terri­
torial integrity. In this Pakistan had been fully supported 
by the United Kingdom and the overwhelming majority of other 
countries. Mr. Noel-Baker, the British Secretary of State 
for Commonwealth Relations, on 30th June, 19 49 stated: "It 
is His Majesty's Government's view that Pakistan is in inter­
national law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the
old Government of India...in these territories, and that
1
Durand Line is the international frontier." This view was 
further affirmed by the British Prime Minister on March 1, 1956 
"In 1947, Pakistan came into existence as a new, sovereign
1. Parliamentary Papers, Commons, 1948-49, Vol 466, pp.1491-92
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independent member of the Commonwealth. Her Majesty's Govern­
ment regard her as having, with the full consent of the 
overwhelming majority of the Pushtu speaking peoples con- 
cerned...succeeded to the exercise of the powers formerly 
exercised by the Crown in India on the North West Frontier 
of the subcontinent. Her Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom fully support the Government of Pakistan in main­
taining their sovereignty over the areas east of the Durand
Line and in regarding this Line as the international frontier
2with Afghanistan....1
The validity of the Pakistani claim was also endorsed
by the members of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation:
"The members of the Council"severally declared that their
Governments recognised that the sovereignty of Pakistan
extends up to the Durand Line, the international boundary
3
between Pakistan and Afghanistan." The statement "deplored
4
statements and interventions by Soviet leaders" . It is true 
that SEATO joint statement in effect rejected Afghanistan's 
claim to Pakhtunistan; and this was the first time that the 
United States of America had openly and officially recognised 
the Durand Line as the international boundary between Paki­
stan and Afghanistan.
During the budget discussions in the National Assembly 
(March 1956) various members criticised the foreign policy; 
and in an effort to placate the Assembly the then Foreign 
Minister Hamid-ul-Choudhry stated, "as far as Pakistan is 
concerned the most notable achievement of the SEATO
2. Parliamentary Papers, Commons, 1955-56Vol. 549, p.1367
3. Keesings Contemporary Archives, Bristol,' 1956, p.!4840A 
Quoting the SEATO Statement issued from Karachi on 8th 
March, 1956. ' '
4. _Ibid.
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is the joint affirmation by the members of our stand on
5Kashmir and the Durand Line". The Assembly was not fully 
satisfied with the statement and posed serious questions 
regarding the visits to New Delhi by Selwyn Lloyd and John 
Foster Dulles before and after the meeting respectively.
Both the visits were considered as a part of the appeasement 
policy being pursued by the allies of Pakistan. The members 
further inquired as to why the British and the Americans 
had not stated in categoric terms that Kashmir was an integ­
ral part of Pakistan since the Russians had stated that 
Kashmir belonged to India. The Foreign Ministry's demands 
for grants and budgetary requirements were passed by 22 to 
16 votes? the highest proportion of votes cast against the 
Governments' foreign policy.
From the Pakistani point of view successive Afghan 
Governments have tried, at times, to elicit support in 
Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province or the Sarhad 
(frontier) region. Some elements in these provinces, who 
are at odds with Pakistan and sympathise with the Afghan 
claims, clearly draw their support from without and as such, 
hope that these two provinces might secede from Pakistan.
It is an indication, not of the weakness of the idea, but 
of the incoherence and inconsistency of the advocates of 
the scheme since there was no viable definition or definite 
approach to explain the extent or validity of their claim.
Some speak of "Greater Baluchistan" and others of "Pukhtunistan" 
and, except in rare cases, they have avoided defining the
5. National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 26th March, 1956, p. 9 6
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territories of "Pukhtunistan" (Pakhtunistan is also spelt 
as Pukhtunistan and is also known as Pushtoonistan or 
Pashtunistan and Punjab is also spelt as Pan jab). It has 
been defined at various times as a state stretching from 
River Jhelum ; to the Oxus; Margalla to the Oxus. North West 
Frontier Province to be renamed Pakhtunistan, within Paki­
stan, or a new country comprising both the Frontier Province 
and Baluchistan, or indeed, a greater Afghan state going 
down to the Arabian Sea with the Indus as its eastern border. 
Pakhtunistan as such remained an ill-defined area which 
would seem to include the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan 
and the North West Frontier Province. Afghanistan, with 
some help from dissident Pushtoon tribesmen and leaders, 
argued that this vast territory should not form part of 
Pakistan and that it should be recognised as the national 
territory of the Pushtoons. The Afghans are still unclear 
on the details, although the proposed Pushtoonistan would 
in some way be united with Afghanistan. This would entail 
the new and expanded Afghanistan which would not only in­
corporate a solid Pushtoon majority to match its Pushtoon 
ruling class, but also give the proposed state a direct 
access to the Arabian Sea (via non-Pushtoon Baluchistan)
instead of depending on Pakistani, or indeed, Soviet facil-
... 6 lties.
To the most vociferous group "Greater Baluchistan" 
means the incorporation of Pakistani Baluchistan, the Jaco- 
babad-Kashmore areas of Sind, the Dera Ghazi Khan area of 
Pakistani Punjab, a slice of the Frontier Province and all
6. See the World Today, London, January, 1974, pp.26-27, 
David Dunbar.
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of Baluchistan's Pathan majority areas in pockets adjoining 
the Sarhad region. The territory demanded from Pakistan 
constituted less than half the area claimed. The remaining 
area would draw the Afghan territory of Farah and parts of 
Helmand Valley and a good part of Iran, especially the en^ - 
tire length and breadth of Iranian Baluchistan. Its western 
boundary would run from Lingeh on the Gulf Coast to Turkem^ 
istan lU.S.S.R.) covering Kerman, Zarind and Turbat-i-Haideri. 
Its southern extremities would encompass approximately one 
thousand miles from Lingeh along the Gulf Coast to Sonmiani 
near Karachi, Pakistan. As stated earlier there is no pre­
cise territorial definition of Pakhtunistan and no coherent 
lines of demarcation. A postage stamp issued by the Afghan­
istan Government shows this map covering the, territory of
Baluchistan, blotting out its name and calling the whole area 
7Pakhtunistan.
The inconsistencies do not end with territory. These 
extend to arguments, supposedly on ethnic grounds, advanced 
in favour of the claims made by Afghanistan on Pakistan 
territories. Mr. Abdul Wali Khan, leader of National Awami 
Party (now defunct) and his colleagues vehemently supported 
the idea of four nationalities. But the father of Mr. Abdul 
Wali Khan, Khan Abdul Ghaffer Khan, in his 'Pukhtunistan 
Day' speech in)1967 and in his autobiography (written for 
him by Kanwar Bhan Narang) has stated that all Tajiks, Turkmen
7. Government of Pakistan, White Paper on Baluchistan
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Uzbeks, Baluchis and Pathans, whether they speak Pushto
or not, should in effect forget their separate identities
and call themselves Pukht.uns, living in a state extending
from Amu Darya, to the west as far as Herat, and to the
8south as far as the Jhelum River.
Surprising enough, whereas Ghaffar Khan advocated unity 
amongst different nationalities inhabiting different terri­
tories, he openly supported the concept of four nationalities 
as advocated by Wali Khan and supported their iright to self- 
deterirrination. This was and still is construed by Pakistan 
as preaching secession of the Frontier and Baluchistan from 
the federation of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan be­
lieved that Afghanistan with the help of dissidents in the 
Frontier Province and Baluchistan was sowing the seeds of 
secession over a wider area and endeavoured to attract support 
and sympathy for secessionists in the areas, hoping that the 
process might engender a process of simultaneous secessions 
and the eventual dismemberment of Pakistan. The strategy 
seemed to have been geared, according to the Pakistani point 
of view, towards concurrent and not consecutive action, so 
as to establish the fall of "Dominoes" at once rather than in 
broken successions, "Kabul's position has never been clearly 
stated, but it appears to be a straightforward irredentist 
claim to the Pathan-inhabited areas of the North West Frontier 
Province and Baluchistan though usually bloaked in the more 
respectable guise of a plea for 'self-determination for the
8. Government of Pakistan, White Paper on Baluchistan
See L.F.R. Williams, Pakistan Under Challenge, Stacey 
International, London, 19 75, pp. 70-75
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Pathans1 ... India has not publicly supported Kabul's position
on Pakhtunistan as the Pathan areas of Pakistan are sometimes
called - but Delhi has made it abundantly clear that its
9sympathies lie with Afghanistan."
It must be noted here that the Embassy of Iraq played 
an undiplomatic role in Pakistan in February, 1973 when large 
scale arms were discovered in Islamabad after the Pakistani 
aurhorities had forced their way into the Iraqi Embassy.
The Pakistanis "...accused Iraq cf being party to an anti- 
Pakistan conspiracy following the recovery yesterday of large 
stocks of arms and ammunition, mostly of Soviet origin, from 
the Iraq Chancellery here. The Iraq Ambassador, Mr. Hikmat 
Suleiman, has been declared persona non grata and the Pakistani 
Ambassador in Baghdad has been recalled...what was described 
as a veritable arsenal was discovered in the Iraq Embassy.
It included 300 submachine guns and carbines, 40,000 rounds 
of ammunition, 40 incendiary bombs and equipment for training 
in guerilla warfare. According to the Pakistan point of
view the arms were destined for Baluchistan where dissidents 
were engaged in sabotage and as such "...arms and ammunition 
imported by the Iraq Embassy under diplomatic cover were 
meant for distribution among elements 'within and without' 
Pakistan who sought to subvert the security and tranquility 
of the country... authorities here have been concerned for some 
time about the Iraq-based movement for Free Baluchistan which, 
according to informed sources, sought to establish an in­
dependent state comprising the adjoining Baluch-inhabited
11areas of Pakistan and Iran." A careful analysis of the
9. The Times, Londom, May 31, 1974
10. The Jang International, London, 14.2.1973
11. The Times, February 12, 1973
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Pakistani point of view would reveal that only a part of their 
argument deserved some credibility since some of the arms 
were meant for Pakistani Baluchi dissidents but the rest 
were destined for the Iranian Baluchistan especially the 
areas of Sistan, Kuhiri, Konarak and Chah Bahar (a military 
and naval base). This seemed to be in line with the Iraqi 
thinking, at that point in time, since they were annoyed with 
the Iranians because of their attitude towards 'the Kurdish 
problem.
The Iraqi arms were meant to support the idea of
"Greater Baluchistan" and were especially meant to subvert
peace and security in Iranian Baluchistan that would naturally
involve Pakistan. The Economist emphasised, "...arms might
have been meant to end upon the hand of guerillas not in
Pakistan but in the Arab Emirates of the Gulf, or in I'ranian
Baluchistan. The Iraqis have undoubtably been striving to
foment revolution in the Emirates and to make as much trouble
as they can for the Shah. They have financed, and provided
guerilla training and an office in Baghdad for, a Baluchi
12'liberation movement' in Iran."
The hopes of Afghanistan succeeding in its designs 
against Pakistan were influenced by Indian propoganda 
suggesting that Pakistan's life as an independent state 
was likely to be short; and the Afghans were convinced that 
Pakistan was a weak state, which could hardly survive the 
social, cultural, economic and military strains of the imm­
ediate future. Therefore, the Afghans advanced their claims 
with the hope of reaping a rich harvest after the eventual 
demise of Pakistan.
12. The Economist, February 17, 19 73
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The Indian propaganda and the Afghan claims against 
Pakistan must have given added incentive to Pakistan to align 
itself with the West in the interest of its security and pol­
itical independence.
The Afghans laid claims to an integral part of Paki­
stan in spite of the fact that people had declared their 
allegiance, in overwhelming majority, to Pakistan in a free 
and democratic manner: "On 15th August, 1947, after a pleb­
iscite, the Frontier Province, with every sign of enthusiasm, 
became a part of Pakistan. And in November of the same 
year this lead was followed by all the tribes up to Durand 
Line and the Chiefs of the Four Frontier States of Dir, Swat, 
Chitral and Amb, the former signifying their loyalty in 
open jirgas, the latter by means of Instruments of Accession."
Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have not followed 
the fraternal patterns which should have been expected be-, 
tween the two neighbouring Muslim States. In fact, these 
have been blurred and confused because of the Afghan attitude 
and outside interference. In December, 1955 the Soviet 
Union entered the scene openly by sympathising with the 
Afghan claims on Pakistani territory and the Pakhtunistan 
issue, the Soviet Premier Marshal Bulganin declared: "We 
think the demands of Afghanistan to give the population of
Pusht.unistan an opportunity of freely expressing their will
14 nare justified and well grounded." This statement apparently
indicated the Soviet displeasure at the Pakistani member­
ship of the American sponsored military pacts. Again in
13. Olaf Caroe, The Pathans, London, 1965, p.435
14. Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.14654
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March, 19 60, the Soviet Union repeated its support for 
the Afghan claims on Pakistani territory. The Government 
and people of Pakistan resented the Soviet interference 
in the internal affairs of Pakistan and declared in un­
equivocal terms the invioability of its territories. The 
then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Manzur Qadir stated
that it was "regrettable that the Soviet Union deemed it
15fit to interfere in this country's internal affairs."
He further challenged the validity of the Pakhtunistan issue
and invited the Afghans to hold referendum on its side of 
the Durand Line, "It is reasonable to assume that Pakhtoons 
(Pathans) whether they live in Pakistan or Afghanistan, 
want to be together and under the same flag. The flag can 
be either the flag of Pakistan or of Afghanistan...a refer­
endum has already been held among the Pakhtoons of Pakistan,
it is only logical that we should now ask the Pakhtoons in
16Afghanistan what their wishes are..."
The Soviet Union had hoped to gain concessions in the 
area which had been considered American sphere of influence 
after the British withdrawal. But the immediate reason 
for the Soviet support in 1960, of the Afghan claim, was the 
shooting down of the American spy plane U2 over Sverdlovsk, 
about 1100 miles inside the Russian territory. The plane 
had flown from Peshawar in the north west of Pakistan (West 
Pakistan), and was said to have landing facilities at Bade 
Ber. It may not be wrong to suggest that the Russians had
15. ibid., p.17323
16. ibid., p.17321
no other immediate objectives in the region, at that point 
in time, and that they were not seeking a confrontation 
in a region which is so close to their borders, and that 
their long term intere&ts could well be served by a policy 
of equal treatment.
This point is clearly substantiated by the policy 
which the Soviet Union pursued after the Indo-Pakistan 
war of 1965. The Tashkent Declaration of January, 196 6 
Was a feather in the Soviet cap, and Prime Minister 
Kosygin earned the praise of both parties for his un­
tiring efforts. The Soviet Union seemed to be the only 
participant to emerge with unqualified success and satis­
faction. Underlining the difficult nature of the task
facing Premier Kosygin, The Times had observed that the
17Russians were trying "to open a lock that has no key."
The fact that both India and Pakistan agreed to meet on 
neutral territory was an achievement in itself, and the 
fact,that the two agreed on a joint Declaration was an 
achievement that no other country could match. Soviet 
diplomacy made a dramatic breakthrough and proved that it 
was a major factor in the power politics of South Asia.
A peacemaker at the time when the Americans were waging 
war in Vietnam. And after the Tashkent Declaration the 
Soviet economic assistance to Pakistan increased,* in
17. The Times, 3.1.196 6
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addition, the Soviet Union agreed to supply military hardware. 
The Russians also quietly dropped their support of Afghani­
stan on the issue of Pakhtunistan.
The Brezhnev plans of organising some kind of coll­
ective security demonstrated the Soviet Union's increasing 
interest in the region; a very important element in the 
geopolitical developments of South Asia. The Soviet 
interests in Afghanistan could either be looked at from 
its preoccupation with security arrangements or as a cul­
mination of the Czarist dreams of expansionism or both 
(the overt Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December,
1979 is a case in point).
The attitude of successive Afghan governments caused 
innumerable hardships to the people of this landlocked 
country, and at times, jeopardised peace and tranquility 
of the region. Various unfriendly moves of Afghanistan 
eventually resulted in tough Pakistani retaliation in 
the Bajaur area (196 0-61) of the North West Frontier Pro­
vince after the Afghans had committed repeated raids into 
Pakistan territories. Pakistan also closed the Torkham
border thus denying the Afghans access to their traditional 
natural 
and most transit route.
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normally entered Pakistan for various jobs over the winter, and it 
is estimated that their number sometimes passed the two hundred 
thousand mark.
The relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan were normalised 
as a result of the efforts of the late Shahinshah of Iran. The 
Torkham route was reopened on July 20th, 196 3 and the Afghan trade 
was allowed to operate once again. These relations were further 
strengthened after the exit of Premier Daud Khan, a cousin of 
King Zahir Shah, who had ruled Afghanistan with iron hand for 
nearly ten years and made the demand for Pakhtunistan one of the 
main planks of his policy. A transit trade agreement was signed 
on 9th March, 1964.
Significance of Tashkent, 1966
The Tashkent Agreement which was signed under the aegis of 
the Soviet Union on 10th January, 1966 could be construed as the 
watershed regarding Pakistan's policy of alignment, and as a defi­
nite shift towards non-alignment. Pakistan was beginning to assert 
itself in view of the disillusionment the Pakistani nation exper­
ienced before, during and after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. The 
Tashkent Declaration was seen as a substantial gain for Pakistan 
because it was perceived as a further erosion of India's special 
relationship with the Russians. This enabled Pakistan to practise 
its policy of friendly relations with all the three foremost world 
powers, the USA, the USSR, and China, on a bilateral basis. Inter­
national relations and developments thereof directly affecting 
i Pakistan between 1960-66 must be considered in their proper per­
spective. For a time, especially in 196 3-64 and up to the war in 
1965, Pakistan sought to regain its capacity to respond to the 
dynamics of power-politics,. and remove itself from a narrow, one­
dimensional, all-or-nothing basis of relations with the great
- 88 -
powers, especially in view of the change in American attitude 
and policy vis-a-vis alignment and non-alignment. The Kennedy 
Administration was not as keen on alliances as the Eisenhower 
Administration had been. Non-alignment was not considered. 
'immoral1 and neutralist policy was accorded recognition and 
respectability. Alliances were termed as 'pactitis' and allies 
were being ignored. Pakistan decided to realign its national 
personality on the assumption that signals and friendship 
from one source alone could be an asset neither to itself 
nor t<b its allies. In the national interest, and in the larger 
interest of restoring balance in the region, Pakistan decided 
to activate its diplomatic ties with both the Soviet Union 
and China. This progress was, however, halted by two sets 
of developments. One was the considerable pressure put on 
Pakistan by the America's hostility towards China, and the 
pressures it exerted to force a change in Pakistan's policy.
The United States was expressing great anxiety and suspected 
every friendly move towards China. In August 1963, it sus­
pended a $4.3 million loan for the Dacca airport because 
Pakistan had signed a civil aviation agreement with China.
The cancellation in April 196 5 of an invitation to the late , 
President Ayub Khan to visit the United States, and the post­
ponement in July, 1965 of the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium 
meeting. A further evidence was the suspension of both the 
economic and military aid to Pakistan and India in '1965 with­
in the confines of American policy of 'evenhandedness'.
This was meant to hurt Pakistan in every sense of the word 
since India continued to receive a considerable quantity of 
armaments from the Soviet Union, and in addition, India had
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developed its own armaments industry.
The other set of developments parallel to the first was 
the Soviet attitude in the Indo-Pakistan war of September 1965, 
and the signing of the Tashkent Declaration under the aegis 
of the Soviet Union, and an apparent change in the Soviet 
policy towards Pakistan and their willingness to quietly drop 
their support of Afgahn claims regarding Pakhtunistan. Neither 
of these events would have confused Pakistan's foreign policy, 
had Pakistan been blessed with a leadership which was capable 
of understanding the sophisticated nature and complexity of 
international relations' and capable of maintaining serenity, 
dignity and steadfastness in the face of temporary setbacks; 
and had it correctly understood and analysed the true nature 
of the U.S. friendship and its foreign policy interests.
Pakistan could not antagonise China in the face of Indian 
and Afghan hostility; and in this the two had received both 
tacit and open support from the Soviet Union. The Indians on 
Kashmir and the Afghans on the Pakhtunistan issue. The Ameri­
can^ had shown a kind of ambivalence regarding Pakistani inter­
ests e.g. Kashmir, India and Pakhtunistan. It is ironical, 
however, that the correctness of Pakistan's policy towards 
China was vindicated for the United States by subsequent devel­
opments in the world situation, but at a colossal expense to 
Pakistan. As far back as 1965-66 Pakistan had conveyed to 
the United States that Pakistan could serve as a bridge between 
China and the United States, but it was not until 1971 that 
the United States took up this offer when Dr. Kissinger's trip 
to Peking was facilitated by Yahya Khan's regime; and the event
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itself, the inception of a direct dialogue between China 
and the United States, could not have been more felicitous 
for Pakistan.
Pakistanis believed, rightly or wrongly, that the sign­
ing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty in August 1971, the draft of 
which had remained under consideration for three years, was 
the sequel to this journey, and in fact, paved the way for 
India to move against Pakistan in a decisive manner; and 
dismember Pakistan by force.
The Americans not only put stringent conditions on the 
use of their military aid to Pakistan, they did not hesitate 
to express their displeasure when Pakistan used these weap­
ons against the Afghan intruders, for defensive purpose, in 
the Bajaur area in 1960-I-61, against the Indian forces in the 
Rann of Kutch in 1965 and during the crisis in East Pakistan 
in 1971.
The North-West Frontier
Coming back to the relations between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan one can safely state that the Afghan Government 
maintained its sympathetic attitude towards the dissidents 
in North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, in an effort 
to influence Pakistan's domestic policies in the two provinces.
The importance of the north-western entry where the 
mountain core of Asia narrows approximately 250 miles be­
tween the Oxus and the Indus and the Hindu Kush has impractic­
able passes through which both the religious zealots and sol­
diers have travelled. The first Muslim landing on the sub­
continent, however, was in the Mekran coastal area when 
Mohammad Bin Qasim landed in Sind in 711. Although during 
this day and age the Chinese domination of Tibet revitalised
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a long-dormant frontier, the North-West Frontier Province 
or the Sarhad remains the major geostrategic area which 
would increasingly come under pressure from the interested 
parties,and the Frontier of the old Indian Empire was simply 
on the northwest and more specifically with Afghanistan; 
all of which was inherited by Pakistan.
The boundary with Iran posed no problems, but an ex­
tension of Soviet influence into the erstwhile British/U.S. 
sphere of influence in southern Iran is bound to pose serious 
problems especially if and when the Soviet union embarked 
upon a policy to project and demonstrate its interests there 
as a "Continental and Oceanic Superpower". The Durand Line 
and the Pakhtunistan issue would become very relevant in the 
context of power politics and the very survival of Pakistan 
as an independent sovereign entity. And so would be the 
concept of alignment and the principles of collective sec­
urity as enshrined in the U.N. Charter.
Pakistani Baluchistan marches along southern Afghanistan 
and south eastern Iran, and is open to tribal movement across 
the border, and therefore, open to subversion; and an effect­
ive control of the Quetta-Peshawar-Kabul-Kandahar quadrilat­
eral could only be effected by one single political administ­
ration and therefore, an open temptation to the parties con­
cerned. This frontier is, therefore, very much alive and 
a potential zone of hostility.
Financial hardships and the preoccupation with the 
Indian and Kashmir borders have in a sense added to Pakistan's 
difficulties in dealing with these thorny and complex prob­
lems, of this region, especially in Baluchistan. A concerted 
effort has been made to develop the social and economic
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potentials of this region, and the discovery of iron ore 
and copper deposits has further strengthened the possibilities 
of greater activity in this region. The Government of Paki­
stan has been actively working to extend the supply of Sui 
Natural Gas for domestic purposes which had previously been 
denied to the region. Moreover, added efforts have been 
made to improve the supply of fresh water in the area.
The Pakhtunistan issue backed by the Afghans, the Soviet- 
American rivalry and the inter-tribal feuds in the region 
may very well play into the hands of either the Soviet Union 
or the ^ United States, who would hesitate very little in cap­
italising on the situation to their particular advantage, 
and embark upon adventurous move' in the region.
The Soviet Union might still be attracted to the warm 
waters of the Arabian Sea and the oil rich region of the 
Persian Gulf. The Americans and their allies are not going 
to take things lightly and would in all probability move 
swiftly to counter any Soviet advance in this region.
Pakistan has important trading links with South-West 
and South-East Asia, but Islamic ideology and cultural aff­
inities are the real bonds. But Pakistan must guard against 
possible subversion from across the Durand Line, and this 
subversion is likely to be directed at,the Baluchi and Pathan 
tribesmen who straddle across this boundary which was agreed 
upon in 1892 but has since been seriously questioned by the 
Afghans who, at times, have received overt and covert support 
from the Soviet leaders-; and in addition, have syrrtpathetic 
ears in Delhi.
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Chapter 5
The Indian Factor
The attitude of Pakistan and India to each other has 
largely been negative, although friction arising directly 
from the Partition itself waned through time mainly because 
India seemed to have accepted the existence of Pakistan as 
an independent Sovereign entity.
The Kashmir Dispute
The Kashmir dispute is more specific locationally than 
the general attitude of India towards Pakistan, and it is 
complex in detail.
The State of Jammu and Kashmir has an area of 84,5 71 
square miles which is only slightly smaller in area than the 
U.K. According to the Census Report of 1941, the population 
of the State was 4,021,616 i.e. four fifths of Lancashire. 
The following figures give a comparative percentage of the 
various communities in the State:
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State:
Name of Province Total
Population
Muslims Non-Muslims
Jammu 1,981,433 1,215,676 765,757
Kashmir 1, 728,705 1,615,478 113,227
Frontier Districts 311,478 270,093 41,385
These figures clearly indicate Muslim majorities in all three 
major divisions of the State though the Indians now claim a clear- 
cut non-Muslim majority in Jammu (according to the 1961 figures 
published in India, Muslims constitute 38 per cent of the pop­
ulation and Hindus 59 per cent of the population). This change 
can be explained first by the continuing emigration of Muslims to 
Pakistan and, secondly, by planned settlement of Hindus and Sikhs 
by the Indian authorities in order to strengthen their claims.
"The State occupies a strategic position in the extreme 
north-western corner of the Indian subcontinent. Not only does it 
have common borders with India and Pakistan, but also with the 
Chinese controlled regions of Tibet and Sinkiang, and for a shorter 
stretch, with Afghanistan as well. Less than fifty miles of un­
populated mountains separates the extreme north-western tip of 
the State from the territory of the Soviet Union"'*'*
The Kashmir dispute seems to have been engendered, in the ab­
sence of a precise understanding among the devisers of the partition 
plan of 19 47, in the Hindu obduracy which has failed to accept 
the "two nations theory" and in the Hindu •'‘’refusal to recognise
1. Lamb, Alastair, Crisis in Kashmir: -1-947-1966, London, 1966, p. 17
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the full implications of Pakistan-. Had the Radcliffe Award 
been pronounced on the majority/contiguous basis and had the 
District of Gurdaspur ( a Muslim majority area ) been trans­
ferred to Pakistan, the Kashmir dispute would have been nipped 
in the bud.
The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 ended the British 
Paramountcy over the Princely States, which were given the choice 
to accede either to Pakistan or India. The Maharaja of Kashmir 
failed to reach a positive decision to this effect though he 
signed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan on 12-15 August,
1947, but no such agreement was exchanged with India. The mass­
acre of Muslims in the State and the District of Poonch by the 
Hindus and the Dogra Forces resulted in a popular uprising.
The tribal Pathans from the Nofcth Western Frontiers of Pakistan 
entered the State on 2 4th and 25th October, 19 47, with the hope 
of saving their brethren, from genocide. On 25th October, 1947, 
Lord Mountbatten presided over a meeting of the Indian Defence 
Committee in which it was decided to send V.P. Menon to Srinagar 
to negotiate the accession of Kashmir to India. Menon flew 
back and forth, and during his second trip to the State capital 
he succeeded in obtaining the Instrument of Accession on 26th 
October 19 47 and on 2 7th October a Sikh Battalion was flown into 
Srinagar; thus began the Indian occupation of the State of Jammu 
and Kashmir
The entry of the Indian forces in spite of the Instrument 
of Accession is difficult to justify since the Standstill
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Agreement had entrusted the defence, foreign affairs and
communications to Pakistan. More important still the letter
accepting the Instrument of Accession on behalf of the Indian
Government clearly established the right of the people to
self--determination.. . a n  the case of any State where the issue
of accession has been the subject of dispute ... .it is my
Government's wish that.....the State's accession should be
2settled by a reference to the people.
Pandit Nehru emphasised the same point in a telegram 
sent to Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, on 
October 28 , 1947...",In regard to accession it has also
been made clear that this is subject to reference to people
3
of the State and their decision...." The promise was repeated 
in Nehru's radio broadcast of November 2nd, 1947. "We have 
decided that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided 
by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja 
has supported it, not only to the people of Kashmir but to the 
world. We will not, and cannot back out of it. We are pre­
pared...-to have a referendum held under international auspices
4like the United Nation-...." These promises and pledges 
abundantly establish the interim nature of the Indian occupation 
of the State, and the right of its people to decide their 
future is a fair and free plebiscite. The Indian leaders 
committed themselves unequivocally to the right of the Kashmiris
2. Lakhanpal, P., Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir 
Dispute, New Delhi, 1965, p.5 7
3. White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir, New Delhi 1948, p. 48
4. Ibid., pp. 52-5
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to self determination. This was further endorsed by the 
Security Council of the United Nations in a resolution passed 
on April 21st, 1948.
The preceding population figures establish beyond the 
shadow of a doubt that the vast majority of Kashmiris was 
Muslim, and that it was contiguous to West Pakistan. Pakistan's 
Western rivers either originated in Kashmir or traversed its 
territories before entering Pakistan and giving them much 
needed waters. Pakistan is very much dependent upon these 
waters; and so long as India maintains its occupation of the 
State of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan would continue to feel 
insecure and apprehensive of India's intentions. India as such 
continues to hold the trump card which could prove to be the 
decisive strangle-hold regarding Pakistan's economic development.
Kashmir is extremely important from the strategic point of 
view since it has common borders with China, Afghanistan and 
is separated from the Soviet Union by the barren mountains of 
Afghanistan.
The Ind.us Waters dispute dragged on for years before it 
was settled in 1960, mainly due to efforts of the World Bank.
The United States of America and Pakistan's other allies played 
a major role in this respect. In addition, these allies made 
a major contribution towards the Indies Waters Replacement 
Programme.
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The United States and Pakistan's other allies took an 
added interest in the settlement of this dispute after Pakistan 
had joined the various unilateral and multilateral defensive 
arrangements.
There is no denying the fact that considerable economic 
progress had been achieved in Pakistan and although the socio­
economic problems facing Pakistan had scarcely been so vast 
and complex as those of India, it is perhaps not surprising 
that Pakistan should have sought to strengthen its position in 
the 1950's by securing economic assistance from the United 
States.
To India this seemed to threaten the delicate structure of 
its version of non-alignment which India was endeavouring to 
build, and as such its immediate reaction was to wriggle out of 
its international commitMent . vis-a-vis a fair and free plebiscite 
in Kashmir.
As stated earlier, Kashmir is of greater economic value 
to Pakistan than to India since much of the irrigation of the 
Punjab and the Lower Indus Plains depends on the Indus, 3helum; 
and Chenab; the Pir Panjal foot hills supplied much timber to 
the Punjab, and there are enormous resources of hydro-electric 
power (Mangla Dam and Terbella Dam), anthracite, bauxite, iron 
ore - marginal to India's needs but perhaps sufficient to make 
much difference to Pakistan's future industrial development.
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The natural economic and socio-cultural links of Kashmir are 
decidedly with Pakistan.
The Indus Waters
"The Indus gave India its name. Now it is to give India a 
large portion of the waters of its eastern tributaries. This 
is provided for in the recent Indus Waters Treaty which took 
twelve years to negotiate and will take ten years to implement." 
The Indus Waters Dispute originated in the partition of the 
Punjab (land of five rivers) in 1947, and quickley became 
critical when, on April 1st, 19 48, the flow of canal water 
from East-Punjab (India) to West-Punjab (Pakistan) was cut off.
The Indus Water Treaty was signed on September 19th, 1960, 
between Pakistan, India and the World Bank. The treaty pro­
vided that the three western rivers the Indus, Jhelum and the 
Chenab were to be used exclusively by Pakistan, and India was 
to be allowed their use only for domestic, non-consumptive and 
agricultural purposes and fob the generation of hydro-electric 
power. India was given the exclusive right over the three 
eastern rivers the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej. Pakistan was 
authorised to use the eastern rivers for "domestic and non­
consumptive" purposes. In addition Pakistan was given the right, 
for agricultural development, to use the waters of Basantar,
Bein, Tarnah and Ujh tributaries of the Ravi. Pakistan is
6. Mueenuddin, G. Indus Waters Treaty, Lahore, 1960, p.7
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authorized to withdraw from the Basantar1 such waters as may 
be available and necessary to irrigate not more than 100 acres
annually may also withdraw.... for Sailib cultivation of as
much area on each of the four tributaries Basantar, Bein, Tarnah 
and Ujh, as was cultivated on 1st April, 19 60, and which cannot 
be so cultivated after that date, to maximum of 14,000 acres on 
Basantar, 26,600 acres of Bein, 1,800 acres on Tarnah and 3,000 
on Ujh annually. If,however, there are extraordinary floods 
during any year then Sailab cultivation may be extended beyond 
these limits. The treaty does not give Pakistan any rights to 
any releases by India in the tributaries of the Ravi or Sutlej...
Both Pakistan and India agreed to cooperate in the effective 
implementation of the treaty and accepted their responsibilities 
in the setting up of "hydrological and meteorological observation 
stations within the drainage basins", and to give early warnings 
on the flood levels of the rivers. The two countries also agreed 
to set up a commission of experts to deal with any disputes? and 
further agreed to refer any such dispute to a "Neutral Expert" 
in case there was a difference of opinion between the two.
The Indus Waters Treaty was accompanied by other agreements 
regarding the replacement works and the financial requirements. 
Although India was required under the financial arrangements 
to provide £62 million, she was not allowed to participate in 
the decision-making that affected the replacement work&« The
7. Ibid., p.9
treaty provided that in case of request from Pakistan for the 
extension of the interim period the Bank will pay the following 
money to India:
i) One Year £3,125,000
ii) Two Years £6,406,250
iii) Three Years £9,850,000**
The Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement was put into 
effect on October 1st, 1960, and accordingly the signatories 
agreed to make the following contributions:
Grants Australia 
Germany 
Canada 
New Zealand 
United Kingdom 
U.S.A
6,965,000 Australian Pounds
126.000.000 Marks
22.100.000 Canadian Dollars
1,000,000 New Zealand Pounds
20.860.000 Pounds Sterling
177.000.000 U.S. Dollars
Loans U.S.A.
World Bank
70.000.000 U.S. Dollars
80.000.000 U.S. Dollars'
Pakistan also agreed to make contributions in foreign 
currency (£440,000) and in Pakistani currency equal to 
£9,850,000. The Indus Waters Treaty provided broad terms for 
future cooperation between Pakistan and India, and it was hoped 
that the two countries would sincerely initiate concerned 
efforts towards a peaceful settlement of their disputes, but 
the hope has yet to materialise.
8. Ibid. p.16
9. Ibid
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These financial committments on the part of the United 
States and her allies won Pakistan's gratitude, and helped to 
provide the United States with an opportunity to enhance its 
standing and influence in Pakistan. Pakistan as such was in­
creasingly drawn within the American sphere of influence, and 
its alignment with the West was further entrenched. Pakistan's 
affiliation with the West projected predominantly by India, and 
carefully exploited to her advantage. India increasingly 
utilized Pakistan and her alignment with the West.
Considerable economic progress was achieved in Pakistan, 
although the socio-economic problems facing Pakistan have 
scarcely been so vast and complex as those of India, it is, 
perhaps not surprising that Pakistan should have sought to 
strengthen its position in the 1950's by securing economic 
assistance from the United States.
To India this seemed to threaten the delicate structure of 
her version of non-alignment which India was endeavouring to 
build and as such its immediate reaction was to wriggle out of 
its international committment vis-a-vis a fair and free pleb­
iscite in Kashmir.
India endeavoured to maintain a balanced foreign policy 
between the Soviet Union, the United States and China. But 
this was interpreted by the United States as being contrary to 
its global interests but in line with the foreign policy
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objectives of China and the Soviet Union.
On 17th October, 1949, the Indian Prime Minister Pandit 
Jawahar Nehru stated: "Inevitably she had to consider her 
foreign policy in terms'of enlightened self-interest, but at 
the same time she brought to it a touch of her idealism....
The main objectives of that policy are: the pursuit of peace, 
not through alignment with any major powers, but through an
10independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue."
India was determined to pursue an independent neutralist 
policy, but the United States continued to look for opportunity 
to extend its influence in India. The 'Point Four1 agreement 
was signed with India in December 1950. Mr. Chester Bowles 
was sent in October 1951, to appraise the Indian situation 
and to offer generous assistance for India's First Five Year 
Plan.
In 1951 a mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was signed 
between India and the United States, which enabled India to 
receive some military assistance from the United States with­
out any of the corresponding obligations that devolved on 
aligned States. In the beginning of 1952, another Agreement 
was signed for the establishment of an Indo-American Technical
10. Karumakaran, K.P. India in World Affairs, February 1950 
pp. 238-239
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Co-operation Fund, with further advances over a period of 
five years, totalling $250 million.
In the middle 1950's increasing influence was being exerted 
by the United States on the countries along the 'defensive 
perimeter'.
India, however, resolutely resisted the overtures from 
the United States, and firmly rejected all the allurements and 
refused to join the United States in its scheme of defensive 
arrangements. The United States became weary of Indian tactics 
and doubted its neutralist stance. Thus in August 195 3, the 
United States openly opposed the inclusion of India in the 
proposed political conference on Korea. Secretary of State 
John Foster Duller made no secret of his displeasure and 
termed non-alignmentas 'immoral'. According to the United 
States News World Report of 24th January 1954, Vice-President 
Richard M. Nixon, tended to favour military aid to Pakistan 
as a counter to the confirmed neutralism of India under Pandit 
Jawahar bal Nehru.
The United States took some time before it realised that 
India was not prepared to get involved with the U.S. in its 
Asian strategy; and just as, after the Communist victory in 
China, Japan had replaced China as one of the pillars of its 
Asian policy, so Pakistan was to replace an India unprepared
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to give its allegiance to the United States' global objectives.
This throws some very interesting light on the Indian 
version of a neutralist foreign policy, its posture on non- 
alignment and the pursuit of its idealism complied with its 
national interest within the field of international relations. ,
tt
Some critics termed it as alignment with both the Super-Powers, y^  ^
"Post-war nationalism and anti-colonialism, and the pressing 
problems of economic under-development, are the backgroun- 
circumstances in which non-alignment has flourished. These are, 
however, features shared by all Afro-Asian countries, including 
those which are aligned. While each has a strong influence 
toward non-alignment, clearly each can be more than offset by 
strong pressures in the direction of alignment". ^
12According to Burton in the broadest terms, non-alignment 
is encouraged by whatever factors contribute to the widespread 
if not universal desire of nations for independence, and by 
whatever current advantages there happen to be in non-involvement 
in the conflicts of others? and alignment occurs when defence 
and related national interests that lequire foreign assistance 
are sufficient to more than offset these non-alignment influences. 
Defence pacts, alliances and non-alignment are resultant of 
these two sets of forces simultaneously.
11. Burton, J.W. International Relations: A General Theory,
C.U.P. Cambridge, 196 7, p. 186
12. Ibid., pp.169-206
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President Sukarno in Belgrade in 1961 stated: "Every nation,
without exception, basically desires such a policy, knows that
it could help preserve world peace by the adoption of such a
policy. But the possibility of conducting a policy on non-
alignment depends not upon desires alone. It may be because of
historical background, because of the immediate national interest,
because of the geographical positions, many countries do not
have the opportunity, or even the capacity, to conduct a policy
13of non-alignment."
More powerful countries can impose alignment on weaker ones 
by the forced installation of a particular government e.g., 
Germany, Korea were divided, and that it was more than a mere 
coincidence that the Western sectors supported the Western 
policies and Eastern sector governments favoured the Eastern 
Block policies. They did not choose and they did not favour 
alignment. In addition, the occupying power ensures alignment
by creating institutions and governments which are likely to
★ - , 
favour alignment. Alignment is; neither imposed nor is’it' a con-.
sequence of imposition; it^is a deliberate response by a nation
to a<!set of circumstances which, in the view of its leaders,
compel it to seek the protection and active diplomatic, economic
and military support of another Power. But in the case of
Eastern Europe, Afghanistan and El Salvador alignment seems to
have been imposed. Pakistan is an interesting example of a
Cold War alliance which had little to do with the
* According to Burton
13. The Official Report of the Conference of Heads of State of 
Government of Non-Aligned Countries, published in Belgrade 
1961, p.26.
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Cold War. As a matter of fact the forces operating in the dir­
ection of non-alignment have been as strong upon Pakistan as 
on any other nation. Pakistan has always been regarded as in- 
tensly anti-colonial, nationalistic, and unconvinced regarding 
the merits of the conflict between the Great Powers.
The socio-economic, historical, cultural and religious 
affinities with the Middle Eastern countries, and relations 
with China and the Soviet Union on the one hand and with the 
West on the other, would seem to make Pakistan a classical 
case for non-alignment. But in 1954 and 1955 Pakistan went 
out of its way to align itself with the United States and its 
allies. This was done in spite of the opposition . in the 
Constituent Assembly and in certain parts of Pakistan. The 
reason for this alignment could be ascribed to Pakistan's gen­
eral defence problems, especially in view of the Indian host­
ility to Pakistan which led to Pakistan having common borders 
with Afghanistan, China, Iran, India and Burma, but left the 
defence industries with India. In addition the
nature of Pakistan created more problems for the nascent state. 
Initially no nation was prepared to offer support, especially 
in view of their vested interests in India. But in 195 3 John
fFoster Duller and the Eisenhower Admltnistrati on were looking 
for clients for their scheme of alliances against communist 
subversion and expansionist designs. Pakistan was considered 
an ideal bulwark against communism, especially in view of its 
Islamic identity. Pakistan's leaders were led to believe that
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such an alignment would not only provide them with much needed 
economic and military aid but full moral and diplomatic support 
for their case regarding the disputed territories of Jammu and 
Kashmir.
The alignment of Pakistan as such had very little to do 
with the Cold War; Pakistan wanted to involve other countries 
in its defence against a non-aligned nation, as a means of ob­
taining economic aid and badly needed military equipment, and as 
a remedy to the isolation from which its leaders were suffering 
after the assassination of Pakistan's first Prime Minister 
Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951.
Pakistan's alignment proved unstable and untenable even 
counter-productive since the non-aligned nations could obtain 
similar, if not better, benefits without in any way having to 
sacrifice their freedom of action vis-a-vis the Cold War. The 
causes of alignment are multifarious and do not necessarily re­
late to the struggle for power being waged in the leading nations; 
and one should not associate ide— -:ological conflicts with that 
struggle. Alliances and alignments emanate out of pre-conceived 
ideas regarding the attitude and behaviour of nations, out of 
subjective expectations, long-standing disputes and enmities 
coupled with traditional fears or out of internal unrest which 
cannot be contained by the people who are at the helm of the affairs.
Most, if not all, of these reasons could very well explain
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Pakistan's urge to align itself with the West during the 1950's, 
and once the realities of the situation had been realised and 
Pakistan had been rebuffed by her allies then the Pakistani 
leadership began to reassess and re-evaluate its foreign policy. 
Pakistan also realised that non-alignment in the prevailing 
power- politics had a wider significance than its relations to 
the Cold War. The non-aligned nations were of the opinion that 
as such their own security was not threatened; and that they 
were fully capable of defending themselves without external help 
or intervention. This supposition, however, has, at times, been 
invalidated in the light of events which have taken place since 
the end of the Second World War. The Sino-Indian conflict of 
1962, the Arab-Israeli wars of 1956, 1967 and 19 73 are cases in 
point.
Pakistan's relations with India have been marred by the 
crucial problems inherent in the basic conception of the part­
ition of the sub-continent. The Hindu leadership clearly deemed 
the Pakistan scheme and the partition to be a vivisection of 
'Mother India' to which they would never be a party. Mr. Acharya 
Kriplani, as President of the Indian NationalCongress in 19 47,
declared: "Neither the Congress no*f the nation has given up its
14claim of a united India." Congress asserted that if Pakistan 
ever became a reality they would do their best to make it 
economically unworkable and exert every effort towards its total
14. Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, August 18 ., 1947.
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collapse and ultimate end"....in effect they said, "Well if the 
Muslims want Pakistan, let them damned well have it and with a 
vengeance. We shall shear every possible inch of her territory 
so as po make it look silly and to ensure that it is^a viable 
country and when they have got what's left we'll ensure that it 
can't be worked economically," Hindus preached "Akhard Bharat" 
and the Congress had accepted partition in anguish and in anger. 
They were frustrated in their designs, of a united India and were 
shocked at having failed to rejuvinate the Maurayan or Ashoka 
Empire. They were bitterly disappointed at the non-fulfilment 
of their dreams of being a great power of the future:"...India
will inevitably exercise an important influence also develop
as the centre of economic and political activity in the Indian 
Ocean area, in South East Asia and right up to the Middle East.
Her position gives an economic and strategic importance in a part 
of the world which is going to develop rapidly in the future... .
The small national state is doomed. It may survive as a culturally 
autonomous area but not as independent political unit."
These principles seemed to be entrenched in the foreign policy 
of India as an independent state, especially when one reviews its 
attitude towards smaller neighbouring states such as Nepal, Bhutan 
and Sikki-wv. India seems to have nursed the same designs regard­
ing Pakistan and, therefore, has never hesitated totally to 
reject policies, and it appears, from the preceding pages, as
15.
16.
/'/
Sir Francis Tu'cker, While Memory Serves, London, 1950, p.25,7
Nehru, Pandit Jawahar Lai, The Discovery of India, Bombay,
961, pp.569-70
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if the Congress had calculated to this effect immediately before
the partition and no wonder that only 72 days were earmarked -it*. f
c O s
! " f C*for the partition. "I agreed to partition as a last resort,
c?tc4Yl(&
when we should have lost all....Mr. Jinnah; did not want a P^tt.CJs
C I  A  t 'v->'
Pakistan but he had to swallow it. I made a further condition
17that in two months time power should be transferred." Indians,
form the very beginning, had thought of dominating the Policies
of Pakistan. "There had been a fair indication of Patel's policy
on this subject in the leading article of (today^s) Hindustan Times.
Ismay drew attention to the relevent extract, which runs as follows:
If there is a settlement between the Congress and the League as a
result of which the Muslim majority areas are allowed to constitute
themselves into separate sovereign States, we have no doubt that
Union will not stand in the way of British establishing contact
with those States. It must be clearly understood, however, that
the Indian Union will consider it a hostile act if there is any
attempt by Britain to conclude any-Treaty or alliance involving
18military or political clauses." These words clearly indicate 
that the Hindu leadership was bent upon treating Pakistan as the 
secessionist part of "Mother India" which must be treated as the 
Indian sphere of influence. India prided herself as the only 
successor to the British Crown in India and has tried hard to 
realise this claim. Foreign observers noted this element of •
Indian foreign policy at the time of the acceptance of the U.S. 
military aid by Pakistan in 1954. "Every conceivable argument
17. Quoted in Kewal L. Painjabi, The Indomitable Sirdar, Bombay 
1962, p.124 (Quoting Sirdar Patel)
18. Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, p.72
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against the offer and Pakistan's acceptance of it was adduced,
every device of organized propoganda applied. But what it
all amounted to, at the higher levels of the Indian Foreign
Office^it can have hardly remained subconscious, was that, in
the average Hindu heart even now, years after mutually-accepted
partition, Pakistan as an independent state had no real right
to exist; she must not devise a foreign policy of her own; her
19destiny was to be an Indian satellite."
The former President of Pakistan has stated similar views 
in his autobiography while discussing the essential features 
of (the)Indian foreign policy "At the back of it all was India's
■k
ambition to absorb Pakistan or turn her into a satellite". This 
t UtMliquid
is further vindicated by India's ready acceptance of the U.S. 
and Commonwealth military aid (including an "air umbrella") 
in 1962, when she suffered setback on the disputed McMahon Line. 
India was not ashamed to have accepted so graciously^ the very 
aid for which she had so ruthlessly criticised Pakistan on the 
pretext that Pakistan had brought the cold war and tension in 
the area. The irony of it was that India had entered into a 
"Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement" with U.S.A. in 1951. The 
agreement was reached through an exchange of letters between 
Mr. James E. Webb, the Acting Secretary of State, and Mrs. Vi jay 
Lakshmi Pandit, the Indian Ambassador in Washington. On March 
7th, 1951, Mr. Webb wrote "The Government of the United States
of America understands that the Government of India is prepared. ...
19. Ian Stephens, Pakistan, Aylesbury, 196 4, pp.26 7-26 8
* Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p.115
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to participate effectively in arrangements for individual
and collective self-defence... to participate in the defence
of the area of which it is a part, and that it will not under-
20take any act of aggression against any other state." To
this Mrs. Pandit replied: "I have now the honour to inform you
that the Government of India are in agreement with the terms,
21conditions and assurances proposed." Pakistan entered into
the mutual assistance agreement openly, India satisfied her
wishes in a more subtle manner to further shroud her posture
of non-alignment. It would not be wrong to suggest here that
India took the initiative in stirring up the trouble with the
Chinese, "General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Indicated in a secret Congressional testimony
made public here today that India might have started the border
22fight with Communist China."
\A (£
2 3 • ' fThe Nehru move against the Chinese in 1962 was calculated fit
to secure massive military and economic assistance from all 
sides? and. as a result India reaped a rich harvest in the shape 
of western military aid of which the emergency aid alone is 
reported to have amounted to approximately $120 million. But 
Nehru also succeeded in creating bigger gulfs between his 
countrymen and the Chinese who had once been acclaimed as broth­
ers (the Indian slogan: Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai). In essence
20. United States Treaties and other International Agreements, 
Department of State, Washington D.C. Vol.2. Part 1, 1951, p. 872
21. Ibid., p.874
22. New York Times, 16.12.1962
23. It would not be out of place to suggest here that the Indians 
were confident at the time that the Chinese would not retaliate 
in an overwhelming fashion to counter the Indian moves in the 
area.
- 115 -
his China policy failed him and his non-aligned posture,
which had already been described as "alignment with both the
super-blocks" and "immoral". G.W. Chau dhurry has given a good
analysis of N.’ehru's ambition in South Asia: "Nehru seemed to
be sensitive to anything in South Asia of which he was not the
architect. India wants to establish a "sphere of influence"
24in South Asia." For achieving his ambitions to be the in­
spired and undisputed leader of South Asia, Nehru had set his 
eyes on Pakistan with a view either to tothl re-annexation or 
to re-incorporation in an Indian dominated confederal structure.
"As late as 196 3, Nehru regarded Pakistan as an area which should
25be re-incorporated into an Indian dominated confederation."
In spite of the Indian Foreign OfficeSdeclaration^that
"Pakistan has come to stay as a viable political and economic 
2 6entity," it is very difficult to envisage a real change of 
heart on the part of Hindus and the Indian hierarchy. The 
former President Ayub of Pakistan explained the Indian concept 
of "Akhand Bharat" and "Bharat Varsha" in the following lines: 
"The Indian theoreticians were claiming boundaries from the 
Oxus to the Mekong.... India was not content with her present 
sphere of influence and she knew Pakistan had. the will,... to 
frustrate her, ... ,designs. She wanted to browbeat us into sub­
servience. All we wanted was to live as equal and nonourable
24. Chaudhury, G.W. Pakistan Relations with India, London, 1968, p.4
y ^
25. ']Jager F.N. , The United States and Pakistan: A Failure of
Diplomacy, Orbis, Vol.IX, No. 3, 1965
26. The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 2 7. 8. 196 7
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neighbours, but to that India would never agree. It was 
Brahmin.... arrogance that forced us to seek a homeland of 
our own where we could order our life according to our think­
ing and faith.... There was fundamental opposition between the 
ideologies of India and Pakistan,u The whole Indian society 
was based on class distinction in which even the shadow of a
27low-caste man was enough to pollute a member of the high caste."
2 8The former Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger has 
very lucidly explained and analysed the Indian attitude vis-a- 
vis the creation of Pakistan. According to him Pakistan's very 
existence was an affront to Indian nationalists who had, like 
other leaders of independence movements, dreamed of claiming 
all the territory ruled by the former colonial power. A Muslim 
Pakistan was considered by India as a potential threat to its 
own national cohesion, and the presence of more than fifty 
million Muslims in India sooner or later could pose serious 
threat to Indian unity by claiming their own national existence.
In the 1950's and 1960's, the United States, oblivious to 
the newly emergent countries' absorption with themselves, sought 
to fit them into its own preconceptions; and Accepted Prime Minister 
Jawahar Lai Nehru's claim to be the neutral moral arbiter of 
world affairs. The United States failed to perceive that this 
was precisely the policy by which a weak nation seeks influence 
out of all proportion to its strength, or that India rarely 
matched its international pretensions with a willingness to 
assume risks, except on the sub-continent where it saw itself
2 7. Khan, M. Ayub, Friends not Masters p.172
28. Kissinger H. The Whitetiouse Years, Weidenfeld and Nicl/olson,
and Michael Joseph, London, 1979, ppl845-49 /
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destined for pre-eminence. The United States treated 
Pakistan merely as an ally with military potential to counter 
communist subversion or aggression. The United States never 
realized or, in fact, recognized the fact that the vast major­
ity of Pakistanis considered India to be the real threat, the 
very country that the United States had enshrined in the panth­
eon of abstract morality and that in turn the armi/ng of Pakistan 
was viewed with suspicion and apprehension; and as such was 
undermining the United States1 attempts to find favour with 
India.
This is the clearest possible exposition of the American 
aims and objectives within the concept of their global object­
ives which, unfortunately, the Pakistani leaders failed to 
perceive; and in a state of fantasy continued to legitimise 
their policy of alignment till 1965 when they were 'crudely 
shaken by the so called 'even-handedness1 policy of the United 
States and its allies. This was deceptive in nature and content, 
and the practical consequence was to injure and cripple Pakistan, 
since India received most of its arms either from the Communist 
nations or from its own well established armouries. The United 
States seemed to consider the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War as a pretext 
to disentangle itself to some degree.
Pakistan should have realized the shift in the American 
policy which was initiated by the Kennedy Administration in 1961. 
Washington's interest in Pakistan cooled noticeably; verbal 
assurances of American protection came increasingly to be sub-
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-stituted for military hardware.
The United States showered its generosity over non-aligned 
India, especially after the Sino-Indian border conflict. Paki­
stan's normalisation of relations with China were suspect in 
the American eyes; and the Border Agreement in 1963 was received 
with considerable distaste in Washington. India had not yet 
disillusioned Americans by its nuclear test and the assumption of 
authoritarian rule. Emotional ties with the World's most pop­
ulous democracy remained intact. Large annual aid proportions 
were proposed by the Administration and passed by the Congress 
with little opposition.
If India basked in Congressional warmth and was subject to 
Presidential indifference, Pakistan's situation was exactly the 
reverse. The irony of it all was the fact that the 'most allied 
ally' was being crudely rebuffed with a view to nurturing 
closer ties with non-aligned India.
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C hapter 6
Pakistan the Arabs and Cento
The Arab countries have generally been sympathetic and friendly 
towards Pakistan, and its relations with Saudi Arabia and Jordan 
have been particularly good. Pakistan has always supported the Arabs 
especially with regard to Palestine. However, these relations have 
been clouded and marred since Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact on 
September 23, 1955, because the Arab countries especially Egypt 
considered the Pact contrary to their interests, "Egypt was opposed 
to joining military alliances sponsored by the west which were contrary 
to her interests, and was pursuing a policy of neutrality between 
world blocks ... what was good for Pakistan was not necessarily good 
for Egypt, and that both countries had their own problems which 
necessitated a different approach to various problems."'*' The Arabs 
criticised the Baghdad Pact and expressed concern that it was designed 
to disrupt and divide the Arab World. These fears may not have been 
totally unfounded since Pakistani attitude, as a member of the Pact, 
during the Suez Crisis in 1956, was confused and illogical; and it 
would not be wrong to suggest that considerable damage was done to 
Pakistani image in the Arab World by the statement of her Prime 
Minister, Mr. Suhrawardy, on 23rd Novenfoer, 1956, "The Suez Canal must 
be cleared as soon as possible and the U.N. must see to it that all 
hindrances and obstructions are removed. We are beginning to feel the 
results of its closure, and our economy will be seriously disturbed if 
the Canal is not cleared soon. Our entire economic policy may well have
1. Keesings Contemporary Archives, Bristol, 1956, p. 14160.
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to be reorientated to meet the situation. Indeed, there are many
countries who, with us, wonder what requirements of military strategy
or tactics necessitated the sinking of so many ships in the Canal,
thereby adversely affecting the lifeline of so many countries who
2
depend upon it for their trade and their essential supplies." 
President Nasser viewed this as anti-Egypt and anti-Arab, and 
rejected Pakistan’s earlier offer of a contingent for the United 
Nations Emergency Forces.
The Arabs were led to believe that Pakistan could not be a 
genuine friend of the Arabs so long as it remained a partner of both 
Britain and France, who had committed aggression against Egypt in 
collusion with Israel. Pakistan managed to salvage seme of its lost 
prestige when Turkey announced on Novenfoer 29, 1956, that she had 
recalled her minister Mr. Istinyeli from Israel "Until the Palestine
3
question has been finally settled with Justice." This move was 
reported to have been successfully initiated by Pakistan intending to 
recover its position and to strengthen the Baghdad Pact.
On July 14, 1958, the military coup led by General Abdul Karim 
Qassem ousted Premier Nuri-as-Saeed and his pro-western government in 
Iraq, and consequently on March 24, 1959, Iraq decided to withdraw 
from the Baghdad Pact. The withdrawal of Iraq changed the whole 
complexion of the western oriented defensive arrangements along the
2. Ibid., p. 15231.
3. Ibid.
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southern periphery of the Soviet Union since its primary objectives 
of drawing the Arabs, with their mineral wealth and strategic 
position, into the western fold were largely alienated; and the plans 
to contain the possible "communist subversion" in the area seemed to 
have backfired. The validity of this argument is established since 
the three regional members of the Pact (Pakistan, Iran and Turkey) 
evolved an understanding with the Soviet Union, and apparently 
succeeded in defusing the tension in the area.
The Military Revolution (October 27, 1958) in Pakistan was 
instrumental in changing its attitude towards the defensive pacts, 
and it was further helped by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 
which had labelled these military pacts as "pactitis". As a result 
a new relationship was initiated between Pakistan and Egypt. The 
visit of President Ayub to Egypt in 1960, considerably helped to 
remove the unfortunate misunderstandings between the two countries, 
and relations have been improving ever since.
The change of government in Pakistan in 1958 was responsible for 
re-aligning Pakistan’s foreign policy. The process of change was 
gradual and painful. The 'most allied ally' was finding out for 
itself the cost of alignment and as a result started the process of 
disentanglement. A considered and authoritative exposition of 
Pakistan's policy of 'bilateralism' is contained in Ayub's book 
Friends Not Masters , and in his successor President General Agha 
Muhammad Yahya Khan's address to the Iranian Parliament on 30th 
October, 1969. Pakistan's prescription of 'Bilateralism' of course
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is primarily meant to save itself from getting scorched by the 
friction between the big powers. It has never been unccmmitted in 
respect of Muslim countries and, as far as can be foreseen, never 
will be.
Regarding ’Bilateralism1 Ayifb' s argument was very succinct and
potent: "I knew of no other small country which has the somewhat
dubious distinction of having three such mighty neighbours. New,
this location is a source of weakness in physical terms but it could
be converted into a source of strength if we could establish normal
and mutually acceptable relations with the countries hemming us in.
With one of them, India, the prospects of establishing normal relations
do not appear to be in sight. We must, therefore, accept the situation
of implacable Indian hostility and learn to live with it. Then there
is the Soviet Union ... it should be possible to cane to an
understanding with the Soviet Union by removing her doubts and misgivings.
And then there was the People's Republic of China fast emerging as a power
to be reckoned with*.... All we had to do was to convince it of our
4
sincerity and friendly intent." The whole pattern of Pakistan's 
relations with others required fundamental re-thinking.
Some of the essentials in Pakistan's geographical situation had 
not been recognised, nor was there a clear concept of the nature of 
the political compulsions to which Pakistan was being subjected.
Therefore, Pakistan was forced by the chain of events to re-assess
4. Khan, M. Ayub., Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography,
O.U.P. Lahore, 1967, pp. 117-18.
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and realign its. foreign policy, and take appropriate measures with 
a view to protecting its: national interests. Experience had 
demonstrated that over-commitment to any one power was not in the 
best interest of Pakistan; and that the interests of great powers 
were constantly changing and as a result small but over-committed 
powers found it increasingly difficult to adjust to these changes. 
Pakistan, therefore, tried to hold a balance in its relations with 
the major powers on its borders and with the United States.
Pakistan did not try to play off one power against another and most 
certainly did not play on 'both sides of the street'. The small 
and medium powers can 'best satisfy their legitimate and laudable 
urge' for making a contribution to the world order by cultivating 
their small neighbours and by extending co-operation with like-minded 
nations with a view to lessening their dependence on outside powers.
Pakistan's Foreign Minister Arshad Hussain while commenting on
Pakistan's membership of SEATO AND CENTO in the National Asseirbly on
28th June 1968, stated that Pakistan no longer took any part in the
military side of these pacts and attended the Ministerial Council meetings
as an observer only. Pakistan had not denounced her connection formally
5
and preferred to let the pacts 'wither on the vine' .
In addition to these defensive arrangements Pakistan's relations 
with the Arabs, led by Egypt, were being hampered by the existence of 
very close and friendly understanding and ties between Saudi Arabia
5. National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 28th June 1968, p. 3192.
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.and Pakistan. The two Arab states had basic ideological 
differences, Saudi Arabia leading the conservatives and Egypt the 
progressives. In this delicate situation Pakistan had a limited 
room to manoeuvre between the two feuding factions. Arabia always 
supported Pakistan in its endeavours to win the Kashmiris their 
right to self-determination, but Egypt on the other hand followed a 
neutralist policy; and cultivated very friendly relations with 
India. Egypt objected to the supply of Pakistani arms to Saudi 
Arabia, because seme of these had found their way to the Yemeni 
Civil War, in which Egypt and Saudi Arabia were backing the progressives 
and conservatives respectively.
Consistent with its policy, Pakistan continued to establish 
closer relations with the Arabs. It signed the Defence Training 
Agreement with Saudi Arabia on August 7, 1967, under which Pakistan 
agreed to render technical advice to the Saudi armed forces, and 
provide training facilities. Relations between Pakistan and Jordan 
have been very friendly, and Pakistan has extended every possible 
moral and material help to the Kingdom.
The Islamic Conference at Rabat in 1969, proved that Pakistan 
enjoyed the status of a friend in the Arab world in spite of the 
Indian overtures towards the Arabs to weaken pro-Pakistani feelings: 
"India's foreign policy suffered a humiliating setback today as a 
consequence of the reports that the Arab world had sided with 
_Pakistan_and.had .excluded Jhdia_from .the Jslamic_supriit - conference
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in Rabat on the A1 Aqsa Masque fire."
Pakistan's relations with Arab countries have been improving 
considerably since the Indo-Pakistan crisis of 1971. These friendly 
relations have assumed greater significance, since the Arab-Israeli 
war of October 1973, and the consequent use of the oil boycott of 
the West by the Arabs and the dramatic rise in oil prices. Pakistan 
imports approximately 90 percent of the oil frcm the Persian Gulf 
area including Iran; and the prohibitive rise in oil prices adversely 
affected Pakistan's balance of payment situation. It could not meet 
these requirements on its cwn and in addition it was finding it 
difficult to finance its development programme since the rising oil 
and commodity prices resulted in the exaggerated worldwide inflation. 
During 1974/75 Pakistan received $450 millions from Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms. These countries promised Pakistan 
further financial assistance and there were reports in the press that 
the Arab countries were helping Pakistan to buy badly needed armaments 
'since her major source of supply (U.S.A.) had not given a positive 
response to repeated Pakistan requests for lifting the arms embargo 
which was imposed after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan hostilities. Pakistan 
tried in vain to remind the United States of its treaty obligations 
especially under the Central Treaty Organization.
The Second Islamic Conference which was held at Lahore provided 
Pakistan with a splendid opportunity to cement its close relations
6. The Times, London, 26-9-69.
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with the countries of West Asia and it seems to have succeeded in 
its endeavours to forge closer collaboration with the World of Islam.
One minor disadvantage of sponsoring the Second Islamic Suranit 
was the lukewarm relations between Iran and Pakistan. It is believed 
that the late Iranian Ruler wanted Pakistan to ignore Libya and 
withdraw its invitation to Colonel Qaddafi, the Libyan leader. But 
Pakistan refused to oblige and as a result the late Shahinshah 
declined the request to attend the conference personally. Ever 
since the relations between Pakistan and Iran have remained somewhat 
cool. Moreover, the Pakistani overtures toward the Arabs, especially 
the Persian Gulf States, have been suspect in the Iranian eyes, 
because Iran considered these States and the Persian Gulf as her 
sphere of influence. From a close study of Pakistan's foreign policy 
it can be safely deduced that Pakistan intended to seek closer 
relations with the Arabs and at the same time assure Iran that its 
intentions were friendly. This was the main purpose behind the 
late Mr. Bhutto's personal exchanges and visits to Iran. It should 
further be stressed that Iran cannot feel safe from all the sides, 
especially when Iran faced difficulties in the Persian Gulf, and 
an air of mutual distrust prevailed with the Soviet Union in spite 
of the increased co-operation in the economic fields. Pakistan 
was trying very hard to keep the delicate balance between its 
increasing relations with the Arabs and Iran, but this balancing 
act could cone under severe strains if Iran adopted an adventurous 
policy in the Persian Gulf; or if Iran endeavoured to woo India
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over and above Pakistan1 s interests.
Pakistan's relations with Iran were * : y good.yioPjoth the 
countries have refrained from interfering in each other's internal 
affairs, and have shown a good deal of understanding in matters of 
foreign affairs. Both Pakistan and Iran gained considerably in the 
socio-economic fields from their ccranon membership of CENTO. The 
western nations helped the three Muslim participants in developing 
transportation and comnunications. A micro-wave telecarrmunications 
network was completed linking Ankara, Tehran and Karachi.
In addition, the CENTO members started work on an all weather 
7
road and rail link between the three Asian members. This would have 
supplemented the already existing rail and road link between Zahidan 
(the main Iranian town bordering Pakistani Baluchistan) Quetta and 
Karachi, thus facilitating their mutual cooperation.
Pakistan, Iran and Turkey organised the Regional Cooperation 
for Development, on July 3-4, 1964, a group "parallel to but outside 
CENTO". This was intended to promote industrial, cultural and 
socio-economic cooperation between the three countries. The member 
countries reached a number of agreements in promoting the development 
of the organisation. These included a Regional Cultural Institute, a 
Tripartite Shipping Conference, a Joint Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, and an R.C.D. commercial bank. Pakistan, Iran and Turkey
7. This was never completed.
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agreed on joint industrial ventures, and among the products to be 
produced exclusively in Pakistan were Kraft paper, textile machinery, 
diesel engines, electrical equipment, aluminium sheets, machine tools, 
polyester fibres and wires and cables. A joint Iran-Pakistan oil 
company was to be set up and under the plan "Iran would place a newly 
discovered oilfield at Pakistan's disposal in return for guarantees 
that Pakistan would consider Iranian oil as a "domestic" product ... 
Iran and Pakistan ... hope to reduce - or even eliminate - their 
dependence on the western countries through a joint venture in 
exploiting and marketing oil ... The oil field is probably in 
Baluchistan, the desert province bordering Pakistan, where surveys
g
have been made with very promising results."
The member countries agreed to abolish visas for tourists at 
the first meeting of the Ministerial Council held in October 1964.
The conception of mutual understanding and cooperation between the 
three Muslim neighbours ushered a new era of political stability into 
the region. Bearing in mind their enshrined objectives the R.C.D. 
members kept the organisations' doors ajar for other countries of the 
West and Southern Asia and also those of South East Asia irrespective 
of their political alignments. Pakistan is reported to have sounded 
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia about participation as equal 
members in achieving the ends of the organization, in the collective 
interests of their peoples; but their response had been rather 
lukewarm because of their political compulsions.
8. The Times, London, January 26, 1970.
- 130 -
Iranian policy however changed ever since Iran discovered her 
economic power which geology has bestowed upon her, and the change 
in Iranian attitude has special significance for Pakistan which is 
already being pressed hard by India, Afghanistan and,by proxy, the 
Soviet Union. During the 1971 war Iran urgently warned India of the 
consequences if she sought to occupy West Pakistan. Reflecting its 
fear of a further disintegration of Pakistan, whether due to external 
subversion or internal fragility, Iran moved quickly to intensify 
her ties with Pakistan in the wake of the 1971 crisis. The late Shah 
visited Pakistan on 8th January 1972, and the late Shah paid another 
visit on 16th-18th January 1973. Iran reacted sharply to the Baluchi 
insurgency in Baluchistan and cooperated militarily with Pakistan and 
issued strong warnings. In April 1973 both Iran's late Prime Minister 
Hoveyda, and her Ambassador in Pakistan Mr. Zelli, affirmed the
9
importance attached by Iran to Pakistan's territorial integrity.
During the late President Bhutto's visit to Iran the following month 
the late Shah warned that Iran would not remain indifferent to, or 
oblivious of, any separatist movement in Pakistan.^ -0
Iran was totally dismayed at the event in East Pakistan in 1971 
and is reported to have voiced its- strong opposition to military action 
there, but this did not detract her from viewing the fact that India 
invaded and dismembered Pakistan, and considered it a very dangerous 
precedent, and which convinced Iran that she had to rely on herself 
alone and so should other regional states.
9. Kayhan International (Weekly edition) 7, 21 April, 1973.
10. Ibid, 19 May 1973.
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A chain of events made Iran come to that conclusion, first the 
Iranian point of view that America could not act, with any 
effectiveness, as the world's policeman, second, the withdrawal of 
British forces from the East of Suez, third the dismemberment of 
Pakistan and finally the inherent dangers of external and internal 
subversion in the Persian Gulf and Baluchistan.
It was generally felt in America that the Soviet Union sought 
to cause trouble in the area - using Iraq as her chosen client and 
instrument. It was also reported, but strongly denied by both the 
Russians and Iraqis, that Russia had a sprawling naval facility at 
Unm Qasr in Iraq and maintains an enlarged and active Indian ocean 
fleet. As such the Soviet Union seemed to go for the jugular vein, 
and the Persian Gulf is the oil jugular for America, the West and 
Japan. Iran was keenly aware of this fact and to dissuade the 
Russians from any adventurous move, signed a $600 million contract 
to supply much needed natural gas to the Soviet Union.
To counter any Soviet sponsored subversive move and to protect 
their independence and territorial integrity the littoral states in 
the Persian Gulf spent a good deal of their petrodollars on the large 
scale purchase of arms, and an arms race was in full swing all over 
the gulf. Saudi Arabia signed contracts worth $600 with the British 
for the supply of air defence equipment, and was also taking delivery 
of 50 F.5E's and $350 million worth of French tanks. The Saudi defence 
bill amounted to one billion dollars annually. Abu Dhabi ordered a 
squadron of Hawker Hunters and Twelve Mirages, and Oman spent more
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than half of her total oil revenues on fighting the insurgent in 
Dhofar, where Iranian troops were also engaged. Kuwait and United 
Arab Emirates were also spending millions of dollars on armaments.
Ittwas estimated that by 1980, America, the World's largest oil 
consumer,would be buying approximately 3.6 billion barrels every 
year (compared with 2.2 billion barrels in 1972), and other industrial 
nations wduTd be increasing their oil consumption and as such higher 
oil imports. The Persian Gulf is the only oil rich region which can 
meet these requirements, and yet the lifeline that connects the Gulf 
to the world - the route through the strait of Hurmuz, seems very 
precarious, and can easily be sabotaged by an unfriendly action, and 
a line of oil tankers can be effectively put out of action. American 
options would severely be limited so long as it continued to support 
Israel against the collective Arab World, hence the need for an 
alternative policeman and the ready appearance of Iran for such a 
role in the Gulf was an understandable phenomenon. Iran's econorry 
was improving rapidly and the late Shah seemed to be a strong, 
dependable and a willing ally. Iran's military hardware and muscles 
seemed to guarantee the free flow of oil to the industrialised world. 
This in turn would greatly depend on how Saudi Arabia and the other 
littoral states react to such ambitions, and as to how the Soviet 
Union views the American and Iranian intentions and interests in 
the region.
Pakistan's wooing of the Arabs was viewed with sane concern by
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Iran. Since the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, Pakistan intensified
its contacts with the Arabs and the late Mr. Bhutto organised and
hosted a large gathering of Islamic Heads of State in Lahore in
February 1974, where the status of Jerusalem and the Arab-Israeli
question figured prominently. The conference was a clear indication
that Pakistan intended to pursue its contacts with the Arab States.
In particular Pakistan's relations with Libya annoyed the late Shah
of Iran, especially the extension of Muammar Qaddafi's stay after
the Islamic Summit in Lahore. However, Pakistan and Libya have much
in common, apart from the religious ties, each has what other needs:
Pakistan has an abundance of human resources and negligible hard
currency, while Libya is wealthy frcm oil revenues and deficient in
trained personnel. If Iran, however, continued to distrust sane of
the Arab States, and latent, and occasionally open,rivalry continued
to exist between Iran and sane of the Gulf States, the Iranians are
likely to frown on any entente between Pakistan and the States of the
Persian Gulf. Although Pakistan's cultivation of the Arabs both in
the Gulf and to the West should not necessarily damage its close
relations with Iran, insofar as this leads to dilution of Pakistani
support for Iranian interests in the region, it may be expected to
diminish Iran's enthusiasm for ties between Pakistan and Iran.
Iran, however, was not convinced that the region's stability 
would be enhanced by a weak and dependent Pakistan and as such Iran
11. The Times, 21, 27 February, 1974.
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tried, for a time to bolster Pakistan's defence needs, which the 
Indians totally disagreed with. It seemed highly unlikely that Iran 
had accepted the rationale that India required an overwhelming margin 
of superiority over Pakistan as a contingency against two pronged war 
i.e. from Pakistan and China. In addition, Iran deeply distrusted 
India's intentions in providing trained personnel to Baghdad; and 
indeed, Iran very much suspected the Soviet links both with Iraq 
and India.
There were widespread reports that Pakistani pilots and military
personnel had begun to replace Egyptians in Libya and that these
military advisers were authorised to fly combat missions within the
Libyan air space to counter foreign intrusions. This development
was logical militarily for both Pakistan and Libya . had similar
12French made aircraft. Moreover, since the Islamic Summit at Lahore, 
Libya and Pakistan had established a joint ministerial commission 
which held its sessions at Tripoli and Islamabad. During their 
deliberations the Commission agreed to establish a joint bank, a 
shipping company, an Islamic centre and a publishing house. The 
two governments also agreed to facilitate the transfer of capital 
and a mutual exchange of commercial and technical knowhow. Libya 
also agreed to finance the installation of a fertilizer plant, paper 
and textile mills in Pakistan. This cooperation between Libya and 
Pakistan in the socio-economic and political fields is bound to
12. The Guardian, London, 19.2.1974.
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benefit the peoples of the two countries and strengthen Pakistan's 
close ties with West Asia and help to neutralise India's 
preponderance in the region.
As stated earlier Iran was not convinced as yet to the real purpose 
of the links between India and Iraq; and was worried about the larger 
strategic implications of close "... politico-military relations 
between India, Iraq and the Soviet Union. So entangled had the 
issues of relations between Iran and Iraq and India and Pakistan
13becomej that mutual anxiety gave way to mutual recriminations."
Recognising the importance of stressing the Islamic dimensions in 
Pakistan's external relations, the late Mr. Bhutto undertook an 
extended whirlwind trip of the Islamic Middle East from May 28 to 
June 1972. Since then Pakistan has been successful in cultivating 
the Gulf Sheikhdoms, by enphasizing the common Muslim heritage, and 
by providing trained personnel. As a result Pakistan has had a 
considerable success in consolidating its: commercial, political 
and military relations with West Asia.
Another important development was taking place in the context 
of the Middle East and Pakistani interests in the region. Libya 
and Turkey seemed to be drawing nearer to each other after the Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus. Both the countries agreed to a number of joint
13. Kayhan International, Tehran (Weekly Edition), 28-7-1973.
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industrial projects and to strengthen socio-economic and cultural
relations. "Turkey and Libya signed wide-ranging agreements in
Ankara that will bring Turkey three million tons of Libyan crude
oil this year and initiate joint military and economic projects
14between the two Moslem countries." Turkey declared her support,
for the first time, and demanded the complete withdrawal of Israeli
forces from the occupied Arab territories. Libya in turn fully
supported the Turkish position on Cyprus. This alignment could
be of iirmense significance both to Libya and Pakistan. Libya has
a large number of Pakistanis working in the country including
military personnel, and according to the Jang International, Turkey
15had agreed to supply about six hundred thousand labourers, doctors, 
engineers etc. Pakistan and Turkey have no points of dissension 
and both have been cooperating in a number of fields since 1954, 
and both were engaged in bilateral and multilateral alliances and 
economic arrangements.
14. The Daily Telegraph, January 6, 1975.
15. The Jang International, London, January 9, 1975.
Chapter 7
S ino-Pakist an Re1at i on s
Pakistan recognised the People's Republic of China on 4th 
January, 1950, and as such became the first Muslim country 
which chose to establish relations with this newly emergent 
Communist state; and the two countries exchanged Ambassadors in 
1951.
In addition, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Chaudhry 
Muhammed Zafrullah Khan, in a plenary meeting of the General 
Assembly held on 25th September 1950, supported the People's 
Republic of China's claim to its rightful place in the United : 
Nations. This was a logical step in pursuit of Pakistan's 
foreign policy which was based on national self-interest coupled 
with its geographical compulsions. Pakistan's proclaimed guide­
lines of foreign policy were to establish friendly relations 
with all the countries irrespective of their socio-economic and 
political idealogies. Pakistan, however, stressed that it would 
strive to establish closest possible relations with the Muslim 
countries consonant with its Islamic ideology.
The preservation of territorial integrity and political 
independence has been an obsession with Pakistan; and its anxieties 
regarding Indian intentions concerning "Akhard Bharat" have not 
diminished since the Partition.
Economically, Pakistan found it impossible either to establish
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or maintain a defence machinery which could provide adequate 
safeguard or effective protection against subversion or ex­
ternal aggression.
Pakistan, therefore, looked for friends who were able, and 
in fact, ready to bolster Pakistan's economy and capabilities.
The United States of America along with its friends and allies 
wasted no time in enlisting Pakistan and involved it in a number 
of bilateral and multilateral defensive arrangements e.g. Baghdad 
Pact (Cento) Seato. Thus Pakistan was actively drawn into the 
Western system of Alliances against Communist subversion or 
aggression. But Pakistan joined these defensive arrangements 
with a view to defending its territorial integrity and political 
independence against a possible Indian aggression. These diver­
gent interests presented a fundamental clash of aims and object­
ives amongst the signatories of these defensive arrangements or 
organisations.
Pakistan's involvement in these pacts drew a sharp criticism 
from India, displeasure from the Soviet Union, critical statements 
from Egypt and understandable objections from the People's Rep­
ublic of China.
According to S.M. Burke China's policy towards Pakistan, in 
particular, is an object-lesson in how to attain long-term 
national goals by calm calculation, forbearance, and diplomatic 
skill. In her durable Prime Minister Chou En-Lai, China enjoyed
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the leadership of a "past master of diplomatic finesse."'*'
There is no denying the fact that initially Pakistan, a zealous 
Muslim country openly expressed its dislike for communism and 
opted to support the policies of the West which was anathema 
to the People's Republic of China. But China showed a great 
deal of patience:' . s ; - - v -
One could also argue that Power politics were involved, 
and that Pakistan was justified in exploiting the Sino-Indian 
differences.
At the same time we must not forget that from April 195 4, 
when India signed .a treaty with China recognising Tibet as a 
region of China till the escape of Dalai Lama at the end of 
March 1959, Sino-Indian friendship was at its apex. Chinese 
and Indians prided themselves as 'Bhai Bhai 1 (brothers).
In spite of very close Sino-Indian relations China still 
succeeded in maintaining the delicate balance, and successfully 
avoided straining relations with Pakistan, and continued to 
follow a positive attitude towards Pakistan, although Pakistan 
was rapidly becoming more and more involved with the West 
through the various defensive arrangements.
The West considered both the Soviet Union and the People's 
Republic of China as potentially dangerous countries but China
1. Burke S.M., Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Historical 
Analysis, O.U.P. London, 1973, p. .21$
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succeeded in convincing Pakistanis that it was different
from the Soviet Union; and when Pakistan decided to accept
the American military aid, William Clarke of the Observer
reported from Karachi that it was 'most noticeable that
Communist China is not regarded as a grave menace, but rather
a fellow Asian country dealing with common Asian problems of
2population, growth, food resources and land reforms.1
The then Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-Lai criticised
the formation of Seato but emphasised that the principles of
co-existence should apply to China's relations with all Asian
3
countries including Pakistan.
In a farewell message to Ambassador A.M. Raza the Prime 
Minister Chou En-Lai expressed his sadness and the fact that 
he felt personally hurt over Pakistan's membership of Seato 
since he regarded Pakistan as a friend, but added that he fully 
understood its peculiar circumstances and hoped that it would
4
continue to play a decisive part in bringing peace to the World. 
Under the able leadership of Prime Minister Chou En-Lai, China 
had embarked upon a path which was to end up in further strength­
ening of socio-economic and political ties with Pakistan in spite 
of their ideological differences; and China decided to initiate
2. The Observer, 14 March 195 4
3. As reported in People's China, 16 October 1954
4. Hindu, 27 November 1954
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an era of increased understanding with Pakistan in view of
the developing relations between India and the Soviet Union:
"If Moscow is trying to tighten its links with India, it is
natural that China should examine the possibility of a link
5
with Pakistan."
Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy made a ten day 
visit to China in October 1956 and was warmly received by the 
Chinese leadership including Mao Tse Tung. Chou En-Lai told 
Pakistani newsmen that,"although Pakistan was a member of 
Seato, there was no reason why China could not be friendly 
with it. China and Pakistan had many points in common and, 
though they differed in some ways the two countries had no 
conflict of interest." This was a very constructive state­
ment which clearly established the fact that China fully 
appreciated Pakistan's peculiar disposition within its geo­
political compulsions. China's constructive attitude under
Chou En-Lai had made "new history in international relations
7
by giving so broad-minded a lead."
This point is fully substantiated by the various statements 
made by the Chinese leadership, especially Chou-En-Lai, who 
visited Pakistan in December 1956. His views were clearly 
defined and expressed in a joint, communique: "The two Prime
5. Manchester Guardian, 18 December 1955
6. Dawn, 2 4 October 195 6
7. Dawn, 25 October 1956
- 143 -
Ministers are of the view that the difference between the 
political systems of Pakistan and China and the divergence 
of views on many problems should not prevent the strengthening 
of friendship between their two countries.... they are happy 
to place on record that there is no real conflict of interests
g
between the two countries."
Pakistan was very much impressed by the sincerity of pur­
pose and the constructive attitude of China. Pakistan’urged 
the Government of the United States of America to recognise 
the realities of the situation and allow China to take its 
rightful place in the Comity of Nations, but unfortunately 
the Eisenhower Administration did not see eye to eye with the 
Pakistani view point and as such rejected Pakistan's plea that 
China should be recognised.The Americans were not convinced 
that China had no expansionist or aggressive designs. Their 
attitude towards China was seriously coloured as a result of 
Chinese involvement in the Korean War and the fact that China 
was a Communist country.
Pakistan projected a mature and realistic understanding 
of international relations which was fully substantiated by 
subsequent events.
Pakistan's Prime Minister made a remarkable prediction 
while addressing the National Assembly: "I feel perfectly 
certain that when the crucial time comes China will come to
8. Dawn, 25 December 1956
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our assistance." The events of 1965 are the living testimony, 
and proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that China expressed 
sincere thoughts regarding Pakistan, and in fact, stood by its 
promises.
This point is fully borne out by Air Marshal (Retired) 
Asghar Khan*in his book"The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965/' 
hie made a very pertinent statement: "... we were in a difficult 
position and needed assistance. I informed the Prime Minister 
that our immediate requirements were some fighter aircraft and 
some anti-aircraft guns and ammunition. Ayu.b Khan was keen that 
this assistance should be chanel.led through Indonesia ... Chou 
En-Lai appeared surprised at’the suggestion and said'... would 
cause unnecessary complications and delay....I then explained 
the military situation as we saw it and said that we felt that 
Chinese moves on India's northern borders would help to reduce 
the pressure against us in West Pakistan... any move by China 
against India would have certain international implications. It 
was for them to weigh these... extent to which China could move 
and the nature of her action was, therefore, a matter for them 
to determine ....; .we would, for the present, be satisfied if 
China concentrated forces on India's borders without any overt 
military action. Further action could be determined in the 
light of future military developments. He said that any action 
that China took would indeed have serious international
9. National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 25 February 195 7 
p.1097
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implications. China however/ was vitally interested in 
Pakistan's security and could not stand idle whilst we were 
being attacked....my proposal had such serious implications 
as to make it necessary for them to discuss things with Ayuh -
Khan Chou En-Lai1s response had been more positive than we
had a right to expect I was back in Rawalpindi ... and I
briefed Ayu.. Khan on my visit He was not prepared to do
this and said that he did not see what useful purpose this
would serve.... . Ayub Khan did not for fear of annoying
our western allies/ meet them until well after the war had 
ended.
This was not the first or only instance when the Pakistani 
leadership seemed to have acted in a feeble and ambivalent 
manner towards China? the representation of People's Republic 
of China at the United Nations/ the juridicial position of 
Taiwan and the 'Danger from the North' are cases in point.
In 1950 Pakistan voted in favour of China in the General 
Assembly vote. Consequently on the Korean War, the United 
States sponsered a draft resolution in 1951 seeking to have 
China branded as an aggressor in Korea. Pakistan abstained on 
this resolution. Pakistan again abstained in 1952/ when the 
United States called for the postponement of the considerations 
of Chinese representations. In 195 3 Pakistan voted for the 
postponement of this question. In 195 4 Pakistan joined Seato
10. Khan, M. Asghar, The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965, 
Islamic Information Services Ltd. London 19 79, pp.37-49
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and from then on its attitude on the question of China's 
representation showed scant regard to the real position in 
China in spite of the fact that Pakistan had itself recognised 
China in 1950,
In 195 7, Pakistan at first abstained from voting on the 
resolution due to procedural considerations arising from a 
slight change in the U.S. resolutions, but changed its vote 
next day in favour of the resolutions blocking China's re­
presentation by its legitimate government. It informed the U.N. 
Secretary General that the previous vote had been incorrectly 
recorded.
On 22nd September 195 8, the Chinese Foreign Office addressed 
a note to the Pakistan Government which in effect stated that 
both the Governments had identity of views as Asians on most 
international issues and yet Pakistan had si'ded with the United 
States, and therefore, China would like to know the attitude of 
Pakistan, as an Asian nation, on the status of Taiwan. Pakistan 
replied on 1st October 1958 emphasising the point that it had 
given neither de facto nor de jure recognition to the 
government in Taiwan and urged that the parties should desist 
from upsetting the status quo and as such the world peace. By 
1959, the policy of supporting the United States on the question 
of the legitimate rights of People's Republic of China was well 
established. In 1960, however, Pakistan chose to abstain, and 
the then Minister of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources ignored
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the American pressure? and in fact Mr. Bhutto addressed a 
letter on 14th October I960, to the Foreign Minister Mr. Manzur 
Qadir impressing upon him that Pakistan should vote in favour 
of the legitimate rights of China at the United Nations. Mr. 
Bhutto further pointed out that if Norway and Denmark (two Nato 
members) could vote against the United States, and Portugal 
(another Nato member) could abstain, therefore, there was no 
justification as to why Pakistan should not be considered a 
staunch ally, any less than these countries if Pakistan took a 
stand on the merits of the question, especially in view of the 
fact that Pakistan had already extended full recognition to 
the People's Republic of China.
In 19 61, Pakistan voted in favour of the draft resolution : 
to seat the representative of the People's Republic at the 
United Nations? and a decade later, the representatives of 
the Chiang Kai-Shek regime were ousted from the world organ­
isation .
In 1958 Pakistan's relations with China were put under 
great strain? and these deteriorated further in 1959. President 
Ayuf Khan criticised both the Soviet Union and China for having 
aggressive designs towards the sub-continent, and as such 
offered joint defence with India against any internal subversion 
or external invasion. According to President Ayub. Khan's 
thinking, China could move south through Burma and the Soviet
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Union could move through Afghanistan and Iran. These moves 
need not necessarily be military; ideological penetration or 
installation of Communist backed regimes could achieve the 
desired objectives. He, therefore, expressed his preparedness 
to collaborate with India against the possible "aggression 
from a third party" which meant China and the Soviet Union:
"The President, General Mohammad Ayub^ Khan, yesterday warned 
that in five years the Pakistan-Bharat sub-continent would 
become militarily vulnerable to major invasion from the north.... 
General Ayub Khan said that the invasions would not probably 
be directed against the bigger segment of the sub-continent 
Bharat, but Pakistan was also in the way. The President was 
last evening giving his impressions as a military man of the 
recent developments in Tibet and Afghanistan, flanking the sub­
continent. .... the position could be defended if both Pakistan 
and Bharat dissolved their differences and ceased to face each 
other with loaded rifles. Pakistan, he said, would very much 
like to defend Bharat in such an event."^
President Ayub; Khan expressed similar views on Novermber
9th 1959, " That Chinese occupation of Tibet and road-
building activities in Afghanistan posed a serious threat from 
the north..... " ^
11. Morning News, Karachi, 24th October 1959
12. Morning News, Karachi, 9th November 1959
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The Boundary Agreement
The dispute concerning the north-eastern boundary of 
Pakistan was complicated since the final status of the State 
of Jammu and Kashmir is yet to be determined. This sector 
involved "China's Sinkl:ang and the contiguous areas the 
defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan".
The boundary alignment commences in the north-western ex­
tremity at Height 5630 metres (a peak, Longitude 74° 34/E 
and Latitude 37° 0 3/N), generally running towards eastward 
and then south-eastward along the main watershed between the 
tributaries of the Tashkurgan and Hunza rivers, and passes 
through the Kilik, Mintaka, Kharchanai, Mutsjilga and Parpik 
passes, before reaching the Khunjerab Pass. Then the bound­
ary generally follows southward along the above mentioned 
watershed up to a mountain-top south of the Khunjerab Pass, 
leaving the main warershed to follow the Akjilga River, the 
Taghdumbash (Oprang) River and the Keliman Su (Oprang Jilga). 
The boundary line then runs up the Kelechin River (Shaksgam 
or Muztagh) along the middle line of its bed to its con­
fluence with the Shorbulak Daria (Shimshal or Braldu). From 
the confluence of the Kelechin and Shorbulak rivers, the 
boundary, according to the Chinese, ascends the crest of a 
spur and runs along it to join the Karakoram Range main water- 
shed, belonging to the Shorbulak Mountain. According to 
Pakistan the boundary line from the confluence of Kelechin 
and Shorbulak rivers, ascends the crest of a corresponding 
spur and runs along it, passing through Height 6520 meters 
till it joins the Karakoram Range main watershed. From this
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point the boundary runs southward and then eastward follow­
ing the Karakoram Range main watershed which separates the
Tarim and Indus dtrainage systems, passing through the East
2
Muztagh Pass, Chogri Peak (K ) , the tops of the Broad Peak,
the Gasherbrum Mountain, the Indirakoli Pass and the top of
the Teram Kangri Peak, and then reaches its southern extremity
13at the Karakoram Pass.
The two sides had widely varying claims of territory 
in the area. According to Pakistan the dispute related to 
a total area of 3400 square miles. According to the Sino- 
Pakistan Boundary Agreement of March 2, 196 3, Pakistan gained 
1350 square miles including 750 square miles which were under 
the actual control of the Chinese (such as Kuz and Sokh- 
Bulak). Pakistan also received the Oprang Valley and the 
salt-mining areas east of the Shimshal Pass. China, accord­
ing to the Agreement, gained 2050 square miles, especially 
from the point where the agreed border met the Muztagh River, 
picking up another crest line and running through the Aghill 
Pass. However, the Indians claim that Pakistan gave up a total 
of 13000 square miles but Pakistan firmly rejects the content­
ion. The boundary has since been demarcated on the basis that 
where there are rivers the boundary runs in the middle of the 
river beds, and where there are passes or dabans the watershed 
forms the boundary.
The agreement on border demarcation was considered as
13. The details of the boundary alignment are based on the 
Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of March 2, 1963.
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the first significant step in the evolution of relations 
between China and Pakistan. Its real purpose was to elim­
inate a possible cause of conflict in the future. This 
agreement was followed by the establishment of air communi­
cations between Pakistan and China when an air transport 
agreement was signed in Karachi on 29th August, 196 3. It 
strengthened relations between the two neighbouring countries. 
Sino-Pakistan trade received further encouragement when a 
barter agreement was concluded in September 196 3.
Pakistan's allies expressed their serious concern and 
apprehension vis-a-vis its dealings with China and Pakistan's 
increased interest in Afro-Asian affairs which were basically 
economic in nature and directed towards the exchange of ideas 
and experiences.
During this period of time relations between Pakistan and 
India had deteriorated because of the Indian plans to integrate 
Kashmir into the Union and because of the communal riots which 
broke out after the sacred hair of Prophet Muhammed was stolen 
from Hazratbal shrine near Srinagar on 26th December 196 3. 
During his visit to Pakistan in February 196 4 the late Chou- 
En-Lai declared China's support for the rights of the Kashmiris 
to decide their own future. A very welcome change in the 
Chinese attitude within the context of triangular relationship, 
especially since the Americans had been very lukewarm towards 
the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan.
President Ayub Khan, however, was not that concerned
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regarding the Sino-Indian clash in Ladakh; and according to 
Dawn/Karachi 4th November 1959, he described it as India's 
problem. According to Morning News, Karachi, 4th November 
1959, Ayub Khan simply described it as India's concern, and 
yet a few days later Ayub Khan talked, in emphatic terms, of 
the danger from the north and was offering joint defence with 
India.
There is no denying the fact that there was some truth 
and foresight in Ayub Khan's utterances as the later events 
unfolded themselves. How far one can apportion the blame is 
a matter for conjecture and serious debate. It would not be 
wrong to suggest that the parties concerned felt genuinely 
that they were taking measured steps with a view to protecting 
their interests in the region.
As far as Sino-Pakistan relations were concerned China 
showed a sense of magnanimity, generosity and astute sense of 
propriety within the context of international relations in the 
face of positively negative statements and assertions from the 
Pakistani leadership.
The relationship between Pakistan and China has withstood 
the Vagaries of time. Its strength lies in their common 
interest i.e. India. Although it has been suggested that the 
ideologies of Pakistan and China were incompatible, and that a
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friendly working arrangement cannot, therefore, be sustained 
between them. It was further argued that Pakistan's relations 
with China, being of a subjective nature, will be unable to 
withstand the stress and strains of time since the predominant 
reason of their relationship was based upon the maxim 'my enemy's 
enemy is my friend'; a relationship based upon tenuous and 
feeble arguments. And as such could be described as untenable 
assumptions. States deal with states, as such, and not with 
their social systems and ideologies. There is no denying the 
fact that since the very inception of Pakistan the various 
Governments have stressed the need and desire to establish 
closer links with the Islamic World but at the same time all 
the Governments have emphasised the need to develop and foster 
friendly relations with all states, especially its neighbours.
If the preceding argument were to be pursued to its log­
ical conclusion, Pakistan should have friendly relations only 
with Muslim states and as such isolate itself from the rest of 
the world, knowing full well that Islam, as a political force 
suffered more at the hands of Christendom than any other ideol­
ogy. It was the Christian nations which held almost all Muslim 
states under imperial bondage for centuries, destroying their 
socio-economic and cultural fabric to such an extent the world 
of Islam is still in the process of recovering from the damage 
inflicted.
Pakistan's relations with China were put under some strains
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during the crisis in its former province East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh), during 1971. China did not talk in terms of 
safeguarding Pakistan's territorial integrity and political 
independence but was content with emphasising the need for 
preserving Pakistan's sovereignty and political independence; 
and this practically meant that China was only interested 
in the unity of West Pakistan (present boundaries of Pakistan). 
China could not support a repressive military regime against 
a revolutionary movement. China, however, emphatically con­
demned the Indian military intervention which eventually led 
to the dismemberment of Pakistan in December 1971.
The emergency military aid for India was agreed upon 
between Kennedy and MacMillan on 29th December, 1962, at 
Nassau. Pakistan expressed its serious concern and protested 
that the Americans had resiled from their understanding 
to consult Pakistan before initiating any military assistance 
to India. Pakistan received a bigger shock on 30th June,
196 3 when Kennedy and MacMillan agreed to extend long-term 
military aid to India, during their meeting at Birch Grove, 
Sussex.
The Sino-Soviet split in 195 8 opened various avenues 
for China to improve relations with Pakistan. These overtures 
received further boost when India and China clashed in the 
Ladakh Region, and later during the Sino-Indian border con­
flict in October 1962.
India continued to receive military hardware from the
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Soviet Union during this conflict. In addition, India re­
ceived substantial military aid from Pakistan's main ally
i.e. the United States. The "most allied ally" was left 
out in the cold.
The Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 1971 was very crucial 
in this pentangular equation and world power-politics.
This enabled the Indians to dismember Pakistan in December 
1971, and established the fact that the Indo-Soviet relations 
had deeper roots than the foreign policy makers in Islamabad 
had either envisaged or calculated. Pakistan's allies had 
once again reneged on their treaty obligations. China was 
obliged to stay out of the hostilities and its support was 
visible only in the political, moral and diplomatic fields. 
China was unable to help Pakistan militarily for the fear 
of Russian retaliation in the Aksai-Chin border region. 
Whereas the Indo-Soviet cooperation established its credi­
bility and reinforced the logicalty of balance of power 
in terms of regional power-politics.
The triangular relationship between China, India and 
Pakistan as such ought to be studied, examined and analysed 
within the context of regional alignment than cold war 
alignment or in the context of global balance of power.
This relationship, in the future, is likely to be determined 
by the logic of local and regional geopolitical compulsions 
than cold war power-politics.
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Since 1971 a modified policy of alignment has emerged 
in Sino-Pakistan relations, impressed partially by the logic 
of great-power relationships. India's close ties with the 
U.S.S.R. and the Sino-Soviet rift have created a situation 
where Pakistan and China are logically close in terms of 
a regional balance of power. It is this, given the previous 
history of Sino-Indian differences and the foundations laid 
by Chou-En-Lai, which has enabled the relationship to sur­
vive various changes of leadership both in Islamabad and 
Peking, as well as the strengthening of China's ties with 
the United States.
Pakistan's relations with China, it could be argued, 
should be understood as an essential part of power-politics 
as practised by the five nations involved in this pentangular 
balancing act; from the global point of view^it could also 
be described as a triangular balance of power from the 
regional point of view. The Soviet Union is very much tied 
to the Indians because of the size, resources and geographic 
position of India. Soviet union has very serious ideo­
logical and boundary differences with China.
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C hapter g
Pakistan and The Soviet Union
Pakistan's relations with its mighty neighbour the Soviet Union 
were bedevilled by its membership of the Western sponsored military 
pacts. The Soviet Union very severely criticised and resented 
Pakistan's participation in these pacts, and went as far as to 
question the very existence of Pakistan. Mr. Nikita Khruschev, 
the First Secretary of the Caramunist Party of the Soviet Union, on 
Decenfoer 10, 1955, at Srinagar, Kashmir, stated: "It made us very
sad when imperialistic powers succeeded in bringing about the division 
of India into two parts ... we are absolutely convinced that,when 
passions have calmed down and people realise the significance of 
such an artificial division of India, they will regret it ... The 
present Government of Pakistan openly profess its close ties with 
American monopolistic circles. They were among the first to
j
initiate the notorious Baghdad Pact. We do not like the Baghdad Pact 
at all, but we are patient and confident that it will burst like a 
soap-bubble ... we should very much like to have friendly relations 
with Pakistan, it is no fault of ours if such relations have not 
developed.n^
The Baghdad Pact (Central Treaty organisation) was essentially 
a defensive arrangement of non-aggressive nature designed to forestall 
any internal subversion or external aggression, especially from the 
Soviet Union.
/
1. Keesinges Contemporary Archives, Bristol, p. 14604.
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But the pro-Western stance of Pakistan proved very expensive 
for it since the Soviet Union ignored Pakistan's geopolitical 
compulsions, in supporting Afghanistan over Pakhtumstan (since 
Pakistan joined the former Baghdad Pact) and India (over Kashmir 
and East Pakistan - 1955, 1965 and 1971) with whom Pakistan had 
territorial frictions and politico-ideological differences. The 
acceptance of the 'gospel of coexistence* by the United States and 
the Soviet Union ushered in a new era of relative understanding 
between Pakistan and the Soviet Union; and as a result the two 
countries signed the oil exploration agreement in October 1961, 
under which the Soviet Union advanced a loan of $3 million for a 
period of 12 years, at 3% per cent interest. The loan was to be 
utilised for the purchase of machinery for oil exploration by 
Pakistan. In addition, the Soviet Union agreed to utilise the 
repayments for the purchase of textile/farm products from Pakistan. 
Unfortunately this development took place after a lot of water had 
passed under the bridge since June 2, 1949 when the U.S.S.R. invited 
the then Prime Minister of Pakistan to visit Moscow. (Liaguat Ali 
Khan had accepted the invitation but the whole matter fizzled out 
when Pakistan declined the exchange of Ambassadors on the pretence 
that Pakistan had a 'shortage of personnel' ( Dawn, Karachi, 9-6-1949.) , 
While Moscow's invitation was spumed, a later invitation from 
Washington was promptly accepted. This fence was not mended for 
quite some time, and by the time the relations between the two states 
seemed to be on the mend the international scene had undergone a 
considerable transformation, and Pakistan had experienced many changes
- 161 -
of government during that period of time.
2
These contradictions in Pakistan's foreign policy surfaced not 
only vis-a-vis great powers but also the Islamic states. On the one 
side, with Pakistan's leadership campaigning against the 
dismemberment of Palestine in 1947, and undying support for the 
Arab cause; on the other, Pakistan adopted a policy of dither and 
equivocation over the Suez Canal in 1956.
These are but a few outstanding examples of the kind of thinking 
that governed Pakistan's foreign policy, and none could be ascribed to 
an objective concern with security.
The Pakistan-India War of 1965, provided the Soviet Onion with a 
good opportunity to exert influence on the two neighbours, which resulted 
in the signing of the Tashhent Declaration of 1966. "Mr. Kosygin 
expressed the Soviet Government's profound satisfaction that the 
President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India were meeting 
in order to establish direct contact with a view to improving relations 
and eliminating the conflict between India and Pakistan ... We regard 
this ... a turning point in the relations between India and Pakistan ... 
to strengthen friendship between India and the Soviet Union, between
3
India and Pakistan, and between Pakistan and the Soviet Union."
2. These contradictions were basically due to the ever changing 
complexion of Pakistani leadership and their understanding, or 
the lack of it, of the international political scene.
3. Keesings Gontenporary Archives, Bristol, pp. 21187-89.
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For a better understanding of the Soviet position it is desirable 
to study in seme detail the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Unicn in 
South Asia and South-West Asia. The Soviet boundaries in Asia for a time 
were relatively calm and stable as compared with its European boundaries. 
The relative success of Soviet policy in Central Asia has mainly been 
due to (a) the Nationalities policy of the Soviet Unicn and (b) the method­
ical application of modem technology to Soviet Middle Asia and Southern 
Siberia.
The Asian U.S.S.R. borders cn Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and China 
(Pakistan and the U.S.S.R. have no common borders). Soviet policy to­
wards Turkey embodied elements of hostility, and as such it was considered 
as a stumbling block in the path of Soviet approaches to the Mediterranean 
and a possible enemy base (Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the 
subsequent refusal of the United States to supply arms to Turkey did 
bring a measure of understanding between the Soviet Unicn and Turkey; 
and the tension between Turkey and Greece seemed to have enabled this 
understanding to flourish apparently to the detriment of the North Atlan­
tic Treaty Organisation).
Iran also poses the same problems to the Soviet geostrategic 
interests in the area since it is interposed between the U.S.S.R. 
and the Indian Ocean by way of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.
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The Soviet Union borders Iran both in South Caucasus and in 
Central Asia, and shares with it the navigation of the Caspian Sea. 
Iran has as such survived as a buffer state in spite of her weak 
defences, merely because of the fact that the situation suited both 
the Soviet Union and the British interest, at a point in tine, in 
the area (American interests have largely replaced purely British 
interests). Moreover, this constituted a major element in the 
Soviet concept of realism as against Utopian precepts. Whenever 
and wherever the two came into clash, it seems, the forces of 
nationalism triumphed and prevailed. With a view to safeguarding 
their special interests in the area both the Soviet Union and Britain 
carved their respective 1 spheres of influence' and in 1941 the two 
Powers occupied their respective zones when German intervention in 
Iran was threatened. In fact, Iran served as a good supply route to 
the Soviet Union during the Second World War and the Allied Powers 
very effectively used this route to fight the Germans who had 
penetrated the Soviet heartland. At the end of the war the Soviet 
Union was very reluctant to vacate the occupied zone in northern 
Iran by the agreed date of March 2, 1946, because she had her eyes 
set on the oil wealth of Iran. Iranian GAzerbaidzaan) Azerbaijan 
is an important centre g ^strategically and commands roads into 
Turkey and Iraq, and is linked by a line to Jolfa. Tabriz is also 
a vital link in the communications complex.
The Soviet Union tried to establish more cordial relations with 
Iran, in spite of the Iranian connections with the Central Treaty
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Organisation; and their endeavours seemed to have met with a certain 
amount of success, although the basic suspicions were never removed 
and the atmosphere of mutual distrust still prevailed.
Three of the Soviet Central Asian Republics e.g. Turkmen, Uzbek 
and Tadzhik adjoin Afghanistan, which, as a semi independent state, 
acquired international prominence in the late 19th century. This 
landlocked country commanded chief landward approach to the subcontinent. 
Since there are no ports in Afghanistan, the usual port for 
consignments destined for Afghanistan is Karachi, Pakistan. The 
trading highway runs via Herat, Kabul and Nandahar, to the gateways 
of the subcontinent and still possesses its geostrategic significance.
In 1893 the Durand Line was agreed upon as the line of demarcation, 
and Russia accepted this region as the 'British Sphere of Influence*.
A close study of the north western frontier of Pakistan would 
clearly establish that its significance lies in the fact that it 
contains the important Khyber , Kurram, Tochi, Gomal and Bolan Passes 
(Peshawar, Bannu and Quetta have served as effective and useful 
military encampments for the defence of these strategic points), 
and these passes provide the only viable overland link between 
Pakistan and the rest of Asia. Almost all past invasions of the 
Indus Valley and the plains of India beyond have ccame through these 
passes; the strategic points the defence of which now devolves 
on Pakistan. To the east of the Indus there is no physical barrier 
of any significance to check the advance of the invading armies
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until the Burmese frontier is reached. The control and defence of 
these passes is, therefore, of absolute importance to the security 
of Pakistan.
Even more important than these frontier passes of Pakistan 
are the passes of the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan and as such the 
Hindu Kush is a much stronger proposition and an effective barrier 
against any hostile force from the north than are the frontier 
foothills of the Pak-Afghan border. The undemarcated frontier 
between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in the Wakhan region does 
not pose much problem simply because of the mountainous and difficult 
terrain of the forbidding Pamirs and the lofty Hindu Kush. However, 
the control of the passes in the Hindu Kush range can give a hostile 
pcwer a strong offensive advantage (this point has clearly been 
vindicated by the Chinese offensive in the North East Frontier Agency 
in 1962). Therefore, it has been the aim of both the defenders and 
invaders of the subcontinent to control the Hindu Kush and as such 
the routes which connect Afghanistan with the Soviet Union or Central 
Asia on the one hand and with Pakistan on the other.
After the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 the defence of 
the north-western marches became the primary concern of Pakistan.
In spite of the fact that the Pakistan - Soviet territories are only 
25 miles apart in this area, their proximity cannot be given 
importance similar to Soviet Tadzhikistan, Kirghizia and 
Kazakistan bordering Chinese Sinkiang (Aksai-Chin) which in turn
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borders Pakistani held Kashmir and controls the new all weather 
road (the old silk route), linking China and Pakistan.
It must be emphasized here that the Soviet interests in this 
borderland have not diminished, and in fact, since the Tashkent 
Declaration of January 1966, these interests have manifestly 
increased. These interests have been projected in a variety of ways, 
and as the first link in the chain of policy manoeuvres the idea of 
Brezhnev's so-called 'collective security' was floated. Pakistan had 
no hesitation in rejecting the idea because it viewed it as an 
anti-China campaign, and as a friend of the Chinese Pakistan could 
not possibly enter into such an arrangement.
The Indo-Soviet "Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation"
was the second most important link in the chain and it further
demonstrated the Soviet interests in the area, "Russia will back
India with force if necessary in the event of War with Pakistan
under a 20 year treaty, signed in New Delhi yesterday, that put
India firmly in the Russian camp after years of non-alignment ...
If India were attacked, there would be immediate consultation with
the Russians to remove the threat and "to take appropriate effective
measures" to counter it. Clearly, then, in the event of an
4
Indo-Pakistan war, Russia might wage war on Pakistan ..." The 
Treaty was signed in a very hurried manner, "After several blunt 
statements by ... Pakistan threatening to go to war with India,
4. The Daily Telegraph, August 10, 1971.
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Delhi sent the former Ambassador Mr. Dhar back to Moscow. Mr. Gromyko
5
forthwith flew to Delhi and signed the treaty within a few hours." 
Article 9 of the Treaty stipulates, ".... In the event of either party 
being subjected to attack or threat thereof, the High Contracting 
Parties shall irtmediately enter into mutual consultations with a 
view to eliminate this threat and taking appropriate effective
g
measures to ensure the peace and security of their countries." 
Immediately after the entry of Indian forces in East Pakistan both 
the Soviet Union and India had made direct contact with each other, 
and as soon as the Indian forces were engaged in war on 
3rd December 1971, in West Pakistan, India despatched Mr. D.P. Dhar 
to Mosccw and the Soviet Union sent a senior representative 
(Mr. Kuznetsov) to Delhi to coordinate action against Pakistan 
during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. These two diplomats remained 
at their respective posts during the whole duration of the war.
This was an active Soviet participation in coordinating her anti- 
Pakistan policy with India. The Western press had already forecast
this policy. The Guardian correspondent Under Malhotra wrote,
\
"India and the Soviet Union today signed a treaty of peace,
friendship, and cooperationy under which Russia has virtually
underwritten Indian defence in the event of an attack by Pakistan
7
with or without connivance, support, or encouragement by China."
The contents of the Treaty also shed light on the Indian concept of 
non-alignment and foreign observers were of the view that "Taking
5. Ibid.
6. Keesings Contemporary Archives, p. 24773.
7. The Guardian, August 10, 1971.
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the world by surprise, India today discarded her policy of non-
g
alignment and entered into a formal alliance with the Soviet Union."
Hcwever, India rejected these interpretations and firmly stated her
position to the contrary, "Mrs. Gandhi similarly emphasized on
August 9 that the Indo-Soviet treaty did not represent a reversal
9of India's policy of non-alignment." These denials and firm 
rejections by India that she had entered into a formal defence 
alliance with the Soviet Union were not taken seriously by Pakistan, 
and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 substantiated Pakistani point of 
vi
The Soviet Union as a 'continental* and 'oceanic superpower' 
is bound to avail itself of any opportunity which might strengthen 
her hold in South Asia and her eyes are specially trained on the 
south-western coast of Pakistan.
This would be of greater temptation to the Soviet Union in 
the event of further dismemberment of Pakistan, "Russia's plans to 
isolate Pakistan continue to prosper. As a result of her alliances 
with Iraq and India she is both increasing her pressure on the 
Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean and also tightening the 
encirclement of China. It was the pact with India in 1971 that 
gave Mrs. Gandhi the green light to intervene in East Pakistan ... 
Pakistan was cut down to half its former size, and pro-Indian,
8. The Times, August 10, 1971.
9. Keesings Cbntemporary Archives p. 24773.
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pro-Russian Bangladesh was created.. .problems in residual Pakistan have 
been exacerbated by subversion frcm Afghanistan with full Russian support.
The aim here was the familiar cne of trying to detach much of the North- 
West Frontier Province and Baluchistan to form a separate state of Pakh- 
toonestan.. .This is the background against which America, after much heart- 
searching, decided to lift the ten year old embargo cn arms for both Paki­
stan and India.
Security and development have been the principal objectives of Pakistan's 
foreign policy, and the requirements of defence were further complicated 
because of the truncated nature of the state as it emerged in 1947.
Pakistan's resources were limited and for the preservation of its 
territorial integrity and political independence Pakistan readily accepted 
the hand of friendship and the bond of alignment as offered by the Uhited 
States and its allies.
This alignment annoyed the Soviet Union and its friends in India.
China was not very happy regarding Pakistan's membership of either Cento 
or Seato but expressed its understanding in view of Pakistan' s geopolitical 
corpulsicns.
Pakistan made it abundantly clear that its alignment with the West 
was dictated by its security requirements especially against a possible 
Indian aggression, m  this Pakistan failed to convince either its western 
allies or the Soviet Unicn. The Americans never committed themselves to 
helping Pakistan against Indian attack, and the events since 1954 have
10. The Daily Telegraph, Lcndon, 26-2-1975
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validated the main line of argument.
In this pentangular equation the objectives of the Soviet Hi ion 
have been vague and dubious especially with regard to Pakistan. And on 
the whole Soviet policy has been barren of ideas, and the notion that the 
collapse of Pakistan would open the door to the Persian Gulf seem to be 
fanciful. But cne cannot deny the fact that Russia has always fancied a 
direct access to the Arabian Sea, and their advance through Afghanistan 
and Pakistani Baluchistan would not only realise their age old dream of 
direct access to the Warn Waters and protect their soft under-belly but 
at the same time give them the strategic advantage regarding the Persian 
Gulf.
But how the Americans are likely to react tb such a Russian advance 
in this strategic area is the real irrpcnderable.
The Soviet policy tcwards Pakistan has largely been dictated by its 
relations with India, and it seems that in this the Russians are tied hand 
and foot to India. The Soviet Unicn has no real policy towards Pakistan 
and has tended to react within the context of its relations with India and 
China.
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Chapter 9
The American Link
The emergence of Pakistan warranted adequate economic and 
defence requirements to : withstand i. ■ I  the imperatives of independ­
ence. Pakistan, therefore, looked for external assistance to 
build up the social overheads and provide initial outlay; to 
this the United States responded generously. The foundations of 
friendly relations between the two countries were laid by 
Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, during 
his three and a half weeks State visit to the United States in 
1950. These relations were further cemented in 1954 when the 
two countries signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement 
under which the United States agreed to supply Pakistan with 
military assistance to maintain its territorial integrity and 
political independence. Pakistan and the United States were also 
signatories of the Manila pact, which stabilised the South East 
Treaty Organisations in 1954. Pakistan also signed the Baghdad 
Pact (Central Treaty Organisation) in 1955, but the United 
States was not a member of this and only attended the various 
meetings as an observer. These close ties were further strengthened 
and consolidated in 1959, with the signing of the Unilateral 
Agreement of Co-operation, which was designed to reinforce the 
defensive of the Central Treaty Organisation (seriously questioned 
by the late President John F. Kennedy. As a Senator, Kennedy had 
altready shown his unhappiness over what he considered to be the 
neglect of India, which, in his estimation, occupied a pivotal 
importance in the American strategy of containing Communism in Asia).
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Before the Sino-Indian clash in Ladakli in 1959, however, Kennedy 
was not prepared to support India at the expense of alienating 
Pakistan, "... our special and valued treaty relationships and 
military pacts with Pakistan do not make possible such an inter­
national effort for India....I have regretfully concluded that the 
current political cleavages between India and Pakistan do not allow
.........-I
such a programme .... " Regarding military pacts Kennedy re­
iterated on 9th February, 1959, that they: "... provide no long 
term solutions. On the contrary they tend dangerously to polar­
ize the Middle East, to attach us to specific regimes, to isolate 
us very often from the significant nationalist movements. Little 
is accomplished by forcing the uncommitted nations to choose
rigidly between alliance with the West or submission to inter-
2
national Communism .... " These words were fully justified and 
validated regarding Pakistan's alignment with the West. This is 
the end proved to be counter-productive, especially in view of 
the fact that when Kennedy assumed Presidency of the United States 
he was in a position to implement his ideas, and put his plan 
into practice. The value of military bases and alliances was 
greatly reduced by the sophisticated and advanced military tech­
nology. These developments, among others, were largely respons­
ible for the shift in emphasis from military support to enhanced 
economic co-operation.
It would not be inappropriate to suggest, that the Military
1. Kennedy J.F. The Strategy of Peace, 1960, p.154
(The speech was originally delivered before the Senate on 25.3.1958
2. Ibid., p. 122
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Coup in Pakistan in 195 8 marked the end of one era and the beginn­
ing of another. There is no denying the fact that the Ayub 
Regime made some confusing and often contradictory statements, 
but Pakistan's foreign policy was gradually being forged on a 
neutralist basis. Ayu'b's well known statement: "Also, I think 
the United States did not quite realize the extent to which the 
people of Pakistan would be prepared to accept economic distress 
and hardship for the £ake of honour and integrity of their country. 
People in developing countries seek assistance, but on the basis 
of mutual respect; they want to have friends and masters. We knew
of the U.S. relationship with China but the U.S., too, must recog-
3
nize our political and geographical compulsions."
It was only after Pakistan's compulsions were appreciated and
understood by the United States that relationship was re-established
on the basis of new understanding i.e. Pakistan's relations with
the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union did not mean
that Pakistan was going into the Communist fold or orbit with all
its concomitants of military alliances or arrangements: "People
in Pakistan were becoming disillusioned? a relationship which had
been built up after a great deal of hard work during the fifties
4
was ceasing to command respect,...." The late President Ayub 
analysed the international scene in a very succint manner: "The 
shock of the conflict and the Indian defeat had altered India's
3. Khan, M. Ayu^, Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography, 
O.U.P. Lahou, 1967, p.159
4. Ibid., p.158
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orientation..... The shift in India's orientation was, for the
United States, one of major importance..... India had been forced
to review her political philosophy in the realm of International
affairs .... Also, there were indications that the Soviets and
5
the Chinese had had profound differences.... " . There was a 
definite shift in international relations and foreign policies 
were re-shaped and re-aligned.
The late President Ayub. stated in his Autobiography "Friends 
not Masters" that from Pakistan*s point of view the rational and 
pragmatic approach in its foreign policy made it imperative on 
Pakistan to establish normal relations with the four major powers 
involved in Asia without antagonizing any one of them. Pakistan 
endeavoured to set up bilateral equations with each one of them, 
with the clear understanding that the nature and complexim of the 
equation should bessuch as to promote mutual interests without 
adversely affecting the legitimate interests of third parties.
The relations between the two countries took a sharp turn in 
September-October 1962, when the United States supplied India with 
massive military aid as a result of the Sino-Indian conflict along 
the NEFA borders and the Ladakh-Aksai Chin areas. Pakistan "a 
friend of immediacy and constancy" was deeply disturbed and felt 
ignored; a relationship which had been developed after a good 
deal of hard work during the fifties was losing respect. The 
United States had agreed that Pakistan would be informed and
5. ibid; pp. 159-160
and consulted before any such assistance was extended to
India "the assurance given by President Kennedy to me that
Pakistan would be consulted before any decision was taken
*
on the question of giving arms to India" . More important 
still, Pakistan argued that these arms would be used against 
her rather than China,* a point which was vindicated in Septf- 
tember 196 5, when India crossed the international boundary 
in the Lahore sector, threatening the very existence of Pak­
istan. The United States had publicly assured Pakistan that 
"The Government of the United States ... has similarly assured 
the Government of Pakistan that if our assistance to India 
should be misused and directed against another in aggression 
the United States would undertake immediately, ... appropriate
action both within and without the United Nations to thwart
6such aggression." These assurances public and private were 
of no consequence as far as India was concerned since it used 
these weapons against Pakistan. During the undeclared war 
of September 19.65, between Pakistan and India, the United 
States assumed a neutral position and immediately stopped the 
military aid to both the belligerents. Pakistan vehemently 
resented the American policy of "equal treatment" since it 
was aligned with the United States through various pacts.
The Americans argued that they were under obligations to 
help Pakistan only in the case of communist aggression. This 
arguement may be accepted as half-truth since there is such
* ibid.
6. State Department Release, 17.11.1962. ibid., p. 145
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a stipulation in the Manila Treaty of 195 4, as the "understanding"
of U.S.A. "The United States in executing the present Treaty
does so with the understanding of its recognition of the effect
of aggression and armed attack ..... apply only to communist 
7
aggression...." . But no such reservations can be detected 
in the American commitments under the bilateral Agreement of 
Cooperation in 1959,"...the members... affirmed their determ­
ination to maintain their collective security and to resist 
aggression direct or indirect..... The U.S. Government, in acc­
ordance with the Mutual Security Act of 1954... reaffirms that 
it will continue to furnish... military and economic assistance 
as may be mutually agreed upon.... in order to assist...in the 
preservation of its national independence and integrity and in
g
the effective formation of its economic development."
American policy towards Pakistan may be described as a 
curious mixture of sympathies and antipathies. She cultivated 
extremely friendly relations with Pakistan during the fifties 
which resulted in the complete political identification of 
Pakistan with the west; and virtually alienated Pakistan from 
the Soviet Union. With the thaw setting in U.S.-Soviet relations, 
the enunciation of the principles of co-existence by Kruschev 
and the exchange of Sino-Soviet polemics, America largely over­
looked Pakistan's friendly overtures towards the Soviet Union.
7. Story of Seato, Seato Publications, Bangkok, p.44
8. Treaties and Alliances of the World, Keesings, Bristol, 1968, p.140
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But Pakistan's "courtship" with China seemed to have been 
rebuffed by the Americans, who communicated strong displeasure 
in 196 3, when Pakistan signed the Boundary Agreement with China, 
The relations between Pakistan and China remained suspect in 
American eyes, and the American policy seemed to have been 
hardened on this question by the Indian propoganda of "Sino- 
Pakistan collusion". The relations between the United States 
and Pakistan have never been the same though a marked improvement
9
was noticeable with the inauguration of the Nixon Administration.
American policy was very much linked with its investment 
and oil interests in the Middle East and this region gained 
further eminence as a result of the Arab-Israel war of October 
19 73, and the Arab oil embargo. There were suggestions in 
various Western quarters that America should take military 
action against the Arabs, especially the Persian Gulf States 
and occupy the oil fields. Direct intervention at that point 
in time, seemed out of the question. This appears to be a very 
tempting proposition but fraught with dangers and such an action 
might lead to global conflagration because the Soviet Union 
might be tempted to protect her interests in the region, where 
she is so heavily committed.
Since December 19 71, Pakistan gradually tilted towards the 
Arab world especially the Persian Gulf states and Libya. This
9. During the 19 71 Indo-Pakistan war President Nixon showed a 
marked tilt towards Pakistan and reminded India of U.S.A. 
treaty obligations towards Pakistan, and this seemed to 
have warded off larger Indian invasion of West Pakistan.
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largely annoyed the Iranians especially the late Shahinshah 
who considered this area as one of his "spheres of influence".
The Iranian policy tended to be adventurous and aggressive in 
the area since the Iranians occupied the tiny islands (the Tumbs) 
in the Persian Gulf and agreed to help militarily the Sultan of 
Muscat and Oman against the insurgents (the Front fcfe the Lib­
eration of the occupied Arab Gulf) "Iranian Forces are still 
fighting alongside Omani forces in the south of the Sultanate... 
A military communique this week reported that nine Iranians 
were killed and one was missing after an ambush in the south 
western mountains, where Government forces launched a new cam­
paign against Leftist geurillas on December 2.....The communique 
was not only the first to reveal the Iranians continued presence 
in southern Dhofar, it was also the first time the army had 
ever mentioned Iranians in a public statement since a "task 
force" was sent in at the request of Sultan Qaboos Bin Said, 
the ruler, about two years ago."^  The Iranians were actively 
mending their fences with India and a number of joint projects 
were agreed.
The Iranian posture towards the subcontinent eminently 
suited the American- and Soviet thinking, which was geared to 
keeping Pakistan very much involved in subcontinental matters? 
subsequent political developments have shown that this policy 
met with success. Pakistan and India agreed in November 19 74 
to renew trade links which were severed in 1965, and the postal
-10. The Financial Times, 13.12.1974 
The Guardian, London, 13.12.19 74
and communication links had already been established. The
Americans did not want Pakistan to be linked with the Persian
Gulf or the Middle East and they wanted to see India, Pakistan
and Bangladesh as one economic unit, obviously under Indian
preponderance. Precisely for these reasons the Americans for
quite some time refuded to restart the supply of armaments to
Pakistan which were suspended after the Indo-Pakistan war of 
111965 . There was a general understanding amongst the American
leadership that Pakistan's close relationship with the Arabs 
might draw it out of its sphere of influence and that could 
jeopardize its political standing in the area. The Iranians 
were armed to the teeth and they were supplied with sophistic­
ated weapons, and the Iranians believed that they would emerge 
as the most powerful nation in the region, and possibly serve 
U.S. Interests. However, there seemed to be a contradiction 
in Iranian policy towards the Arabs in the sense that they were 
directly concerned and involved with the Kurdish movement in the 
northeast of Iraq, which was struggling hard to win some kind 
of independence from Iraq, and on the other hand Iran wished to 
align itself with the Arabs, "The Shah of Iran said in an inter­
view published today that another Arab-Israeli war would involve 
all Moslem countries and not just the Arab States.... " Certainly 
it will be our war this time. None of us has a choice".... .
12We will never accept any change in the identity of Jerusalem. "
11. These restrictions were lifted both against India and Pakistan. 
But it should be stressed here that America did not lift the 
arms ban on Pakistan to bolster Pakistan's defence capabilities 
but to support American geopolitical interests in the area, 
especially with regard to the oil rich Persian Gulf, and 
Pakistan enjoys a very desirable geostrategic location to" that 
effect.
12.. The Financial Times, 13.12.19 74
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This policy would have to be further streamlined if Iran
has any idea of establishing closer links with the Arab World
as such. In this field Iran would have to reconcile with the
Pakistani efforts in developing close socio-economic, political
and military links with the Arabs, especially in the Persian 
13Gulf. Pakistan has already signed agreements with United Arab
Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Libya and as such joint ministerial
boards have been set up to coordinate socio-economic and cultural
development. Such cooperation already existed between Iran and
Pakistan and some joint ventures were either under study or were
being implemented. The Regional Cooperation for Development
offered opportunities to both Iran and Pakistan to coordinate
policies in various fields but the progress was really slow- and
never achieved its desired objectives. This was especially true of
Pakistan-Iran cooperation with Turkey, the third member of RLC.D.
Turkish trade with Iran and Pakistan amounted to one per cent of
her total foreign trade. The total imports from Iran and Pakistan
during the first nine months of 1974 amounted to 0.11 per cent
of total Turkish imports, and the total amount of exports to
Pakistan and Iran during this period were to the tune of 0.98 per
14cent of the total Turkish exports. . This is a clearcut indication
13. "Iran is to close its northern borders to Kurdish rebels from 
Iraq, ending a long-standing over the path of an international 
boundary line through a river estuary on the Arabian Gulf.
Iraq has agreed in principle to make concessions on its
'.territorial claims in the Shatgl .-Arab estuary, which provides 
river access to the Iranian^ .' largest refinery at Abadan, in 
return for closing of all the borders to infiltration of a 
subversive character"
The Times, London, 7.3.19 75
14. These figures are taken from "The Jan '^1 International" ,
London, 11.12.1974
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that mutual trade amongst the R.C.D. countries was very neglig­
ible in spite of the fact that the member countries could bene­
fit tremendously during the high inflation period which was 
specially caused by the soaring oil prices. This would have 
eminently suited Pakistan because the mutual trade afod trade 
concessions would have benefited the member states in the sense 
that new markets would have been discovered closer at home, and 
the damaging effects of inflation and highly exaggerated oil 
prices would have been effectively met. Cooperation between 
Turkey, Iran and Pakistan could have been based on the principles 
of regional economic community but such coordination did not 
seem to meet the growing demands of increasing Iranian interests 
in the Indian Ocean area. Iran visualised greater interests 
and its ambitions were formidable because of the flow of petr- 
dollars, and it envisaged itself as "big power" in the geo­
political complexion of the region. Iran seemed to be inter­
ested in controlling lines of communications and transportations 
between the Nile and the Straits of Malacca and beyond, and 
Pakistan's growing friendship and involvement with the Arabs, 
especially in the Persian Gulf seemed to lay bare the roots of 
expansionist designs of Iran and its posture of aggrandisement.
The Americans tended to support the Iranian designs and they 
supplied the Shah with an ever increasing quantity of sophisti­
cated weapons. In spite of the widely publicised pro-Pakistan 
"tilt" during the Pakistan-India crisis of 1971, it seems that 
America would not help Pakistan to such a position where it could
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effectively challenge the Indian preponderance, although the 
American policy would tend to support the continued territorial 
integrity and political independence of Pakistan. America 
would increasingly endeavour to improve her : re.lations with India 
and her policy would be geared towards establishing a politico- 
economic structure under which a weak but defensible Pakistan 
would be allowed to exist, and Indian hegemony would prevail. 
Unfortunately for Pakistan, this also seems to suit the Soviet 
cynical realism and the close Soviet cooperation with India,
This understanding and cooperation also eminently suited the 
growing Iranian interests in the region. But the situation would 
not appear so desperate for Pakistan so long as it succeeded in 
unifying the forces at home and possessed the kind of technical 
knowhow the Arabs wanted and with the help of the Arab petro­
dollar it could effectively neutralise the tripartite or quadri­
partite stranglehold on Pakistan's foreign policy options;- and 
in this Chinese reactions might hold the key to Pakistan's survival 
as an independent and sovereign state. It is important to observe 
here that China's policy towards Pakistan, for some years has 
been to adduce her support for Pakistan's "independence and state 
sovereignty", this was ambiguous in relation to East Pakistan, 
although it certainly represented a firm commitment to the sur­
vival of the nucleus of Pakistan in the West, and this position 
of course defined very precisely the character of the Chinese 
stake_ in Pakistan? deeply committed to the maintenance of a strong 
and independent West Pakistan. What Pakistan required of China 
and the United States was a firm commitment to the "national unity
and territorial integrity" of Pakistan - a formula which implied 
the defence of Pakistan and as such of East Pakistan against the 
possibilities of invasion from India. In the event both China 
and America decided not to adopt such a policy and their commit­
ments towards Pakistan remained dubious. The U.S. Government 
probably shared the Pakistani assessment that thfe Soviet Union 
posed the greatest threat to the peace of Asia, which partially 
accounted for the American "tilt" in favour of Pakistan during 
the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, and President Nixon was quick 
enough to remind Mrs. ffthat the United States had treaty
obligations towards Pakistan.
The refusal of Pakistan to participate in Soviet schemes 
for "collective security" and regional cooperation in the sub­
continent prevented the Soviet Union from deepening her influence 
in India, and by engaging India in regional preoccupations 
Pakistan's hostility also reduced India's capacity to support the 
Soviet Union in its rivalry with China. If Pakistan were to 
agree to come to the "goodnneighbourly" terms with India which the 
Soviet Union has been impressing upon it for more than a decade. 
India's regional preponderance would have been decisively confirmed 
and it would be more able to compete for regional influence with 
China, especially in the Himalayan States including Chinese
Tibet, and as such India would be able to command a position of 
strength and respect in the area with or without the help from 
the Soviet Union.
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Chapter 10
Alignment in Pakistan's Foreicm Policy
, v The inception of Pakistan as an independent sovereign
political entity with discontiguous territorial regions 
yt&lc presented it with considerable economic, political and sec-
' urity difficulties and problems. With a view to ensuring 
its socio-economic development and safeguarding its terri-
/
torial integrity and independence, Pakistan decided to j
I
align itself with the West and some of the Asian countries j
j
i
e.g., Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Thailand and the Philippines.
To re-emphasise the point these defensive arrangements and 
groupings projected the divergent requirements of the part­
icipants in the context of international relations and the 
prevalent power-politics. The West led by the United States 
was primarily concerned with the containment of the rising 
tide of communist influence and its threatened inroads amongst 
the emerging nations of the world, especially in Asia and 
Africa. The West offered friendly co-operation and assist­
ance in the economic, defence, cultural, social and tech­
nical fields, and in addition offered protection and sec­
urity guarantees, in the guise of multilateral and bilateral 
treaties and agreements, against communist threat and sub­
version. The newly emergent nations on the periphery of 
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were 
considered suitable and effective points of deterrence 
against communist infiltration or subversion.
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The United States and its allies held the view that by 
injecting massive aid coupled with security guarantees, the 
communist advance in South and Southeast Asia could effect­
ively be deterred, and in fact, stemmed; and the "Dominoes" 
consolidated.
Pakistan was identified as one of the prospective 
participants whose economic base and defensive potential 
required to be bolstered and strengthened. From this point 
of view Pakistan with its Islamic ideology and zeal looked 
an ideal candidate in the western scheme of global interests 
and strategy aimed at curtailing the communist advance, and 
precisely for this reason Pakistan was invited to join the 
anti-communist alliances. The reason for Pakistan's partic­
ipation, however, in these military pacts with the West and 
other allies was not dictated by its hatred or contempt for 
communist ideology or actions but by the instinct for sur­
vival and self-preservation,,in particular, against a poss­
ible Indian action aimed at undoing the partition "...there 
were several important parties and personages in India who 
had made it very plain that they will unite Pakistan and 
India and undo partition...India, for some reason, which it 
considered to be justifiable, massed her troops on the 
borders of Pakistan in March 1950, poised for attack... again 
in July 1951 India considered it necessary... to mass its
1
troops on our borders... to overawe us and to invade us."
Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, told the Pakistan National Assembly:
"The main driving force behind a nation's foreign policy is 
its urge to maintain its independence and territorial integrity
1. H.S. Suhrawardy, Dawn, Karachi, 23.2.1957
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... to preserve its distinct ideological personality."
This important clash of ideas within the multilateral 
defence alliances very clearly manifested the paradoxical 
attitudes of the participants and their divergent interests. 
There were sharp and different views amongst the signatories 
of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation; the Manila Treaty 
of 1954 was a vivid example of their respective positions 
and their interpretation of the various clauses of the 
Treaty. Whereas Pakistan considered the provisions to be 
effectively applied against any external aggression or in­
ternal subversion, the United States understood the provisions 
to be applicable only hgainst communist aggression or sub­
version. The American interpretation was very accurate and 
correct. It was a gross misjudgement' on the part of the 
Pakistanis to have given such a naive interpretation in spite 
of the clear-cut reservations incorporated into the provisions 
of the Treaty at the insistence of the United States. The 
Pakistani policy makers, and the Foreign Office, to my mind, 
were misleading the people of Pakistan and duping public 
opinion. Pakistan, in fact, invoked the provisions of the 
Treaty during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 but the United 
States Irefused to oblige, and the other signatories acquiesced 
with the American position.
Pakistan1s membership of SEATO, the Baghdad Pact (later 
CENTO) and its friendship with the United States were dic­
tated by its economic requirements and the need to preserve 
its territorial integrity and political independence.
2. Bhutto,Z.A. Foreign Policy of Pakistan, Karachi, 1964, p.27
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Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) to safeguard West
Pakistan and to foster closer relations with the countries
of the Near East with whom it had common affinities i.e.
history, culture and religion. Mr. Hamidul Haq Chaudhary,
the then Foreign Minister, addressing the National Assembly
stated: "the development of the closest friendship with the
Middle Eastern countries has been the cornerstone of our
policy... pursuant to our policy to strengthen the fabric
of peace in this vital region and to ensure its stability,
Pakistan acceded to the Turko-Iraqi** pact along with Iiran
3
and the United Kingdom." Arab opinion, however, was sharply 
split over the viability the validity and the purpose of such 
a defensive arrangement. The Egyptians considered it as 
a manoeuvre to split the Arabs; the Saudi Arabians were 
also displeased, especially at the inclusion of Pakistan 
with whom they had very friendly ties and were particularly 
concerned at the inclusion of the United Kingdom since the 
British were considered to be the friends of Israel.
The Egyptian opposition to the pact may be attributed 
to i) deep rooted hatred for Turkey, ii) Nasser's friend­
ship with non-aligned India and iii) the prospective chall­
enge to Nasser's leadership in the region.
The Suez crisis of 1956 brought some of the underlying 
fears to the surface and Pakistan's relations with Egypt 
were put under severe strains. In November, 1956 at a meet­
ing of the former Baghdad Pact, held without the presence 
of the United Kingdom, the three Muslim members of the Pact
**Iraq withdrew from the Pact after the July Coup in 1958
3. Foreign Relations (O.P.), Karachi, 1956, p.35
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condemned Israel for invading Egypt, and demanded that 
the United Kingdom's forces should be immediately with­
drawn from Egyptian territory (It is now openly admitted 
that there was a clear-cut collusion with Israel on the 
part of France and the United Kingdom: the United Kingdom 
was allied to Pakistan.through the former Baghdad Pact and 
SEATO. France was allied to Pakistan through SEATO.)
The meeting also admitted the sovereign rights of Egypt 
in its nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. Mr. H.S. 
Suhrawardy, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, however, 
criticised Egypt for blockading the Suez Canal. He issued 
this statement on 2 3rd November, 1956, and this was con­
sidered to be extremely hostile by Egypt, and in order to 
show his indignation President Nasser rejected Pakistan's 
offer to participate in the United Nations Emergency Force 
while at the same time he accepted an Indian military 
contingent to be included in such a force. Mr. H.S. Suh - 
rawardy, referring to the Muslim countries, delivered the 
celebrated verdict: "Zero plus zero still equals zero."
His full verdict was as follows: "The question is asked:
Why don't we (the Muslim countries) get together irather 
than be tied to a big power like the U.K. or America?
My answer to that zero plus zero plus zero after all equal 
zero. We have, therefore, to go farther afield rather than
get all zeros together because they will never be able to
4
produce anything which is substantial."
4. Dawn, Karachi, 12 December, 1956
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At the time of the historic Suez crisis of 1956, Prime 
Minister Suhrawardy addressed the National Assembly and, in 
the course of his statement, said "Today we see no reason 
why the United Kingdom, having obeyed the mandate... should 
not sit with us in order to promote the security of the 
Middle East and also ourselves...and as I said elsewhere, 
any number of zeros cannot make more than zero, whereas if 
you add one to it, the larger the number of possible zeros 
the greater will be the ultimate result, whether they are
5
put in front or put in the rear, they are more than zero."
Mr. Suhrawady's statement could only be considered in 
the light of Egyptian attitude towards Pakistan and its dis­
pute with India over the status of the disputed territory
of Kashmir since President Nasser had stated, "Suez is as
6dear to Egypt as Kashmir is .to India."
President Nasser's views seemed to follow the Russian 
way of thinking on Kashmir since he openly criticised Paki­
stan's membership of the defensive arrangements and seemed 
to side with India over the issue of Kashmir. President 
Nasser was annoyed with Pakistan since Pakistan had aligned 
itself with France and the United Kingdom, and these two 
states in collusion with Israel had invaded Egypt,therefore, 
the Egyptian leader doubted Pakistan's credentials as a 
true friend of the Arabs. This whole episode obliged Paki­
stan to reappraise its policy vis-a-vis the Arabs and the 
Pan-Islamic movement. Pakistan initiated a more realistic
5. National Assembly Debate, Vol.l, 1957: pp.917-918
6. Stephen,Ian, Pakistan: Old Country and New Nation, Hazel 
Watson & Viney Ltd., Aylesbury, 1970, p.172
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policy towards the Muslim countries and its emotive attitude
towards Pan-Isl:amism seemed to dissipate. President Nasser's
actions thus caused Pakistan "to be guided more by facts
7 •and less by theories and sentiments."
Pakistan signed the Manila Treaty of 1954 largely with
a view to safeguarding its truncated eastern half against
a possible Indian action because Pakistan believed Indian
policy to be based on the view "that the creation of Pakistan
was a tragic mistake which might still be corrected, at least
8as far as East Bengal is concerned." Thus Pakistan became 
fully aligned with the West, and for a time, acted as a pawn 
in the global strategy of the Americans. Pakistan had offered 
communication facilities to the Americans in the vicinity of 
Peshawar (Bade Ber) in the North West of the then West Pakistan, 
and the United States had been using Pakistan territory for 
U-2 spying missions over the Soviet Union.
There is no denying the fact that Pakistan enjoyed
great technological and economic benefits from its member­
ship of SEATO and CENTO', but at the same time it suffered 
a great deal in its relations with the Soviet Union, Egypt 
and some of the other Middle Eastern countries. It also, to 
some extent, suffered initially, in its relations with the 
People's Republic of China but Pakistan was good enough to 
have rer tised that it had to mend its fences with that great 
country, and in this a notable achievement was recorded 
during the Bandung Conference in 195 5.
7. Round Table, 1956-57, p.174
8. Callard, feeith, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Interpretation, 
New York, 195 7, p.11
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Various states of Africa and Asia were not only sus­
picious of the military arrangements that Pakistan had opted 
to join but were openly critical of these defensive arrange­
ments and very much doubted the motives behind such bilateral 
or multilateral arrangements, :and denounced these pacts as 
merely the instruments of American or Soviet "imperialism" 
directed against the emerging nations of Africa and Asia. 
Pakistan found it difficult, and at times impossible, to 
further strengthen its ties with African countries, especially 
the Arabs of Africa, Nigeria, Guinea, and Ethiopia.
Pakistan achieved a considerable success during the 
first Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia 
from 18 to 24 April 1955. This conference was sponsored 
by Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, and was 
attended by 2 4 Asian^African countries in addition to the 
sponsors. The Pakistan Prime Minister Mr. Mohammad Ali 
Bogra was successful in allaying the misapprehensions of 
the leaders of the People's Republic of China with regard 
to Pakistan's membership of the military pacts. Mr. Chou 
En-Lai the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, 
while addressing the Political Committee of the Badung 
Conference on 23 April, 1955 said, "...I paid a visit to 
the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He told me that although 
Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, Pakistan was 
not against China. Pakistan had no fear China would commit 
aggression against her. As a result of that, we achieved 
a mutual understanding.... The Prime Minister of Pakistan 
further assured me that if the United States should take
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aggressive action under the military treaty or if the
United States launched a global war, Pakistan would not
be involved in it...just as it was not involved in the
Korean war...through these explanations we achieved a
mutual understanding. This creates agreement and harmony
amongst us in understanding each other on collective peace
9and cooperation...." The Bandung Conference provided 
Pakistan with a good opportunity for a dialogue with the 
People's Republic of China and the perusal of the initiative 
resulted in the establishment of friendly and good neigh­
bourly relations between Pakistan and China in spite of 
their ideological differences, "... the differences between 
the political systems of China and Pakistan and the diver­
gence of views on many problems should not prevent the 
strengthening of friendship...due importance should be 
given to commercial and cultural relations between the 
two countries...."^
These friendly ties have further been strengthened
between China and Pakistan, because the absence of any
"real conflict of interests".
Pakistan achieved another diplomatic success during 
the Bandung Conference when it very effectively challenged 
the proclaimed Five Principles of "Panch Sheel" of Indian 
Foreign Policy. These Five Principles had been agreed upon 
between China and India during bhe period when it was voc­
iferously being claimed, "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" (Indians 
and Chinese are brothers); and in the course of discussion 
on "Trade and Intercourse between India and the Tibet Region
9. . <.S. Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan, 
Karachi, 1966, pp.361-62
10. ibid. p.363
j
/, u yu
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of China, 29 April, 1954, and the principles were as 
follows i) mutual respect for each other's territorial 
integrity and sovreignty, ii) mutual non-aggression, 
iii) mutual non-interference in each others internal 
affairs, iv) equality and mutual benefit, and v) peace­
ful co-existence.^ It may be deemed surprising that 
agreement failed to incorporate the right to self- 
determination, the peaceful settlement of disputes and 
the admissibility of collective security. All of these 
principles had a direct bearing on the Indo-Pakistan re­
lations, especially with regard to Kashmir and the military 
pacts of which Pakistan was a member. Incidentally the 
important principles are very much a part and parcel of 
international law and in conformity with the enshrined 
principles of the United Nations.
As a substitute for. "Panch Steel" the Prime Minister 
of Pakistan Mr. Bogra presented his "Seven Principles" to 
the Conference. These were 1) sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of all nations, 2) equality of all independent 
nations, 3) non-interference in the internal affairs of one 
country by another, 4) non-aggression, 5) rights of self- 
defence of each country to be exercised singly or collect­
ively, 6) self-determination for all peoples and abhorrence 
of colonial exploitation in every shape, and 7) settlement
of disputes through peaceful means, that is, by negotiations,
12mediation and arbitration.
11. ibid. p.40
12. Chaudhury, Pakistan Relations with India, 1947-66, p.248
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These principles specifically include self-determination,
peaceful solution of disputes and individual or collective
security, all three of which are accepted standards of
international conduct.
The Bandung Conference modified the "Five Principles"
and in its final communique enumerated "Ten Principles"
for the conduct of relations among independent political
entities, and emphasised the need for the recognition of
13"the equality of all nations large and small" and urged
the Afro-Asian countries to abstain "from acts or threats.
14of aggression or the use of force." These principles are
very much in line with the basic concepts and the valued
principles of the U.N. Charter, which upheld "the right of
15each nation to defend itself singly or collectively."
India's Prime Minister Pandit Nehru was unhappy at the
inclusion of these principles, especially at the endorsement
of collective security. The Times special correspondent
to the Conference reported in a despatch: "It has been Mr.
Chou En-Lai's week....From Turkey to Philippines, Mr. Chou
16En-Lai spread reason and tolerance," and in its editor*- 
ial the Times observed: "Indian diplomacy displayed all its 
customary adroitness but could not have succeeded in over­
coming the distrust which Delhi's neutralism implies in
17such powers as Turkey, Iran, and Thailand..."
As a result Pakistan appeared to have partly succeeded 
in breaking the Indian policy of containment against it:- 
in Asia and Africa.
13. Hassan op.cit. p.60
14. ibid. 15. ibid.
16. The Times, London, 23.4.55 17. ibid.
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The Sino-Indian border conflict in the NEFA area in 1962 
seriously affected the political and military thinking of 
the regional and world powers. The border conflict under­
lined the vested interests of both India and China, and 
projected a serious rupture between the two countries which 
has yet to be effectively mended. The conflict provided 
the Americans with a chance of bringing India to their fold, 
and the United States showed its eagerness in rushing mili­
tary aid to India in a massive way with a view to containing 
the communist giant or dragon, which was projected as an 
expansionist and aggressive power.
The Kennedy administration believed that India had the 
ideal size and adequate potential to serve as a bulwark in 
its policy of containing China. It, therefore, was consid­
ered expedient to give large scale military hardware to 
India so as to strengthen India's economic base and military 
preparedness against communism "... in Kennedy's view, the 
long range struggle with communism in Asia depended on 
how India solved its economic problems. His goal was de­
scribed as an attempt to turn India into a 'showplace' for
his ideas on what the Western world should do for an Asian 
18country." Mr. Kennedy was never enthusiastic towards 
Pakistan and the direction of American policy to the sub­
continent after the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 
was very succinctly analysed by an American columnist in the 
following words: "Washington recognises Pakistan's loyalty 
to the two Asian alliances... rather less enthusiastically 
endorsed by Kennedy. But we also recognise that Pakistan
18. Hindu, Madras, November 16, 1960
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represents only 20 per cent of the subcontinent and is 
divided...the sole hope of establishing a viable compet­
itor to China is India...affection for an ally is tempered
19by geographic reality."
The changed tone of the American administration and 
their support for "non-aligned" India gave Pakistan further 
opportunity to establish closer relations with the other 
great power, the Soviet Union,,and as such a golden oppor­
tunity to adopt a positive policy of positive neutralism 
and Pakistan should have picked a leaf from the Kennedy 
Administration's book on power-politics, which very clearly 
demonstrated that the Americans had no time for their ally 
and that America was fully prepared to sacrifice Pakistan's 
interests at the altar of Indian understanding.
Pakistan was not prepared to accept hegemony from any 
quarters especially India, and therefore it condemned the 
American endeavours to treat India as the regional power,
"At President Kennedy's request, I had urged Mr. Nehru to
20extend his leadership to other areas in South-East Asia."
Mr. Johnson seeme'd to have worked on these lines after 
having succeeded Kennedy in November, 1963, and after his 
re-election in 1964. The U.S. attitude during the Indo- 
Pakistan war of 1965 seemed to have confirmed the changed 
direction of American policy towards Pakistan, and in fact, 
towards "non-alignment" and the alliances which the Americans 
now described as "pactitis" and not as pacts or alliances 
were fundamentally eroded. To my mind, both the aligned
19. Sulzberger, C.L. New York Times, 24.12.1962.
20. Round Table, 1960-61, p.409.
Dawn, 29.5.1961 (quoted Vice President Johnson's state­
ment in Washington 26. 5. 1961)
- 197 -
and non-aligned were treated equally, and therefore, the 
non-aligned states were in a better position since they 
had given no cause to complain as far as the Soviet Union 
was concerned.
Pakistan also started to demonstrate some indifference 
to these pacts, and in fact helped to render both SEATO 
and CENTO as ineffective instruments vis-a-vis American 
interests. In Vietnam various countries helped the Americans 
on their own.
Pakistan manifested increasing desire to develop 
relations with the Third World, and to be linked with the 
non-aligned movement, and endeavoured to adopt a more open 
and realistic approach in its foreign policy. The "most 
allied ally" was beginning fo find an independent identity 
and positive direction in its foreign policy.
As stated earlier there was a divergence of opinion 
and interests vis-a-vis the military pacts or defensive 
arrangements. Pakistan's adherence to the Manila Treaty 
or Cento was primarily due to its security needs, especially 
against Indian aggression. Precisely for this reason Pakistan 
reacted sharply when America and its other Western allies 
did not come to its aid either in 1965 or 1971. The United 
States of America had expressed its clearest possible in­
tentions with regard to its position as a signatory of 
the Manila Treaty which America considered to be a defen­
sive arrangement against a possible communist subversion 
or aggression. The Americans were at pains to explain their 
position, as they understood it to be, and indicated that
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they were not committed to help Pakistan against a non­
communist aggression, in particular, Indian aggression.
The United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand were not pre­
pared to help Pakistan against India simply because these 
member states were not prepared to assist one member against 
another within the Commonwealth. Ralph Braibanti expressed 
a similar point of view and asserted that both Australia 
and New Zealand had publicly declared that they were in no
way bound, by the Manila Treaty, to take military action
21against any member of the Commonwealth. But it also is 
true that the Treaty did not prevent them from helping 
Pakistan in a positive manner, and in defence of its terri­
torial integrity and political independence.
In the case of Pakistan the signatories to the Manila 
Treaty were not willing to accept their obligations. Once 
a state has indicated its willingness to be bound by a 
treaty then this willingness should be unequivocal 7 a reason­
able effect should be given to the treaty rather than un­
reasonable excuses. The basic principle involved herein is 
an attempt not to defeat but to fulfil the intention.
Australia and New Zealand joined the Pact to safeguard 
their interests against communist threats, a possible Japan­
ese military resurgence and because of their treaty relations 
with the United States of America and the United Kingdom.
The Americans expressed concern regarding the communist 
threat in the region and Australia was concerned with the 
Indonesian policy vis-a-vis New Guinea.
All these multifarious interests clearly cancelled out 
any advantage that Pakistan might have in joining the South
21. Braibanti R. International Implications of the Manila Pact, 
American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., N.Y.195 7, 
pp.21-23
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East Treaty Organisation. Pakistan was as such duped by 
design when it became a signatory to the Manila Pact? and 
the American reservation was not in conformity with the 
letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter since no distinct­
ion is made between a communist and a non-communist agg­
ression whatsoever. In fact, the United Nations had not ' 
agreed upon, at that point in time, a definition of the 
term aggression. The Americans, therefore, were ethically 
and morally wrong in insisting on the insertion of such a 
reservation in the Manila Pact. This established a fund­
amental and a crucial point of divergence between Pakistan 
and the United States. It protested at the American attitude 
and the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan Sir Muhammad Zaf- 
rullah Khan asserted that all aggression was evil and that 
the Americans should have no reservations to that effect.
In view of these clearout differences Pakistan was at 
a disadvantage, to begin with, and as such should not have 
joined SEATO'since it was obvious to its political leaders 
that the fellow signatories would not help Pakistan against 
an Indian attack.
For the reasons outlined above Pakistan failed to re­
ceive any help from the signatories to the Manila Pact either 
in 1965 or 19 71. It may be pointed out that the United 
States and its western allies were not prepared to give pref­
erence to Pakistan over India because of India’s size, its 
political record, institutions and because of the importance 
of India to the West.
- 200 -
In the ultimate analysis the West was invariably 
prepared to forget and forgive India for its anti-American 
posture, pro-Russian stance, direct or indirect align­
ment with the West or the Soviet Union or, in fact, India's 
alignment with both the super-powers. Both the Russians 
and the Americans were prepared to supply India with arms 
and extended economic assistance in spite of India's 
disregard for the U.N. Charter, and in spite of the fact 
that India did cross the International Border on 6th Sept­
ember, 1965, along the Lahore-Sialkot Sector, and in 1971 
along the Jessore Sector in the former East pakistan.
It would not be out of place to state here that India
entered into Treaty obligations with the Soviet Union in
August 19 71, and that it paved the way for India to take
decisive action against Pakistan and dismember it by force.
w»
Pakistan's allies with-SEATO were content with the situationk
and allowed the events to take their natural course in 
spite of the fact that the Treaty and its Articles I,III 
and IV clearly asked for common action "to resist armed 
attack and to prevent and : counter subversive activities 
directed from without" (Article II) . It was morally wrong 
for Australia, ,New Zealand and the United Kingdom to sign 
the Manila Treaty, in good faith, and then to renege on their 
obligations, under the Treaty, irrespective of their position 
vis-a-vis the Commonwealth.
These countries along with France, Philippines and 
Thailand were bound by the Treaty to come to the aid of 
Pakistan both in 1965 and in 19 71 since no reservations or
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"understanding" had been included in the Treaty. Treaties 
entered into voluntarily are bound to be upheld, respected 
and honoured since such treaties are signed in good faith 
(pacta sunt servanda) and the signatories should not try 
to wriggle out of their politico-moral and legal obligat­
ions under the pretext that a vital change of circumstances 
has occurred. The clausula rebus sic stantibus has in­
variably been brandished implying that the treaty is to be 
binding only so long" as things stand as they are. This 
principle has been used, merely to excuse the breach of a 
treaty obligation that a state finds it inconvenient to 
fulfil.
One might excuse Pandit ffawahar Lai Nehru, albeit 
reluctantly, for wriggling out of his commitment to hold 
a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir after Paki­
stan had joined the military Pacts SEATO and CENTO. But 
one would find it difficult, if not well nigh impossible, 
to accept the pretences under which Australia, New Zealand, 
United Kingdom, France and Thailand failed to fulfil their 
treaty obligations both in 1965 and 19 71. All these sig­
natories were fully aware of the facts, and therefore, their 
excuses or arguments were immaterial and untenable.
It could be argued that Pakistan should not have 
signed its rights away by becoming the "most allied ally" 
but unfortunately Pakistan had taken certain decisions 
since 1950 which put it in a most unenviable position where 
Pakistan could not trust or find another World Power to 
champion its cause or protect its territorial integrity 
and political independence.
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Pakistan's increasing affinity with America,, such 
as Pakistan's attitude towards the Korean War and the 
Japanese Peace Treaty were receiving ready approval,
"...in contrast to India's aloofness from the struggle 
between communism and democracy, Pakistan has been almost
22aggressive in her moral commitment to the Western Powers."
The first J?>rime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Liaquat Ali 
Khan was reported to have told the New York Herald Tribune 
that America wrongly equated Pakistan's foreign policy 
with that of India; and stressed that Pakistan, was^  opposed 
to an isolationist policy and was prepared to make sacri­
fices for the collective security system being chalked out 
by the free world.^
Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din who succeeded Liaquat Ali Khan, 
after Liaquat Ali' s assassination in October, 19 sl, was 
obliged to ask the United States in 195 3 for free help and 
obtained a gift of approximately one million tons of wheat 
since Pakistan did not have foreign exchange to meet such 
a requirement. The need for economic assistance, indeed, 
added much urgency towards greater affinity with the United 
States.
After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan on 16th 
October 1951, Pakistan experienced internal instability 
and early in 1952 prices of both jute and cotton fibres, 
upon which its foreign trade solely depended, began to 
drop fast.'. While the general commodity price index dropped
22. New York Times, 15.9.1951.
2 3. The Pakistan Times, 3.10. 1951
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from 162 to 12 3 between June 1951 and December 1952, 
fibres fell from 193 to 98, and Pakistan's foreign ex­
change earnings dropped from 288 crore Rupees to Rs.192
crores during 1952. Gold and Sterling reserves which 
* * 2 4stood at Rs.148.7 crores on 1.1.1952 slumped drastically
25to Rs. 60.61 crores by the beginning of 195 3.
This picture of Pakistan's econ.omic plight is-a vivid 
exposition as to why it endeavoured to strengthen relations 
with the United States, and as to why Pakistan entered 
into bilateral and multilateral military arrangements in­
volving the Americans and their allies.
The Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement signed between 
the United States and Pakistan on 19.5.1954 was as irksome 
to India as the arms assistance to India, following the 
Sino-Indian border conflict of October 1962, was to Paki­
stan. But the suggestion or the implication that, apart 
from the question of military supplies to Pakistan, all 
was in good shape between India and the United States is 
a misleading concept. Basic differences existed between 
the United States and India long before the Americans 
started their arms supplies to Pakistan, and it has been 
suggested that the United States turned to Pakistan after 
they had been rebuffed by India. Chester Bowles emphasised
that it was bad arithmetic to alien&te 360 million Indians
26in order to aid 80 million Pakistanis. India was acting 
contrary to U.S. interests. Richard Nixon's biographer 
stated that the Vice-President's recommendations of military
** Rs. Denotes Pakistani Rupees
24. One Crore is equal,to 10 millions
25. The Pakistan Times, 15.3.195 3 (Choudhri Muhammad Ali's
Budget Speech in the Constituent Assembly, 14.3.1953)
26. Chester Bowles, 'A U.S. Policy for Asia iNew Leader' ,
22.2.1954
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to Pakistan "was entirely carried through as a counterpiege
27to the confirmed neutralism of Jawahar Lai Nehru's India."
Both in India and the United States persons like
Sunderlal Poplai and Phillips Talbot wrote that "American
military help and political alliance have gone to Pakistan
only and not also to India because India has declined
2 8such help and association." Richard P. Stebbins ex­
pressed his views: "Had the United States been less firmly 
committed to its worldwide strategic programme, or had 
India been somewhat less sympathetic to American views on 
the 'cold war', this coiuntry might have hesitated to take 
a step which threatened to complete the breach of confidence 
which had been developing with the largest democracy in Asia. 
As things stood, however, Indian-American relations were 
already in a condition that made many Americans doubtful
whether it was really possible to continue taking Indian
29susceptibilities into account."
There were sharp differences between India and the 
United States regarding communist states and the possible 
threat that they posed to the free world. Economic col­
onialism, according to the Indian point of view, posed 
a bigger threat. Krishna Menon believed that a major ob­
jective of American foreign policy was to create an economic
political and military vacuum in India which would in itself
30be filled by the Americans.. The late Clement Attlee 
asserted that in the eyes of Asians, the "number one
27. See Ralph de Toledano, Nixon, p.164
28. Talbot, P. and Poplai, S.L. India and America, A Study 
of Their Relations, Harper and Brothers, N.Y. 1958, p.70
29. Stebbins, R.P. The United States in World Affairs, H. & 
Bros., N.Y. 1956, pp.312-313
30. Hodson,H.V., The Great Divide, Hutchinson, London, 1969, 
p. 243.
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31exploiter, even more imperialist than Britain/1' was 
now the United States of America. During the eighth 
Session of the General Assembly the Indian delegate, 
alleging that the United States was establishing and per­
petuating a new form of colonialism in Puerto Rico, sought
32to have the whole Peurto Rican matter investigated.
There were other differences regarding capitalism, 
socialism and the preservation of peace. India held the 
view that capitalism was more dangerous than socialism 
and that peace could be effectively preserved by creating 
a zone of peace than a system of collective defence. All 
this was in sharp contradistinction with the American 
foreign policy objectives.
Since the Americans failed to enlist the Indian support 
in search of their objectives they opted for the secondary 
option i.e. Pakistan which, at that point in time, was 
considered to be the second largest non-communist state 
on the face of the Asian Landmass. A Muslim state which 
was fervently opposed to Godless ideology, and which needed 
economic and large military assistance which enjoyed a 
strategic position and had an important role to play in 
the fight against communism.
Pakistan continued to express its enthusiasm for the 
defensive arrangements, especially the Central Treaty 
Organisation because of its religious and cultural aff­
inities with Turkey, Iran and Iraq; and because of its
// isv<-9 .
Twilight of Empire,* Memoirs of Prime Minister Clement 
/\- Attlee, as set down by Francis Williams, p. 2 38
rv 32. Report on the Eighth Session of the General Assembly 
I of the United Nations: House Report 1965, 83rd Congress,
I , .\c&  / 2nd Session, Washington D.C. ,195 3, p. 2.
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proximity to these three Muslim members of the Pact.
The United States never joined the Pact because it 
did not want to alienate or estrange any further the Egyptians. 
Moreover, the United States did not want to enter, at that 
point in time, into a mutual defence alliance with Israel 
because that would have totally alienated Iiraq and other 
Arab States, and possibly driven them into the Soviet fold.
Nasser's objections to these arrangements and his 
pronounced adherence to the non-aligned movement were hypo­
critical, to say the least. Like Nehru, Nasser claimed 
the leadership of the non-aligned movement'," but it would 
be well nigh impossible to establish that Egypt under Nasser 
was non-aligned in the true sense of the word. Egypt was 
either aligned with the United States or the Soviet Union, 
at a point in time, during the last thirty years. It was 
more a question of changing partners according to the 
changed circumstances, and criticising the various military 
pacts was deemed necessary with a view to performing a 
ritual act. It was only after Egypt had been spurned by 
John Foster Dulles and the United States when Nasser's 
request for financial assistance and military hardware had 
been rejected that Egypt turned to the Soviet Union in 
1954-55. Nasser's successor the late President Anwar Sadat 
followed the same policies and invited thousands of Russian 
personnel and military advisers to train the Egyptians in 
various fields; and when Sadat found their presence unpalat­
able he had no qualms in ordering the Russians out uncerem­
oniously during 1971-72. The events since the Arab-Israeli
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War of 1973 are the living proof of increasing co--operation 
between Egypt and the United States of America.
Alignment and non-alignment seem to have been syn­
onymous in Nehru's approach to international relations, and 
it could be argued that India under Nehru behaved in almost 
identical manner after the Sino-Indian border conflict of 
1962 when Nehru quickly accepted the American and Common­
wealth help with much gratitude.
The late President Ayub wrote in his autobiography
33that Pakistan learnt on October 2, 1962/ through the 
Pakistan Ambassador to India, J.K. Galbraith, and that the 
Ambassador had, on the authority of the U.S. Government, 
told Jawahar Lai Nehru that America would supply arms to 
India and it was for the Indian Prime Minister to indicate 
the requirements. Jawahar Lai Nehru also addressed a gen­
eral appeal for support and help against China for "the
elimination of deceit, dissimulation and farce in inter-
34national relations." British military supplies arrived
35in India on 29.10.1962, in two Royal Air Force Britannias;
and on 3rd November, 1962 the first U.S. arms shipments
3 6arrived in four planes which landed at Calcutta,
By 16th November, 1962 the Indians under Pandit Jawahar
Lai Nehru were not only asking the Americans for transport
planes but were also asking for pilots and crews to fly the 
37aircraft. Galbraith has gone further and stated that the
33. Khan,M.A. Friends Not Masters, O.U.P., London, pp.144-6
34. Noorani,A.G. Our Credulity and Negligence, Ramdas G. 
Bhatkal, Bombay, 196 3, p.111.
35. Kavic,L.J. India's Quest for Security, U.Cal.P. 1967, p.182
36. Galbraith,J.K. Ambassador's Journal, Houghton Mifflin, 
Boston, 1969, p.456.
37. ibid. p.481
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Indians, at that time, yearned for the sight of American 
38uniforms, and shortly afterwards the Indians began to plead
for military association with the United States, and they
wanted the U.S. Air Force to back them up so that their own
pilots could fly tactically without leaving the cities un- 
39protected.
According to New York Times, a squadron of U.S. c-130 
transport planes, having arrived during November 1962, threw 
a crucial air bridge across the Himalayas from Central India 
to Leh and flew fifteen to seventeen runs a day to the 
front, moving 150 to 180 tons of desperately needed equip­
ment daily.^
In addition to military hardware, a high powered team 
headed by Averell Harriman arrived in India, from Jtihe 
United States, on 22nd November, 1962, and another from 
the United Kingdom led by Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State 
for Commonwealth Relations arrived on 24th November, 1962* 
After the emergency aid had been agreed at Nassau in Dec­
ember 1962, the two leaders i.e. President Kennedy and Prime 
Minister MacMillan met again at the end of June 196 3, at 
Birch Grove house in Sussex and declared that they were 
agreed on their policy of continuing to help India by pro­
viding further military aid to strengthen its defences
41against the threat of renewed Chinese Communist attack."
The U.S. Engineers helped to build an all-weather 
highway from Srinagar to Leh (from the Capital of Indian 
held Kashmir to the Capital of Ladakh) and in addition, 
the airport at Leh was improved. Indian Air Force held
38. ibid. p.; 489 . . v  ■ ' •.. 39. ■ ; ibid. p, 486 : J
40. New York Times, 21.4.196 3
41. See Pakistan Horizon, 3rd Quarter, 1963..:,
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joint defence training with the U.S. Air Force and the 
Royal Air Force and made arrangements for the U.S. Air 
Force to come to India's rescue in case of renewed host­
ilities. The U.S. Ambassador designate Chester Bowles 
stated in a radio interview that the United States was
"very anxious to help India-and the only question was the
42amount of military aid the Indians can absorb. "
The Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan announced on 8.4.196 3
43that India proposed to double the strength of the army.
Early in 1964 a five1 year defence plan was chalked out
which was expected to cost Rs.5,000 crore including foreign
44exchange worth Rs.6 80 crore.
The Economist reported that by May 196 4, India had 
secured an offer of £200 million from the United States for 
a period of five years, and in addition, had secured large 
scale military hardware from the Soviet Union and the United
Kingdom which would enable India to assume the role of
45a major power in the region.
In essence the United States had given economic aid 
to India to the tune of $6 billions but TP&kistan received 
only $3 billions in economic assistance. Pakistan, how­
ever, received by September 1965 a total of $1.5 billion 
while India had received military hardware to the tune of 
$84.5 million. Thus, while Pakistan had received more 
arms from the United States, India having received massive
42. Christian Science Monitor, 28.5.63
43. Asian Recorder, 1963, p.5207
44. Kavic,L.J. India's Quest for Security, p.193
45. The Economist, 26.9.1964. See also Asian Recorder, 1964, 
p.6099. Defence Minister Chavan's Statement, 21.9.1964
- 210 -
economic aid was able to divert its economic resources
to its military machine, and in addition, received in-
46creased military supplies from the Soviet Union.
Pakistan made repeated representations and protested
that the arms will be used against it, and not against
China, especially in view of the fact that the dispute
over Kashmir had not been resolved.
Pakistan's Foreign Minister stated that "Kruschev
did not say that India will be annihilated. He said
47Peshawar would be annihilated." Pakistani leaders 
seemed to have acted in a positive manner and adopted a 
correct approach in emphasising the fact that they did 
not ask for a total ban on arms for India but wished that 
they should have been properly consulted before the supply 
of arms, and that there should have been some guarantees 
and that there should have been some restraint on the use 
of these arms. They further argued that the Sino-Indian 
border conflict provided India, Pakistan and the West 
with a golden opportunity for a peaceful solution of the 
Kashmir dispute: "only a speedy and just Kashmir settle­
ment can give us any assurance that the contemplated in­
crease of India's military power is not likely to be de-
48ployed against Pakistan m  future."
The Americans also started to question the very 
validity and relevance of these Pacts,* and this criticism
46. Norman D. Palmer, 'India and Pakistan: The Major Re­
cipients', Current History, Nov. 1965; Selig S. 
Harrison, America, India, and Pakistan', Harper's 
Magazine, July, 1966.
47. Nikita Kruschev threatened the Pakistani Charge d' 
affaires on 9.5.60. (New York Times, 10.5.1960)
48. Khan,M/.\A. Friends Not Masters, O.U.P. p. 150
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became more severe with the inauguration of the Kennedy
Administration in January, 1961. After assuming office
President Kennedy took a number of decisions which soon
began to affect American- relations with Pakistan. In
his address to the joint session of Congress, Kennedy
declared: "I can vividly recall sitting where you sit
now...the undimmed eloquence of Churchill, the soaring
49idealism of Nehru, the steadfast words of de Gaulle."
And at the same time there were visible changes in 
India's attitude especially in the United Nations, where 
India supported the United States over Congo and did not 
support the Soviet campaign against the Secretary General 
Dag Hammarskjold.
The American grievances against India's past activities 
were beginning to erode and disappear, and India was en­
couraged to take a more active role in Afro-Asian affairs.
At the same time America, under the direction of President 
Kennedy was negotiating to provide India with substantial 
economic assistance and to help India in its Five Year 
Plan. The bulk of the economic assistance was to be pro­
vided in the form of Long Term Development Fund Loans 
at very low interest rates and repayable over a forty 
to fifty year period.
Vice President Lyndon Johnson was sent on a mission 
to Asia with a view to establish a new equilibrium be^ - 
tween the United States and other non-aligned states.
During his visit to India Johnson declared: "I am
49. Dawn, Editorial, 24.2.1961
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confident without reservation that India and the United:- 
States will continue to build a friendly and a wholesome 
relationship. This I can assure you is very much welcome 
on the part of America. Our President John F. Kennedy's 
high regard for India and India's leadership needs no re­
iteration beyond the presence here of Ambassador Galbraith."
Z.A. Bhutto stated that Senator Fulbright, Chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had invited India 
and other nearby countries to play a more active military 
and economic role in the defence of the region? and acc­
ording to Bhutto, the U.S. roving Ambassador Averell 
Harriman, was reported to have made a statement, on 6th 
May 1961, in which he asked Nehru that it was the view of
the Americans that certain neutral countries of Asia should
51underwrite the neutrality of Laos. Bhutto agreed further 
that-India was gradually being won over by the United 
States through increased economic assistance and through 
an elevated Indian position in international affairs? 
and Premier Nehru was considered a top favourite of the 
Kennedy Administration among world statesmen.
Nehru, it was suggested, was also responding in a 
positive manner since he agreed to send Indian troops to 
Congo at a time when the United Nations Force was about to 
collapse? and supported the British moves for a ceasefire 
and urged Kruschev to accept them.
50. See Bhutto,Z.A. Myth of Independence, O.U.P. 1969, 
p. 56
51. ibid.
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On May 18th 1961 Krishna Menon attending the 14 
Nation Conference on Laos in Geneva, objected to the Soviet
demand that it should have the right to veto the 'peace
i , 5 2plan 1.
Only the previous month, twenty four hours after 
having attacked American intervention in Cuba, Nehru had 
no qualms in changing his tune - calling President Kennedy 
"dynamic" and suggesting that "there might be two sides 
to the Cuban story.
There was an exchange of pleasantries between American 
and Indian leadership which could be construed as a 
further demonstration of growing confidence between the 
two countries. The Indian Ambassador to the United States 
was reported to have said: "When I came here neutralism 
was distrusted and suspected. Today it has become respected 
...the switch in American policy is so great that America
now wants neutral states in Africa and Southeast Asia...
54and take economic aid...." The change in policy was 
so abrupt and far reaching that it left the Pakistani, 
leaders isolated. It rekindled not only all the old passions 
for India but also the known prejudices against partition. 
Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru's irksome policies were forgotten, 
as was the fidelity with which Pakistan attached itself 
to the American interest. Pakistan, however, did receive 
substantial economic and military assistance but not with­
out a price. Pakistan had undertaken defence committments
52. ibid.
53. ibid. p.57
54. Dawn (Karachi), 4.6.1961
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against Communist Powers without a categoric assurance 
with regard to its security against India. Pakistan 
incurred the hostility of the Russians, who openly supp­
orted Afghanistan and India against Pakistan. Pakistan's 
image was a.’so tarnished, due to its policy of alignment, 
in the United Nations. It strained Pakistan's relations 
with neighbouring Islamic Arab countries and drove Pakistan
towards isolation in the community of Asia and Africa.
The changes in the subcontinent and on the Himalayan front­
iers erased with a single stroke both the services of 
Pakistan and the antagonism against India. The "most 
allied ally" was left without a dependable ally.
The American policy towards India and Pakistan has 
undergone numerous changes but the basic policy objectives 
have remained the same. Broadly speaking these objectives 
could be summarised as follows_
i) Both India and Pakistan must remain within their reach.
ii) India has priority over Pakistan
iii) Pakistan to be brought in the limelight only as a 
counterweight to overt Indian hostility and antagonism.
iv) The containment of communist influence in the region.
v) The protection of American global interests.
Pakistan's alignment or non-alignment is bound to be viewed, 
reviewed and scrutinised, by the United States and its 
allies, according to the vested interests of the Americans? 
and the United States would help or ignore Pakistan acc­
ordingly.
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Con clus i on
The preceding pages establish the fact that Pakistan emerged 
as a dislocated state with a number of problems/ in the socio­
economic, administrative, military and political fields; and
this goes without saying that the "possession of an uninterrupted
/ » ,f .
territory is one of the principle, requirements for the smooth 
functioning of a political entity."^ The birth of Pakistan, 
however, was subjected to the tremendous disadvantage that the 
-strate—would find itself burdened with great economic pressures, 
and that its vulnerability in the economic field would be suff­
icient to lead Pakistan towards its eventual disintegration 
or demise.
The two distant and distinct parts of Pakistan were bound 
by their Islamic faith and an inborn desire to free themselves 
from socio-economic and political exploitation. The people 
believed that the creation of Pakistan would enable them to 
achieve their ends, and this would help them to throw off the 
yoke of economic exploitation and to rehabilitate their 
position through an acceptable democratic process.
The fragmented nature, however, of the state caused ser­
ious problems and in spite of the fact that "Pakistan's two 
Wings... were united by a common religious faith - but divided 
by numerous cultural contrasts. As happens frequently with 
fragmented States, one part of the State, in this case the 
East, felt itself the victim of political discrimination.
Charges of'domestic colonialism' abounded and in the end the
State broke up as East Pakistan - now Bangladesh - fought for
2
independence, aided by neighbouring India."
1. Robinson,G.W.S., "West Berlin" Geography of an Enclave, 
Geographical Review, Vol.43, p.540, 1953
2. de Blij"i,H. Systematic Political Geography, London, 1972, p. 40 j
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These were some of the high ideals which the people 
cherished within the concept of a strong and prosperous 
Pakistan, but their hopes of achieving these objectives were 
blunted by the entrenched position of internal and external 
vested interests. "In every state there are forces tending 
to reduce its cohesion. In extreme cases they break the 
state into two or more parts, as Czechoslovakia was broken up 
in 1939....In other cases, it may serve merely to make ad­
ministration more difficult and to weaken the political power 
of the State....The division of a state area into two or more
parts by the territory of another, as Pakistan... is a matter
3of serious importance." Externally the very existence of 
Pakistan as an independent state was challenged by India who 
never gave up the idea of the eventual reunification of 
"Bharat Mata". India used various economic, political and 
military means to demonstrate its dominance as the arbiter 
of the future political patterns on the sub-continent, and in 
the pursuit of its policy it received useful help from within 
and without, especially the Soviet Union. To counterbalance 
this inherent threat to its security and independence, Pakistan 
opted to align itself with America since Pakistani leaders 
held the view that the Americans with their world-wide in­
fluence would help Pakistan to strengthen its defences and 
assist its economic development. The Americans were more 
than keen, at the time, to aid Pakistan in both the fields 
since they thought that a strong Muslim Pakistan would serve 
a useful purpose in their global strategy of containing 
communist influence especially in the Middle East and South 
Asia.
3. Pounds,N.J.G., Political Geography, McGraw Hill,N.Y.1972,p.7.
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Consequently Pakistan proved more than a willing ally, 
and joined with the United States, in signing a number of 
bilateral and multilateral defensive arrangements e.g.
S.E.A.T.O. CENTO (the old Baghdad Pact). These pacts gave
  _ t-!(nSf^
Pakistan a sense of security and considerable amount of 
military, economic and technical assistance. The member­
ship of these pacts, however, made Pakistan the convenient 
target of criticism, and marked it out as the active pawn in 
the game of powerpolitics and the dreaded cold war.
The Soviet Union openly and vehemently criticised Paki—
I Tstan for allowing itself to be drawn into powerpolitics.
Pandit Nehru (the then Indian Prime Minister) showed his in­
dignation and criticised Pakistan for bringing the i.cpld war 
to the South Asian subcontinent (while he conveniently ignored 
the agreement signed between the United States and India in 
1951), and employed this as an excuse to wriggle out of his 
international commitments (as if Pakistan had violated the 
U.N. Charter or the basic principles of collective security 
within the precepts of International Law) over Kashmir, and
accused Pakistan of having "destroyed the entire basis for 
■ . . .  4a plebiscite in Kashmir." President Nasser of Egypt accused 
Pakistan of subverting the Arab world and collusion with the 
friends of Israel.
These were some of the formidable obstacles that Pakistan 
had to face as a result of its close association with the 
Americans, and which consequently proved to be more damaging 
than the help Pakistan received from the Americans and their 
allies.
4. Keesings, op.cit., p.14895
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Had India accepted the emergence of Pakistan as a sover­
eign and independent state, and showed some shrewd diplomacy 
and a degree of magnanimity towards it at the very outset, 
Pakistan's fears could have been allayed and an atmosphere of 
cordiality generated. A logical requisite for the two develop­
ing nations who shared a variety of common interests. Instead,
an atmosphere of suspicion and mutual hostility was nurtured
on both sides much to the detriment of — and---
as such provided opportunity for outside powers to influence 
the chain of events in South Asia.
Due to the fact that a large Hindu minority (20 to 25 
per cent) remained in the former East Pakistan after the part­
ition, the process of national integration was undermined 
since this large minority had never opted for Pakistan and 
had openly rejected the very idea of Two Nations and the con­
cept of Pakistan. There is no denying the fact that a Muslim 
minority remained in India (about 10 per cent), especially 
in the former United Province and the former Central Province, 
and many Indians considered them Pakistanis in disguise.
But their position was comparatively weaker than the Hindus 
in the former East Pakistan or Sind. The Muslim minority in 
India was not in a position to influence the fissiparfms 
tendencies in India and were not effective in terms of their
geopolitical location. Had this minority been located within
the outer fringes of India, especially in the North-West of 
post-partition India then their position would have been much 
stronger and they might have played a more active role in the 
Indian Politics, particularly in the area of Indo-Pakistan 
relations.
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Moreover the division of Indian Panjab into Harayana and 
the Panjab clearly demonstrated that the large Sikh population 
was not pleased with the state of affairs within the Indian 
Union, and were clamouring for more autonomy, and possibly 
desiring the establishment of Khalistan, independent of the 
Union.
Had the Muslims not migrated to Pakistan from Gurdaspur, 
Jullundur, Ludhiana, Ferozepur and Amritsar the position of 
the Indian government would have been considerably weakened
N
vis-a-vis the Sikh demand for Khalistan, and instead of 
dividing the Panjab into Haryana and the Panjab, the Sikhs 
could have been encouraged towards the establishment of their 
own homeland or at least a fully autonomous state within the 
Union? which in turn would have given valid grounds to the 
people in Tamilnad, Mizoland and Nagaland for greater autonomy, 
if not outright independence. As a result India would have 
been deprived of her geopolitical competence to assimilate or 
annex Bhutan and Sikkim into the Union.
The position of the Indian Muslims weakened further since 
the Indians advanced their argument that if they allowed the 
promised plebiscite in Kashmir the potentials of communal 
bloodshed would seriously jeopardise the lives and property 
of the Indian Muslims, and their interests could be seriously 
damaged (as if there had been no communal riots in India).
In fact, the argument was advanced to nullify the concept 
of Two Nations which the Indians never really accepted. There 
have been more than two thousand communal riots in India since 
1947, resulting in bloodshed and widescale loss of property,
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and the Muslims have been the main victim. This has also 
belied the Indian claims of secularism and democratic social­
ism, "Despite the assertion in the Indian Constitution that 
the State has no official religion, it is difficult to deny
that in fact, it has been established around the Hindu 
5
Faith." Therefore, the Indian argument holds no water.
The separatist tendencies in the former East Pakistan 
could be explained in the socio-economic and political dis­
satisfaction of the people in the eastern wing; the total 
lack of enthusiasm for the concept of Pakistan amongst the 
Hindus, who always looked favourably towards Calcutta rather 
than Dacca, and the politically disenchanted dissidents whose 
only interest vested in the possibility of wielding political 
power. One of the foremost duties of the political parties 
and their leadership in Pakistan should have been to forge 
national unity and cohesion through tolerance and political 
compromise so as to effectively check the growth of parochial­
ism and regionalism, and stem the tide of fissiparous tend­
encies, especially in the former East Pakistan, which would 
ultimately prove fatal for the territorial integrity and 
the very existence of Pakistan.
It would not be out of place to emphasise here that such 
a goal could very well have been achieved through some degree 
of democratic processes and by a sustained effort towards 
interregional understanding and co-operation. Unfortunately 
the political leadership in Pakistan failed to fully appreciate 
the geopolitical compulsions of a dislocated Pakistan, and the 
gradual drift towards authoritarianism generated a strong 
feeling of mistrust, fear and hatred for the Central
5. Pounds,N.J.G., op.cit.p.7
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government; which the regional political leadership exploited 
in full. The gradual disintegration of the Pakistan Muslim 
League (the political party which was largely responsible for 
the creation of Pakistan) provided the regional political 
parties with an opportunity to voice their demands with 
added confidence, and with a definite parochial flavour and 
on regional lines, which proved so damaging, and consequently 
led to the disintegration of Pakistan with active military 
help and support from India.
Keeping in view the geopolitical limitations of Pakistan 
a true federal structure with a bicameral legislature would 
have safeguarded the legitimate rights of the federating 
units, eliminating the parochial tendencies, and the vicious 
circle of suspicion, hate and fear among the people of Pakistan 
as a whole. Instead a quasi-federal or more appropriately a 
quasi-unitary state was established under the constitutions 
of 1956, 1962 and 19 73. This brought the centrifugal and 
centripetal forces into a direct clash, and as such the fissi- 
parous elements were allowed to work fast and effectively in 
destroying the unity of Pakistan. This process had been amply 
demonstrated in the failure of the United Arab Federation 
(Iraq and Jordon dissolved in 195 8), United Arab Republic 
(Egypt and Syria dissolved in 1961) and the Malaysian Feder­
ation (Malaya and Singapore dissolved in 1965).
In the case of Pakistan the need for national cohesion 
and integration was very crucial because of its specific 
geographic location, "The extreme case in the division of 
Pakistan into West and East Pakistan.... The two are accessible 
to one another by ship, but the difference between the ports 
of Karachi and Chittagong is about 3000 miles. This fact 
alone has necessitated a federal constitution; it has increased
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innumerably the defence problems, and weakened seriously
6the homogeneity of the state...."
A close study of the geopolitical factors of Pakistan
would reveal that there are a number of inherent problems
in the very method of partitioning the sub-continent which
adversely affected the geopolitical and economic life of the
nascent state, "....few modern states started their existence...
under such severe initial difficulties as Pakistan...^the east
wing lost its principle port, the pivot of its railway system,
and the industrial complex that had processed its jute, while
west wing's frontier with India cut across the extensive...
irrigation network, leaving vital headworks in Kashmir and
India...,, the country's mere survival as a political unit was 
7
remarkable."
Edwardes also expressed similar views, "Radcliffe had
great difficulty in drawing his lines on the map. Indeed he
found it impossible to get hold of a large-scale map on
which to draw them...and Radcliffe had been forced to work
with inadequate data. His problem in the Punjab was not
just that of dividing areas of community as it mainly had in
8Bengal. In the Punjab it was a matter of water."
The Radcliffe Award in the Punjab left its irrigation 
system in jeopardy and the Pakistani Punjab was made depend­
ent upon Ferozepur and Hussainiwala Head-works which were 
carved out to India though India had less irrigated areas 
dependent on these headworks. Furthermore, the award of 
Ferozepur TehsiIs to India left Pakistan very much vulnerable
6. ibid. p.57
1, Myrdal, Gunnar, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty 
of Nations, Vol.1. London, 1968, p.305
8. Edwardes,P.S., Nehru: A Political Biography,London,1971, 
p.215
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to Indian interests geographically and economically since 
Ferozepur was a very important rail and road junction and 
a military centre of considerable significance. There is a 
general belief in Pakistan that the award of Ferozepur Tehsils 
(sub-districts) was not based on contiguous majority areas 
principle but on "other factor's".
Again the award of Gurdaspur to India facililitated the 
Indian occupation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir which 
negated the contiguous majority areas principles but un­
fortunately the "other Factors" were employed and favoured 
India. In fact, the Indian Independence Act of 194 7, had 
provisionally included the whole of Gurdaspur District in the 
hew province of West Punjab, "Districts provisionally in­
cluded in the New Province of West Punjab. In the Lahore
Division, the District of Gujranwala, Gurdaspur, Lahore,
9
Sheikhupura and Sialkot...."
It is important to emphasise that had Lord Mountbatten 
given the same advice to the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir 
which he is said to have given to the Maharajah of Jodhpur, 
the people of India,.Pakistan and Kashmir would have been 
spared the misery that followed the questionable decision of 
the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir. Lord Mountbatten at the 
time is reported to have impressed upon the Maharajah of 
Jodhpur,".... that the Maharajah had every legal right to 
accede to Pakistan if he wished, but did he really realise 
what the consequence might be? As a Hindu ruler of a largely 
Hindu state, he was surely going against the principle
9. Poplai,S.L., India-1947-50:Select Documents on Asian
Affairs, Internal Affairs, Volume One, 0.U.P.London,1959,p.40
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that India was being divided into a Muslim and non-Muslim 
Dominion. His decision to accede to Pakistan might cause 
considerable communal disturbance in Jodhpur.... The Maharajah 
was quickly reduced to bluster...."^
The division of Gurdaspur becomes more questionable when 
one learns about the reported statement made by the late Lord 
Mountbatten regarding the partition of the Punjab, "I put that 
in for the simple reason that the district of Gurdaspur in the 
Punjab the population 50.4 per cent Muslim, I think, and 49.6 
per cent non-Muslim. With a difference of 0.8 per cent you 
will see at once that it is unlikely that the Boundary Comm­
ission will throw the whole of the district into the Muslim
11majority areas." Small wonder that Radcliffe eventually 
awarded the large majority of the said district to India 
against the very principle on the basis of which India was 
to be partitioned, and of which the Maharajah of Jodhpur 
was so emphatically made aware.
These observations to an impartial mind, seemed to be 
improper and highly predudicial, and were bound to affect 
the State of Jammu and Kashmir and its position vis-a-vis 
India and Pakistan.
The failure to reach an amicable settlement of the out­
standing disputes between India and Pakistan is bound to en­
courage outside interference; a potential threat to the 
stability and security in the region, "That Pakistan will 
survive appears certain; it could not be destroyed short of 
war, and although in that event the dice would be heavily
10. Mosley,L., The Last Days of the British Raj, London, 1961 
p.178
11. Ali,C.M., op.cit. pp.215-216
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loaded against Pakistan....India would be very unlikely to add
to already numerous internal problems that of holding down a
hostile population in the granary of the sub-continent; Kashmir
12may alone prove a quite sufficient strain."
j If and when India decided to take a major military in­
vasion of Pakistan aimed at the total dismemberment of Pakistan 
then India would have done irreparable damage to her own unity 
which to many observers seems tenuous and full of fissiparous 
and divisive elements. "In spite of the geographic Kaleido­
scopic appearance of India and the resulting chain of Indian 
geographic unity...,the history of India regurgitates in­
numerable instances of cultural, economic, political and social 
disunity, and the emergence of Pakistan... is the latest and
the most comprehensive rebuttal to the claimants of such
13illusionary unity."
The continued Indian occupation of Kashmir could very 
well jeopardise the very existence of Pakistan, especially 
if the policy of confrontation is pursued by the two neigh­
bours, "West Pakistan is fundamentally better-found... and it 
has the makings of a decent if not spectacular agrarian pros­
perity, if only the Kashmir crisis can be settled.... Otherwise 
the prospect is bleak indeed...."^
If and when the troubled relations between the two are 
put on a friendly basis then Afghanistan could be pursuaded 
to realise that its safety would be strengthened by a strong 
and stable Pakistan.
12. EastfW.G. and Spate,O.H.K. The Changing Map of Asia: A 
Political Geography, London, 1961, p.170
13. Tayyeb,A. op.cit. pp.2 4-25
14. East and Spate, op.cit. p.170
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A detente between India and Pakistan, and Pakistan and 
Afghanistan would greatly help in lessening the tension in 
the region, and remove the possible seeds of instability in 
South Asia. Such an atmosphere is bound to help and benefit 
the peoples of this region. This would be directly in line 
with the basic principles of the Bandung Conference.
The outside powers such as the Soviet Union, the People's 
Republic of China, Japan and the United States would be ob­
liged to seek open and fair competition rather than sow the 
seeds of dissension and as such would be obliged to seek co­
operation and understanding as against exploitation, and carv­
ing out their respective spheres of influence.
Developing nations such as Pakistan cannot afford to be
pawns in power-politics and as such serve the entrenched
interests of great powers. The regional powers must look around
for economic, commercial and cultural ventures instead of
looking towards distant corners for friends and protection.
♦
For Pakistan, these objectives can very well be served best 
by seeking closer relations with India, Sri-Lanka, Iran, 
Afghanistan, Russia, Bangladesh, China and Japan, and the 
other countries of South, East and West Asia. This would be 
very much in conformity with the geopolitical compulsions of 
Pakistan, especially after the recent events in Afghanistan.
The emphasis should be towards reconciliati/on and understanding; 
and away from confrontation and acrimony.
Pakistan has succeeded, at times, in establishing useful 
relations with the Soviet Union which has taken increasingly 
greater interest in the region, especially after the signing
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of the Tashkent Declaration in 1966. The Soviet Union, however,
seems to have done more damage to the Pakistani interests than
brought constructive help to Pakistan in socio-economic and
cultural fields.
In addition the Soviet Union has taken considerable
diplomatic steps to further strengthen its position in the
region. It has succeded in securing useful naval facilities
from the littoral states in return for socio-economic and
military assistance e.g., South Yemen, Iraq, Ethiopia. In
order to bolster its position and to widen the area of Soviet
influence and presence Moscow concluded a number of treaties
with the littoral states since 1970, including India.
The attitude of India towards the increased Russian
naval activities in the Indian Ocean seems paradoxical in
nature and content; whereas it is totally unfriendly towards
American efforts to securing naval facilities, especially Diego
Garcia, in the region, "the Indian attitude tends to be soft
15towards the Soviet Union." If India really desires to have 
a "Zone of Peace" then it must endeavour to keep both the 
super-powers out of the Indian Ocean area to avoid any poss­
ibility of direct confrontation between the two.
India has at times, tried to minimise the Soviet presence 
in the area and grossly exaggerated the American intentions,
"Moreover, there is a lurking fear. .. ., that India indirectly
16promotes Russian naval activities in the Indian Ocean."
The Soviet Union would,endeavour to dominate the entire region 
especially the Persian Gulf to ensure a reasonable share
15. ibid. p.62.
16. Jackson,R. "Great Powers and the Indian Subcontinent" 
International Affairs, London, Vol.49 (1973), p.37
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of the wealth of the area, and would very much want to have
ports or port facilities in the warm waters of the region.
The Soviet union which arms and trains the Afghan military
forces has never given up its dreams of access to a warm water
port on the Arabian Sea. If "Pakhtunistan were ever to emerge...
it would probably provide the Russians with the corridor...
17to the coast."
This does not augur well for Pakistan, especially in view 
of the Afghan interests in NWFP and Baluchistan, and in this 
respect the Soviet interests direct or indirect cannot be 
ignored or dismissed,"only if Afghanistan, as a Soviet sat­
ellite, were able to further the cause of Pakhtunistan inciting
18the Pathans to open revolt against Pakistan," then the Soviet 
Union would be willing to lend help in this direction and seek 
the total dismemberment of Pakistan. The position has not 
remained so simple since a number of very important events 
have taken place, especially the creation of Bangladesh, and 
the Indo-Soviet involvement in the whole affair after the 
signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of August, 19 71.
Mar. Bhutto expressed his thoughts on the subject, "It 
was to a large extent Soviet Union's involvement in the sub­
continent which made possible India's invasion of East Pakistan... 
whatever motivated the U.S.S.R. to enter into this pact, it
certainly gave India the backing....to embark upon her armed 
19aggression."
The increased Soviet involvement and activities in the 
region, the close Soviet-Afghan co-operation and the increasing
Indo-Soviet collaboration is bound to adversely affect
17. The Guardian, London, 14.3.19 75
18. Cohen,S.B. Geography and Politics in a Divided World,
Methuen, 1964, p.202
19. Foreign Affairs, April, 1973, p.550
- 229 -
Pakistan's geopolitical interests directly clashed with those 
of the Soviet Union then there would be a concerted effort 
to subdue and even subjugate Pakistan. To counter any such 
move Pakistan would be obliged to seek greater and closer 
co-operation and understanding with China, Iran and other 
states of West Asia and the Persian'Gulf. In addition, Paki­
stan might be forced to have greater economic links with the 
United States, Japan and the Common Market. Pakistan would 
have to chalk out a very delicate balance without losing its 
self-respect or independence.
It ought to be made clear that in this day and age a 
small incident might become an international problem and threat­
en peace and security as such; and it would not be wrong to 
suggest that either America or Russia or both might be directly 
involved in such a situation. It is also clear here that the 
Indian Ocean is slowly but surely becoming a theatre of cold 
war and that both the Soviet and American interests are bound 
to clash. This dreaded thought is likely to occupy the Ameri­
can mind for quite some time, and therefore, persuade the 
Pentagon to stay its hand with regard to taking some kind of 
military action against the Arabs to secure the supply of oil.
In case of an Arab-Israeli detente the Russians would 
find it very difficult to secure any further inroads in the 
Arab world; the reverse of this scenario could also take place.
With this background in mind the strategic location of 
Pakistan cannot be underestimated and Pakistan can play an 
effective role in the geopolitical affairs of the region, 
"Pakistan's destiny is inevitably intertwined with that of
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the subcontinent...,her geopolitical position is not circum­
scribed by the subcontinent. There is a 371-mile-long border 
between Chinese Sinkiang and Pakistan-controlled Kashnir 
with its ancient silk route, and only Afghanistan's Wahkan 
Corridor...,divides the Soviet Union and Pakistan along 180 
miles. Situated at the head of the Arabian Sea, Pakistan 
flanks the entrance to the oil-rich Persian Gulf and is, there­
fore, of strategic importance to many countries of the Middle 
East....Moreover, Pakistan provides an overland passage from
Europe to the Indian Ocean, an area on which international
20attention is being increasingly centred."
The Dismemberment of Pakistan
At the time of the inception of Pakistan as an independent 
state, Islam was one of the most powerful elements in the 
composition of its people. The national leadership, however, 
failed to establish a stable political edifice, based upon 
consent and capable of reconciling the disparate tendencies.
The internal divisions, the geographical separation, and the 
cultural-linguistic distinctiveness accentuated the sense of 
relative socio-economic deprivation felt by the former East 
Pakistanis with respect to their compatriots in West Pakistan. 
The East Bengalis identified these inadequacies with the 
state-structure itself, whose tenuous unity was increasingly 
undermined by the constant tendency in Pakistan to centralise 
authority, especially since 1958, in the shape of military
20. Bhutto,Z.A. Foreign Affairs, April, 1973, p.553
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dictatorship. In 1969, the Ayub Regime was dissolved, and his 
successor General Yahya Khan (incidentally both the gentlemen 
have died) attempted to rehabilitate the principle of consent 
but by that time the situation had entirely changed and the poli­
tical concession was considered too little and too late.
The emergence of sub-nationalism (East Bengali nationalism) 
had gathered momentum in 1970, particularly after the devastations 
of the cyclone in the former East Pakistan. The break between 
the two wings could yet have been averted, had there evolved a 
constitutional system guaranteeing the East Bengalis access to 
power, and the reward of economic expansion and communal self- 
expression within the framework of a united Pakistan. Such a 
system could have attracted sympathy and support of the moderates 
right across the social and political spectrum in both the wings 
of the country, and the polarisation of forces could have been 
averted. This would also have discouraged the external vested 
interests from precipitating the events in the former East Pakistan.
The divergent interests, however, of the two main parties, 
at the time, especially after the 19 70 General Elections, left 
very little room to manoeuvre, and as such the two were heading 
towards a collision, undermining the unity of Pakistan as it emerged 
in 194 7. The flight of the refugees to India from the former 
East Pakistan furnished India with a golden opportunity to justi­
fy its unwarranted intervention and subsequent invasion with a 
view to dismembering Pakistan.
The hostility between the two neighbours was a well established 
fact, and their antagonism was expressed in the mutually incom­
patible principles upon which the two nations based themselves 
in 1947. The instinctive Indian attitude to the events in the 
former East Pakistan was discernible in its deep routed hostility 
to the very existence of Pakistan as an independent political
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entity.
The international reaction represented a fair description 
of the international power-politics, and the fundamental recon­
struction of the system as envisaged by the great powers, espec­
ially with regard to South Asia. The Soviet Union sympathised 
with the Indian point of view; France, United Kingdom and the 
United States refrained from condemning Pakistan; People's 
Republic of China condemned the Indian motives and activities 
and fully supported Pakistan's position.
A kind of rapprochment had been established between China 
and the United States which seemed to have opened new vistas 
for the international balance of power, and naturally, involved 
South Asia. Geopolitically the South Asian landmass represents
i
an area in which both China and Russia have shown their increased 
interest, in particular, since the Sino-Soviet rift and the sub­
sequent border clashes along the Ussuri River. According to 
J.R.V. Prescott (Boundaries and Frontiers, 1978, p.114), positional 
dispute between China and Russia over the location of the bound­
ary at the junction of Amur and the Ussuri, arose. The treaty 
in 1860 defined the boundary as following the Amur River to its 
junction with the River Ussuri, and then turning south along 
the Ussuri River. The crux of the problem is to decide the 
confluence of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. The Russians place it 
at Kazakevichevo (K'o-tsa-K'ai-wei-ch'ai-wo Shui-tao) while the 
Chinese put it at Khabarovsk. In short the Russians put it be­
tween two arms of the River Amur while the Chinese claim it 
between the two arms of the Ussuri River.
- 233 -
The rapid development of nuclear technology and its in­
herent dangers have obviously convinced these mighty neigh­
bours of the necessity to defuse the situation along their 
common borders, and to shift the area of their activities 
to the regions where the risk of direct confrontation is not 
so accute; South Asian sub-continent is an obvious choice.
The chances of involving this region have been tremendously 
increased since the Russians sent their forces into Afghanistan.
Until recently the Soviet Union has been very carefully 
excluded from the sub-continent, basically as a direct re­
sult of the deliberate policy followed by the British Empire, 
in creating the buffer zones, during the last quarter of the 
19th century ; the Wakhan region is a good example. This is 
a very narrow strip (at one point only seven miles wide) 
occupied by the Kirghiz of Afghanistan separating Pakistani 
held Kashmir and the Soviet Union; and as such there does 
not exist a direct overland link, to the annoyance of both 
the Indians and the Russians, between India and the Soviet 
Union. China, on the other hand, is geopolitically better 
placed since it has common borders with Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and India.
The geopolitical characteristics of the northwestern 
region of the sub-continent have largely influenced the 
pattern of the Sino-Soviet rivalry in the area. There is no 
denying the fact that the Soviet Union has enjoyed the Indian 
diplomatic support against China, but this has equally been 
neutralised by the close ties between China and Pakistan. To 
the annoyance of its neighbours Pakistan has not allowed the
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transit trade either between Russia.and India or between 
Afghanistan and India; and Pakistan at the same time dis­
associated itself from Brezhnev's concept of "Collective 
Security". This refusal, on the part of Pakistan, has com­
pelled the Soviet Union to rely on the distant sea routes 
to maintain its links with India.
The Indian pre-eminence would decisively be confirmed 
if and when Pakistan accepted the Brezhnev concept. Without 
Pakistan's co-operation, however, direct or indirect, the 
Indo-Soviet attempts to dominate the region, and to isolate 
China are likely to end in failure.
It would not be wrong to argue that if Pakistan represented 
Soviet Union's gateway to India, is is also the central point 
in the Chinese security system, for the reverse of the same 
argument. Pakistan as such is the crucial gap in what other­
wise would be a ring of hostile powers encircling China's 
most vulnerable salient. Pakistan has also provided China 
with useful outlets to vital geostrategic regions of West 
Asia, and the Karakoram Highway is the most vital link. This 
clearly establishes the fact that China is very actively in­
terested in the preservation of Pakistan's present territorial 
limits since China's security system is directly involved.
The opponents of Pakistan, in the past, have rejected 
the concept of "TWO NATIONS" on the basis of their paradoxical 
contention that the sub-continent was inhabited by one people 
but with different social, cultural, linguistic and religious 
values and affinities. These elements argued that the economic 
and political viability and validity of Pakistan was suspect
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and highly questionable, and therefore, it was bound to 
disintegrate. They apparently rejoiced at the dismemberment 
of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in 19 71, and con­
tended that the "Two Nations Theory" had been totally negated 
and demolished.
The break between East and West Pakistan did not, how­
ever, mean that Bangladesh was willing to be absorbed into 
India. The nascO.nt state very vociferously proclaims its 
independence, an independence which can only be predicated 
upon its didtinctive Muslim character? the Bangladeshi sec­
ularism was very short-lived, indeed. Secularism in the sense 
of tolerance and the rejection of theocracy is very much a 
part and parcel of the Islamic political culture.
The Chinese Premier, the late Chou En-Lai, stated in 
December 1971, "The fall of Dacca had laid completely bare 
the Indian expansionist's wild ambitions to annex Pakistan..., 
the fall of Dacca is definitely not a so-called"milestone" 
towards victory for the Indian aggressors, but the starting
2'point for endless strife on the South Asian sub-continent...."
The events in Bangladesh have largely substantiated
the main point of the argument, and the Soviet backed victory
of India over Pakistan, now looks hollow. Indian Hegemony
in South Asia is once again threatened by the emerging Muslim
unity. in fact, right from the outset, many Bangladeshis
have accused India of exploiting their country and treating
22
it as an Indian colony.
From the preceding argument it may be conluded that 
the raison d'etre-of Pakistan has not been demolished, and
21.Chou En-Lai, as reported by New China News Agency, 17.12.1971 
22.See Oren,S. After the Bangladesh Coups, The World Today, 
January 19 76, pp.18-20
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the present geopolitical disposition and the territorial 
limits of Pakistan have further strengthened its chances to 
survive as an independent political entity. Pakistan cannot 
be further dismembered without a massive covert or overt sub­
version or aggression. The present geostrategic location, 
size and compact territoriality of Pakistan have enhanced 
its chances to emerge as an important regional power.
Pakistan must make every effort to avoid taking sides 
in the field of power-politics, and should pursue a foreign 
policy which is consistent with its territorial integrity 
and political independence. Pakistan must not side with one 
great power to the detriment of its opponent. It is very 
heartening to note that Pakistan has eventually taken its 
legitimate position amongst the non-aligned nations. It is 
desirable to discuss in some detail, at this point in time, 
that India's own security and interests are very much inter­
twined with a strong and stable Pakistan, "India's security 
and interests are bound up with the issue of strong and stable
neighbours; if Pakistan, Ceylon,and Nepal are weak they will
23not be able to withstand outside pressure."
India was in 1947, and is today, the strongest local 
power; ignoring the Soviet Union and China, India could be 
classified as the most powerful state in the region. India 
is large and militarily strong, and by comparison Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal are small and weak, and there 
is no local balance, only India's military dominance. Precisely 
for this reason Pakistan, has from the beginning looked outside
2 3. Mrs Indira Gandhi, addressing a conference of Indian envoys 
from 2 8 Asian countries (New Delhi April, 1972)
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the South Asian sub-continent for equilibrium, "In 19 72 as
in 1947, tussle between centripetal and centrifugal forces,
tension about political fission and fusion, dominate the
international and internal politics of the countries of
South Asia. Politics and strategy are, closely entwined....
The geographically separated Pakistan of 1947 finally split
in 1971, and the governments of the two separate states of
Pakistan and Bangladesh are now both subject to severe tests
24of their capacity to survive...."
Peter Lyon (Strategy and South Asia: twenty five years on. 
International Journal 1972) states that the end of the British 
Imperial authority throughout South Asia in 1947-48 brought 
in its train the dismantling of a strategic system and new
political divisions and amalgamations. In the wake of India's
/ j ~  -
^9minant petition /practised a strategic frontier-zone policy
4-^ based on control of the "reverse slopes" of the land frontiers.
This was simply a frontier, or zonal, much more than it was 
a boundary, or linear, strategy; this policy, however, was 
expressed in the term of buffer states in the areas off the 
"reverse slopes" with military cantonments to their rear such 
as Quetta, Peshawar and Bannu-Kohat.
He further argues that the strategic calculus of ’the 
Himalayan region has changed so much since 1947, and India 
considers the central sector as the most vulnerable section 
of the Himalayan boundary and does not attach similar import­
ance to the northwest boundary whereas Pakistan regards its 
common border with China in Sinkiang as a major strategic
t* /.
2 4. Lyon,P. Strategy and South Asia: Twenty five years on, 
International Journal, 1972, pp.334-335
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and political asset. It is this area where the all important 
Karakoram Highway has been completed to the mutual benefit 
of China and Pakistan. Three empires met in the Pamirs 
i.e. China, India and Russia. Afghanistan was created as
C/. i  ’ -f
a buffer and the Wakhan region formed the panhandle that
Ik
Co.vkvvl; separated the Russian and the British Indian territory.
Russia as such was regarded as the real threat.
It would be interesting to know the real Indian reaction 
and the degree of interest that India shows to the Russian 
invasion of and presence in Afghanistan. So far India has 
been reluctant to either condemn or criticise the Russians, 
on the contrary, the Indians seemed to have sympathised 
with the Russian position over Afghanistan. In addition, 
the Indians believe that the Russians are in Afghanistan 
at the invitation of the Afghan governmentir. and that their 
stay is going to be temporary, but according to the Daily 
Telegraph, London (28.8.1980), "Soviet forces in Afghanistan 
have begun a wide-ranging military construction programme, 
indicating an occupation lasting several years, informed sources 
in New Delhi reported last night....The implication of the 
construction program is that the Russians believe they are 
in for a long stay in Afghanistan....One high level analysis 
in New Delhi is that the Russians may eventually find that 
they need as many as 400,000 men in Afghanistan, almost as 
many as the Americans had in Vietnam when fighting there 
was at its peak." It would be interesting to know as to how 
the Indians are going to react in such a situation.
The Sino-Indian border war of October 1962, and its 
immediate aftermath, confirmed and polarized the trends in
- 239 -
great-power relations in South Asia which confirmed the
developments of the late 1950's. Sino-Indian relations
became deeply affected and the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai slogan
was lost and forgotten. The Soviet Union chose to side
with India, and in the wake of these developments the late
President Ayub Khan unfolded his foreign policy objectives,
"to establish normal relations with the four major powers
25involved in Asia without antagonising any one of them."
This opened the way towards ripening friendship between 0 
Pakistan and China.
Peter Lyon clearly states that the very considerable flow 
of armaments both from the West and the Soviet Union after 
the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, was most probably the 
major precipitating factor in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. 
India used the weapons against Pakistan, although these weap­
ons were meant to bolster its defences in the North Eastern 
Frontier Agency; once again these well equipped forces were 
used against Pakistan, especially against its eastern half, 
and all Pakistan's protestations fell on deaf ears, in spite 
of the fact that Phkistan had been given repeated assurances 
that no arms would be supplied to India without first con­
sulting rp«aki st an (no such consultations-took place), and 
then Pakistan was repeatedly assured that these weapons will 
not be used, but the fact of the matter is that India used 
these weapons against Pakistan,and Pakistan's allies did 
nothing to give any useful practical assistance.
History has taught very useful lessons to the leaders of 
Pakistan. All those bilateral and multilateral defensive 
arrangements were counter-productive, in fact, detrimental to 
the very interests of Pakistan. Pakistan must have strong 
25. Khan,M.A., "Friends not Masters", p.118
- 240 -
ties with the Islamic world in general and the Arabs in 
particular with Pakistan it has cultural, religious and 
economic ties.
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